Falla obliga a tomar medidas antisísmicas en ampliación

EXISTEN 5 FALLAS EN EL CANAL DE PANAMA, PERO 1 ES LA MAS VULNERABLE

Falla obliga a tomar medidas antisísmicas en ampliación
Las nuevas esclusas se están construyendo con un criterio más exigente que el actual y están diseñadas para resistir un movimiento telúrico de hasta 7 grados en la escala de Richter.

Ereida Prieto
ereida.prieto@epasa.com
PA-DIGITAL

Trabajos. El peligro de sismo se tomó en cuenta para los estudios de diseño del proyecto de expansión del Canal. La última ruptura de la falla de Pedro Miguel causó el devastador terremoto de Panamá Viejo, el 2 de mayo de 1621.

Una falla tectónica, ubicada al oeste del Canal de Panamá, hizo que se tomaran "criterios más estrictos" para la construcción del Tercer Juego de Esclusas, reveló el vicepresidente de Ingeniería y Administración de Programas de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), Jorge Luis Quijano.

Quijano dijo que esta falla, con "potencial sísmico", tiene una profundidad de 15 kms. y su longitud de 50 kilómetros "podría extenderse más hacia el sur, bajo el mar".

La falla, que está ubicada en Pedro Miguel, sigue por Howard, pasa por las esclusas de Miraflores, luego por donde se están construyendo las represas y el canal de acceso a la nueva esclusa, hasta llegar a Gamboa.

De acuerdo con consultores de Inglaterra, Noruega, Canadá y Suiza, contratados por la ACP, de producirse un sismo sería entre 6 a 7 grados en la escala de Ritcher, por lo que se "está construyendo para esa magnitud".

"Todo se está considerando en la construcción, como la colocación de unos sellos de arcillas que se autorreparan y pueden soportar movimientos de hasta tres metros laterales y un salto de un metro, en los casos extremos", indicó Quijano.

Aclaró que "no hay ninguna señal ni evidencia de un sismo inminente".

Ampliación.
El gerente de Ingeniería de la ACP, Luis Domingo Alfaro, aseguró que "no ha habido un impacto real en el valor final de la ampliación", pero han hecho "ajustes a las alineaciones y estructuras para ahorrar en la excavación por razones geográficas, recomendado por los consultores".

Explicó que debido a la falla, las especificaciones antisísmicas "son superiores a las estructuras existentes", ya que se diseñó para "un sismo extremo".

"Reconocemos la falla que tenemos en el Canal que no es nueva, ya que hay un mapa geológico que se conoce desde 1938".

"Si tenemos una falla en un lugar sensible del Canal, por eso tenemos que tomar las previsiones", advirtió.

Alfaro dijo que hay que recordar que otra falla conocida como el Cinturón del Formado del Norte "está en casi todo el país desde Colombia hasta Costa Rica y ha producido terremotos superior a los 7 grados en la escala de Ritcher".

Estudios.
El administrador del Canal, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, giró instrucciones a la División de Ingeniería para que se revisen de "manera integral todas las estructuras viejas" de la vía interoceánica, incluyendo la represa del lago Gatún, para determinar si "requieren medidas correctivas".

Recomendaron que para la construcción del Metro, se incorporen todas las medidas antisísmicas, tomando en consideración que las construcciones elevadas son más inestables.

Entre el 2005 y 2007 se realizaron estudios a esta falla, que revelaron que el movimiento más reciente fue en 1621 y afectó a la ciudad capital.

"Hemos compartido esta información con el Instituto de Geociencias de la Universidad de Panamá y el Comité Consultivo del Reglamento Estructural de Panamá".

Alfaro reveló que el funcionamiento del Canal "dependerá de qué tan severo sea el sismo", ya que están construyendo para "salvar vidas".

"Hemos tomado los pasos prudentes para asegurarnos, por eso hemos diseñado las nuevas esclusas con un criterio más exigente que el actual", resaltó.

El sismo de mayor magnitud fue de 7.9° en la escala de Ritcher. Provocó un maremoto en San Blas el 7 de septiembre de 1882.




14 comentarios
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Me remito al ny times el cual indica que a la medianoche el 1 de octubre de 1913 un año antes de inaugurar el canal se experimentó un fuerte movimiento sísmico el cual originaba presumiblemente en la falla de portobelo el cual se estimaba sobre los 7 grados escala richter. Sin embargo no se registraron grietas en las esclusas de gatun donde se sintió con más fuerza. También se debe mencionar el gran sismo de panamá 7. 9 grados del 7 septiembre de 1882 el cual destruyo la fachada de la catedral y que el ing. De leseps ordenó que la repararan rápidamente para que los accionistas de la compañía del canal no se llegaran a enterar de tal noticia.
Oscar sogandares correo privado 25-04-10 [12:37]

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Espero que a pesar de salas los edificios esten bien construidos, sino ya podemos pensar lo que sucedera.
Ines ines@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [12:14]

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Cual sera el nivel de resistencia del corredor sur ante un sismo de categoria 7, podra resistir o se vera seriamente afectado, la falla existe, por lo tanto la posibilidad de un sismo es real no es un invento, antes de usar el dinero de los viejitos asegurados, consideren este hecho.
Angel angel@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [11:20]

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Magnificos comentarios, ya el panamamerica en el confabulario habia advertido sobre el riesgo que tendria esta inversion de la compra del corredor sur, este informe de la acp constituye plena prueba de lo riesgosa que es ejecutar esta inversion, de ocurrir algo y comprar los corredores con el dinero de los asegurados, se establece el conocimiento de los funcionarios que participen en esta transaccion del alto riesgo de la inversion, por ello se hacen mas responsable de lo que ocurra los funcionarios que en el participen, mejor es que se vayan asesorando bien desde ahora.
Fulvio fulvio@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [9:25]

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Acertada opinion de efrain, pues con este informe pagado por la acp y que se debe publicar completo, se debe suspender la idea de compra de corredores por parte de css, pues es inversion de muy alto riesgo para los proximos años y sus puentes y calzadas sobre el mar no soportarian un terremoto del poder indicado, perdiendose todo el dinero de los asegurados. Al menos que reconozcan un error humano en interpretacion de esta falla considerada capaz de generar terremoto de magnitud 7 similar al de haiti y a quema ropa.
No importa correo privado 25-04-10 [9:12]

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Lo que sucedio en prado del este, la naturaleza cobro lo suyo y boli pariente tuvo que responder ante la justicia, si sucede lo mismo con el corredor sur y lo compran con dinero de los asegurados, los que participen de esta decision tendran que asumir sus responsabilidades, conato, apede, camara de comercio, suntracs, educadores, y pueblo en general tendran que estar atentos y las advertencias deben ser publicas para que no evadan responsabilidades juridicas, sociales y morales, esto podria general un escandalo mayor que el envenamiento de los asegurados.
Simon simon@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [9:09]

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Estoy de acuerdo en que se tomen medidas antisísmicas para proteger nuestra principal megaconstrucción y que esto se haga usando tecnología moderna. Pero cuestiono los datos de sismos que ocurrieron hace cientos de años, ya que el primer sismógrafo moderno fue inventado en 1855. Alguien puede aclarar esto?.
Observador correo privado 25-04-10 [9:03]

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Definitivamente que el panamono se identifica con gentuza pesimista y patetica q cree q todo lo sabe y se lo merece. Solo hay q leer a "mundo alreves" esos viven con un mojon pegado en el ano q le mantiene la amargura fresca. Para ellos cada ladron juzga con su corrupta mente. Todo es destilar pesimismo y agrura, como detestan a su propia gente! gracias a dios "mainor" felicita. Yo tambien felicito!.
Para "mundo al reves correo privado 25-04-10 [9:02]

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"mundo al reves" y "no importa" con individuos como ustedes, dios nos salve.
Libre correo privado 25-04-10 [8:56]

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Si al corredor sur en la parte marina sufre un desastre y lo compran con dinero de los viejitos asegurados quien responde por los danos, esto debe quedar claro antes de hacer esta inversion, y se deben responsabilizar de esta compra funcionarios con nombres propios , apellidos y numeros de cedula, para posteriomenten no esquiven sus obligaciones civiles y penales


Nota extraída de: http://www.pa-digital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/nacion-interna.php?story_id=913146&ch=1#ixzz0m8BK0JRo
Ver más noticias en el Panamá América

El costo ambiental de ampliar el Canal de Panamá, LP. Abr. 19

DEFORESTACIÓN contra COMPENSACIÓN

El costo ambiental de ampliar el Canal de Panamá

En 2006 los panameños decidieron ampliar el Canal de Panamá. Implícitamente también aprobaron la tala de 470 hectáreas de bosque.

HUELLA. En la medida que avanza el proyecto de ampliación del Canal una zona boscosa desaparece. LA PRENSA/ Gabriel Rodríguez1364149

JOSE ARCIA
jarcia@prensa.com

Con la detonación de explosivos en cerro Paraíso el 3 de septiembre de 2007 se iniciaron los trabajos de ampliación del Canal de Panamá. El hecho también marcó el inicio de la destrucción de 470 hectáreas de bosque secundario, de las cuales 332 ya sucumbieron por el paso de los tractores.

Hasta ahora, la ampliación de la vía interoceánica también ha representado la destrucción de 22 hectáreas de mangles.

El proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá tiene un “costo ecológico desde el punto de vista de vegetación”, señala el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EIA).

“La duración del impacto será larga dado que las áreas verdes en la zona donde será removida la vegetación no se recuperarán por mucho tiempo”, señala el EIA.

Los efectos de la obra no se limitan a la devastación de bosques. El ensanche de la ruta, la construcción de las tinas de reciclaje de agua y del nuevo juego de esclusas también traen consigo la erosión de suelos y el desvío de los ríos Grande y Cocolí.

Son las consecuencias ambientales de un proyecto que fue aprobado en un referendo, de forma mayoritaria: un 76% de los panameños se manifestó a favor y 21.94% lo rechazó. En esa ocasión –22 de octubre de 2006–, 905 mil 445 panameños acudieron a las urnas, de los 2 millones 132 mil 842 habilitados para votar.

Cuatro años después y el proyecto en pleno desarrollo los ambientalista no están fiscalizando la obra. Félix Wing, director de asesoría legal del Centro de Incidencia Ambiental (Ciam), admite que no está pendiente del tema. Mir Rodríguez, director de Almanaque Azul, indicó lo mismo.

Resarcimiento

Por la tala de las 332 hectáreas de bosque secundario, la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) ha pagado $3 millones a la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (Anam) como compensación ecológica.

La ACP también ha desembolsado la suma de $455 mil 800 a la Autoridad de Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá (ARAP), en concepto de compensación ecológica por las 22 hectáreas de manglar afectadas en el Pacífico.

De igual forma desarrolla un programa de reforestación en parques nacionales, tanto en la ciudad capital como en el interior del país (Ver mapa).

Arizmendis Montoya y Abdiel Delgado, especialista ambiental y jefe de proyecto de reforestación de la ACP, respectivamente, son los responsables de que se cumpla con el plan de mitigación, que incluye el plan de reforestación. Además, son los encargados de garantizar que se realicen los inventarios de especies de las áreas que son devastadas.

Sobre el proceso, los especialistas explicaron que antes de iniciar el desmonte del bosque el lugar tiene que ser saneado, es decir, se realiza un inventario de los animales para su reubicación. Hasta la semana pasada se habían rescatado y reubicado 2 mil 353 animales, entre los cuales había osos perezosos, monos, culebras, armadillos, iguanas, caimanes y puercoespines.

Hasta la fecha se han reforestado 450 hectáreas, mientras que otras 65 serán reforestadas en lo que resta del año, para completar 515, aseguró Montoya.

Delgado, por su parte, dijo que esta semana se debe abrir la licitación para la reforestación por la afectación de la zona de manglar. Precisó que en coordinación con la ARAP se escogió la desembocadura del río Chiriquí Viejo, en Chiriquí.

Dificultades

En cuanto a las áreas donde se realizarán las reforestaciones por las zonas de bosque afectadas, los funcionarios explicaron que la Anam es la que decide en qué lugar se harán.

En este proceso han tenido algunas dificultades.

Delgado explicó que este año suspendieron un proyecto de reforestación en La Yeguada, provincia de Veraguas, por problemas de tenencia de tierra.

Es importante, comentó, que la reforestación se realice en zonas que no presenten conflictos territoriales, para garantizar el proyecto. Ahora, comentó, la Anam debe ubicar otro lugar para completar la cantidad de terreno que se debe reforestar por las 332 hectáreas que hasta la fecha han sido devastadas. El compromiso es reforestar el doble de lo que se destruye y con una especie nativa, enfatizó.

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ENFOQUE

No hay fiscalización ciudadana

MIR RODRÍGUEZ*
panorama@prensa.com

OPINIÓN. El resultado del referendo demuestra que a pesar de toda la plata que gastó el Estado en propaganda patriotera, la mayoría de los panameños no sentimos vinculación ni compromiso con el Canal. Pero al ganar el sí los sectores anti expansión quedamos desarticulados: el referendo le calló la boca a los ambientalistas. Pareciera que tras esa consulta los ecologistas ya dimos por perdido ese caso y nos estamos concentrando en atender el asalto sin los precedentes que están sufriendo los ecosistemas de Panamá en los últimos años.

Pero, las razones por las que hicimos campaña por el no a la ampliación siguen vigentes. Al final, las minas a cielo abierto y las hidroeléctricas gigantes forman parte de la misma lógica desarrollista, irracional y elitista de la expansión del Canal, una fórmula que ha contribuido en buena medida a producir las enormes desigualdades de este país.

*Almanaque Azul

La ampliación del Canal de Panamá (Panama News)

La ampliación del Canal de Panamá
por Bruno Peron Loureiro --- Barómetro Internacional

La opulencia de las partes en pugna crece mientras padecemos en América Latina de los peores males. La ampliación del Canal de Panamá, que une el Océano Pacífico al Mar Caribe se inició en 2007 y está prevista para finalizarse en 2014 con un costo de 5,25 millardos de dólares.

Navío de varios países atraviesan el canal, mientras Chile disputa con Bolivia por la intención de este país de tener un acceso al Pacífico. Todas las barreras se levantan cuando el asunto nos incumbe solamente a nosotros, los latinoamericanos.

Los primeros navíos cruzaron el Canal de Panamá en 1914, desde entonces la mayor parte de ellos han sido buques comerciales o de guerra. La construcción del canal se inició con los franceses en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, pero luego fue retomada por los pangericanos (estadounidenses).

El proyecto sufrió reveses. Enfermedades tropicales, sobre todo la fiebre amarilla y la malaria, afectaron a los trabajadores y provocaron la muerte de millares de ellos. Parte considerable de la mano de obra vino de las islas caribeñas. Inversores de traje y corbata de Nueva York colocaron el dinero pero no se arremangaron siquiera.

El gobierno de Panamá asumió el control del canal recién en 1999 a través de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), que es una empresa pública y autónoma. Inmediatamente, en 2001 surgió la propuesta de expansión.

Aunque las bananas y el café sean los principales productos agrícolas de Panamá, la renta generada por el canal es muy importante para los números de la economía del país. Desde 1998, el precio por el uso del canal aumentó en un 70%.

Panamá tiene una de las tasas de crecimiento económico más altas de América Latina. Sin embargo, el valor recogido por los impuestos es del 11% de la renta de los contribuyentes, lo que significa una tasa baja, comparada con la media de América Latina. A guisa de comparación, en el Brasil la tributación alcanza a más del 40% de la renta, lo cual arranca las vísceras de los trabajadores, que todavía deben pagar los servicios básicos que el Estado no retorna.

Existe sin embargo un desfase entre el potencial laboral de los panameños y la renta de 1/5 del producto interno bruto generada por el canal, que acaba siendo una herramienta de país pujante para la reducción de los costos de flete. Esta bonanza se mezcla con la enorme desigualdad en la distribución de la renta, que se hace notoria en la bajísima remuneración de la mano de obra de baja calificación y en la concentración laboral de los panameños en el sector agrícola.

Los productos pangericanos y japoneses de alto valor agregado, como computadores y otras piezas electrónicas pasan por el mismo canal por el que se desea que cruce el carbón de Colombia y la soya y minería de hierro de Brasil. En esta pista de doble sentido se mueven por un lado productos pomposos que no tienen ningún sentido útil y por otro las joyas agrícolas latinoamericanas que así pueden tener mejor acceso al mercado asiático y a la costa oeste pangericana.

La economía es un factor sobresaliente en la lucha por un espacio mundial, en detrimento del desarrollo humano. El intercambio cultural y la globalización desafortunadamente han sido pensados sólo en función del lucro que generan.

Se habla cada vez más de desarrollo sustentable. El presidente panameño, Ricardo Martinelli presiona por la aprobación de un tratado de libre comercio con la Pangérica (EEUU). Su mejor argumento es que Panamá suma esfuerzos en la lucha internacional contra el narcotráfico.

Panamá tiene poco que perder con la expansión del canal, por el que pasarán más y mayores navíos y la renta podrá aumentar en los cofres públicos. El quid de la cuestión mientras tanto, es como beneficiará a los panameños y que lección obtiene Nuestramérica de ello.

Desconfío de que los inversores del Norte tengan más para ganar con la ampliación del Canal de Panamá que nosotros, los latinoamericanos que nos hemos especializado en vender lo que no sabemos aprovechar, como el gas, el petróleo y el sudor de nuestros pueblos.

A Con to Beat all Cons: The Panama Canal Expansion

A Con to Beat all Cons: The Panama Canal Expansion

by: Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer March 15th , 2010

　

A new lane is to be added to The Panama Canal -- one to handle ships that are larger than what can fit into the two lanes the US built a hundred years ago. That is what was told to the people of Panama when they were asked to give the go-ahead vote for its expansion.

Concurrently, shipping companies and ports abroad apparently continue with the impression that, not one bigger lane, but two, are to be added to the canal in fairly short succession.

The first problem the project's "planners" had to overcome was how to obtain enough water to supply just one bigger lane, never mind two.

When the Panamanian people were informed that adjacent watersheds were to be incorporated -- which meant land would be expropriated and people displaced -- the public outcry was hastily appeased by increasing the number of water-saving tanks beside each lock chamber (of the planned third lane that the public was aware of) from two to three. With that modification, and without making mention of plans for yet a fourth lane and its water needs, the project's promoters got the go-ahead vote.

Thus, it would seem that there is no intention of honoring the Panamanian people's desire that the canal expansion not include the incorporation of more watersheds.

Money is obviously the driver of this whole affair. With some 36 transits a day that on average pay about $0.25 million each, which is about 10 times what the US charged for doing the same, there are upwards of 3 billion yearly reasons behind ensuring the success of this game.

　

What the Popular Vote was About

Conditions set in the canal treaties and during the negotiations for the US turn-over of the Canal to the people of Panama, were intended to safeguard the interests of both parties and to protect the watershed. Defining the watershed protection plan was an inter-disciplinary international effort that involved prestigious specialists in water-resources management.

After the vote, the apparent lack of concern demonstrated by all those governments involved in the canal turn-over preparations -- as development plans within the former Canal Zone have unfolded -- has shocked most of the knowledgeable observing public. Precisely what was not supposed to happen -- the takeover of the canal by special interests -- is what has happened. And, in effect, its watershed has been invaded for uses other than those contemplated prior to turnover.

What appears to have happened is that, when this canal expansion was announced, the players in charge around the globe were the same ones in charge leading up to the financial collapse from which the world is now trying to recover. And, considering how the present players are rewarding those responsible for that debacle, any change to the "status quo" in Panama is most improbable.

　

Tactics Employed in Setting-Up the Popular Vote

Prior to the vote, a series of public forums, or town meetings, were held across the country. More like a promotional campaign than a format for discussing plan particulars, these forums were carefully orchestrated to praise the job-producing and money-making virtues of the project while steering clear of any technical discussions that might derail the gravy-train.

The forums included pre-selected panelist representing the "for" and "against" expansion camps, all of whom kept to the script. When pressured by individuals in the audience to answer direct questions of a technical nature, the first action was to brush the question off as a secondary issue. If an individual persisted, that person's competence was put in question, insinuating that the questioner likely lacked the necessary depth in the subject to fully understand the answer...a tactic meant to belittle and shut the person up.

If the person was clearly knowledgeable, the deflection tactic then used was to state that a presenter qualified to answer that question was not available at the forum, but would be at a subsequent forum, which never happened.

Added to that, following the canal expansion plan's announcement to the nation, Panama's Society of Engineers and Architects (known in Panama by the acronym: SPIA) declared that it would perform a technical assessment of the plan. What the SPIA's leadership didn't realize was that political maneuvers were already afoot to derail their assessment plan and it never happened.

In addition to technical discussions at forums being effectively shut down -- an act that alone should invalidate the vote as being undemocratic -- along with the country's only qualified scientific society's plan to assess the project's technical merits being canceled, the Panamanian government officially declared that it favored going ahead with the project. That the government took sides, and openly campaigned for the go-ahead vote, was grossly undemocratic.

Furthermore, the ballot asked only whether or not the people of Panama wanted the canal to be enlarged. Any person with a working knowledge of engineering and business would be crazy to answer no to that question; the canal is a good business with great potential. The problem is that Panamanian politicians have construed the "go-ahead" vote as license for their class to "divi up" the US gift to the Panamanian people among themselves. Similarly, it was taken to give license to the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) to be independent of the nation, accountable to no one, and with the power to reach out and grab anything it wants when it decides it needs it.

What kind of a vote was that?

The story typically told at the start of the public forums was how the proposed water-saving side-tank lock design, now 140 year old, was "re-discovered" by the ACP. They claimed that the method had been overlooked by the US during its years of searching for lock designs that used less water. That feat of uncovering it -- touted as the ACP's crowning achievement -- together with the canal making more money under its management formed the basis for raising the ACP to the status of canal experts.

Historical facts, however, contradict the claim that the US failed to identify side-tank locks. All the locks the US built in the Panama Canal actually include more efficient combinations of water-saving methods than the combination of methods included in the side-tank locks planned for this expansion.

Truth be told, the ACP has never built a canal. This first crack at it, began with a failure to recognize why the canal's original designers did not use side-tanks. As for making more money, when running a monopoly, not much expertise is required to increase income by raising tolls.

What makes the ACP "canal experts"? Could it be expert dissemination of self-promoting propaganda?

It gets even better. The Canal Expansion's Master Plan does not mention -- much less compare -- any concepts applying other combinations of recognized water-reducing methods and lock operating procedures; not even those that exist in the US built Panama Canal locks. What is presented in the Master Plan would embarrass any self-respecting engineer.

Amazingly, prior to and up to voting time the Master Plan did not even include an engineering basis upon which lock designs could be developed and compared. That suggests that the "planners" of this monumental engineering project were just "winging-it" to get things rolling.

Before the vote was taken there were promises made that evaluations of details, which the ACP "did not have the money to do prior to the vote", would be faithfully done. That hasn't happened.

All of this suggests that the true purpose of the expansion has been achieved with respect to the construction work and those who will profit from it.

Seeing beyond the hype, the goal of this project does not appear to be to endow this important piece of world infrastructure with a first-class addition, one that maximizes return-on-investment by using resources optimally, while impacting third parties and the environment the least.

　

What They Didn't Tell Us

Based on observations along the way, it would seem that those who put together the expansion plan were oblivious to the water-saving capabilities the US built into the Panama Canal's system.

This became apparent after examining what transpired during the extended dry season that occurred immediately prior to the expansion plan's announcement, at which time cargo was unloaded from ships and railed across the Isthmus -- in order to transit ships at shallower draft -- followed by reloading at the other end.

Although the ACP was made aware of the canal's water-saving capabilities soon after that offloading and reloading fiasco, their existence has never been acknowledged, much less their use. But clearly these are now used as dry season transits have tended to take longer since then, and that unusual lock operations have been seasonally observed.

Recognized at the outset that water-saving operations take extra time and reduce the number of daily transits, the original canal's US designers included a plan to add a reservoir in the near future (today's Madden Dam and Lake) to avoid having to use the notably slower water-saving manipulations. To save some money, US politicians of the day eliminated one of the two culverts that were to be in the center-wall of the locks. Designers had included them, because water could have been manipulated markedly faster with two instead of one.

Although only the simplest procedures were used thereafter by the US canal operators, the water-saving capabilities of each of the locks were tested in the canal's early days, as witnessed by many canal employees at the time. Many passed the knowledge down.

The planned third lane is to have three steps at each end of the canal, like the locks the US built. Steps can be used to reduce water use, to manage structural limitations, and/or to handle elevation changes throughout a waterway. With steps of equal height, as is the case in Panama, the same volume of water can be used step-to-step in raising or lowering ships, resulting in less water being used.

In addition, the US built locks have paired lanes, the parallel chambers of which are laterally connected by pipes with valves. That permits water in this two-lane lock design to be drained from one chamber into its adjacent pair to fill it half-way, effectively cutting water-use in half. With side-tank locks, on the other hand, two tanks are required beside each chamber to do the same thing.

Those tanks are each as wide and as long as a chamber -- and must be piped individually to the chamber. They do nothing more than receive, hold and return water; whereas the chambers of paired-lane locks both handle ships and save water. Furthermore, paired-lane locks have fewer pipes and require fewer water movements to achieve it.

Among the Panama Canal's US built locks, is one single-step paired-lane lock unit -- the Pedro-Miguel locks -- that can raise and lower ships using 25% of the water normally used. In addition to saving water by laterally draining it from one chamber to its pair, a second ship can enter each of the chambers after the first ships traveling in the opposite direction exit, thus using just 25%.

This significantly outperforms the planned side-tank locks, which will use 40% of the water normally used per transit at each step.

　

More About Those Better Lock Options

If the canal expansion were reconfigured to use Pedro-Miguel style locks, a two-step system that uses about 13% less water than the three-step system planned by the ACP would result. This paired-lane system would be comprised of two single-step units at each end of the canal that have a short channel between them, similar to today's Miraflores Lake.

For the same money, instead of just doubling the canal's capacity with the planned three-step third lane, it can be tripled with a two-step paired-lane system that adds a third and a fourth lane. (Lock bids show that two more chambers would cost about the same as the planned 18 tanks.)

With the ACP's plan, tripling the canal's capacity requires the addition of a fourth lane that costs as much as the third, added to which more watershed must be acquired and prepared, adding yet more cost; not to mention that doing so goes solidly against the wishes of the people of Panama.

The beauty of the paired-lane option, besides fulfilling the people's wishes, is that it occupies less space than the planned third lane. With two lanes in the space of one, the space for the planned fourth lane can be reserved for a fifth and a sixth lane of this more efficient option.

And, if the right locks are built now, today's watershed can supply the future operation of all six! To do that would require operating the locks the US built in their maximum water-saving mode to fully supply the new lanes, while reducing their transits to no less than three fifths of normal.

(Note that this "borrowing" of water is apparently already contemplated in what is planned.)

The new lock efficiency needed to accomplish that is attained by adding a pair of tanks to each of the Pedro-Miguel style lock units, which reduces their water-use to 17% from their "normal" 25% minimum volume per transit.

Using locks outfitted in that manner would result in a new system that uses 43% less water per transit than obtainable with the planned side-tank system.

　

Minimizing Cost and Risk

The Pedro-Miguel system with tanks provides, by far, the least expensive way to minimize the risk of running short of water and the best way to get the most out of the present canal expansion effort. With it and the water available in today's watershed, the canal's transit capacity can be more than quadrupled at its maximum potential.

In contrast, for greater cost and with more impacts, as was noted earlier, the planned expansion will only about triple the canal's capacity. What is worse, it will add unnecessary risks.

The first point to remember is that fewer ships will transit the planned system than the equally priced, simpler, and more efficient Pedro-Miguel style system. It will also cost more to use: two ships will end up paying the toll that could transit three.

The second point to remember is that the planned system has a lot more operating parts and will require many more operations to complete a transit than otherwise. Consequently, maintenance costs will be higher and breakdowns will occur more often. That adds expense and risk.

Most importantly, what is now planned introduces a new -- and unnecessary -- risk of losing the entire canal. It requires an elevated channel to bypass Miraflores Lake, a lake that "bridges" known faults. An earthquake could fail a dike that is to be built across those faults.

While the ACP insists the seismic risk in that area is low, the French experienced a substantial quake there. In light of that, the US wisely decided to add Miraflores Lake.

Why take that risk now? Why put worldwide ports and shipping businesses in jeopardy when -- without that risk and for the same cost -- simpler two-lane locks could be built that would handle more transits? Besides tripling capacity, the investment could be paid off much sooner.

In short, a two-step paired-lane system has no unknown or risky gadgets, transits more, costs less, and causes the least impact to others. With it, truly sustainable development is possible.

A system styled after the Pedro-Miguel Locks could easily be used in place of what is planned, considering that its parts and operations are all known and in use. In addition to the benefits already noted, this system would also avoid the excessive intrusion of salt into Gatun Lake through the planned locks. The lake between the lock steps will serve as a barrier to salt intrusion, as Miraflores Lake proves at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal.

　

Unmasking the Con

Considering all that's been noted above, and years of independent study and analysis since the expansion of the Panama Canal was announced, it truly appears as if this construction project is being driven by charlatans looking to transfer canal wealth as quickly as possible into the pockets of family and friends in “ typical banana-republic style”.

In order to effect that transfer of wealth, acceptance of the canal expansion plan itself first had to be gained. Knowing that key concerns had to be satisfied -- regarding water conservation, environmental protection, human rights, animal rights, etc. -- promotional efforts declared them to be of great importance to the project. However, claims that due attention has been given to these concerns are not given credence by deeds.

Actually coming up with reasonably good solutions for the various challenges of the project does not appear to have ever been a project goal. This conclusion is based on project-related actions and statements, or lack thereof, as the case may be. With no one higher up holding the feet of those really in charge to the fire to put things right, they can do -- and have done -- as they please.

In this allegedly democratic republic the media regularly focuses on how the people don't have a say because the judicial system serves the state, not the people. That, in fact, is a stated reason the US declined to sign the most recent attempt at a "free" trade agreement between the two countries.

By what can be seen and surmised, there are many issues with respect to the canal that have been poorly handled, or simply ignored, and choices made that make no sense.

The bidding processes alone speak volumes about the views on ethics and how doing things right is not likely even on the project leadership's list of concerns. A closer look at which companies have “won” the dry digging and the lock construction bids -- while considering their family ties -- says it all.

Anyone who fancies participating in bids for canal-related work -- or any other work down there for that matter -- should understand that the playing field is not level. The common third world practice of requesting bids from competent firms just to obtain ideas and “how-to”, with no intent to award them work, but rather to obtain that input for the "winning" bidder, often family, is not alien to Panama.

To downplay the fact that "planners" and promoters apparently got what they were after without bothering to do real engineering, propaganda to this day relentlessly trumpets the virtues of this "great and well-planned project" ostensibly to keep up the show and all the side businesses that have sprung up in concert.

(Some of those side businesses are, in themselves, no laughing matter; and many like them -- which are most unfriendly to the locals -- are in operation throughout Latin-America.)

The fact that reputable consortia were bidding on the locks was, in effect, being characterized in the news releases as somehow validating the lock choice. The consortia, however, were not charged with investigating and proposing alternative systems; they were charged with proposing solutions to the challenges of the pre-defined system and providing construction cost estimates.

The fact that the bidding process had to be extended several times for bidders to be able to come up with ways around numerous problems with the plan -- problems that should have been resolved during the design selection and pre-engineering phase -- naturally did not receive press.

As an example of just how effective the propaganda continues to be, many people still parrot what they've heard about how transparently the bidding process was managed. Being told that they should feel honored by the fact that such fine and reputable consortia had vied for the opportunity to design and build their canal's great new locks was lapped up by them.

　

Where This Leaves "Joe Public"

To this day the general public remains clueless to what was, and is, really going on.

Einstein once theorized that just two things seemed infinite: the universe and human stupidity; although he wasn't absolutely positive about the universe. This would seem to support his theory.

Panamanians are not the only ones that have been taken in by this sophisticated con. Even before the Panamanian public was aware of what was afoot, project promoters had apparently wined and dined their way into the hearts of canal clients around the world -- spending money that was not yet theirs to spend -- gaining the confidence of their "clients"; all the while refining the game. Once they got the vote, any questionable conduct there may have been became irrelevant.

The con artists have, for all intents, won the game.

It would seem that these new canal owners see no need to bother with maximizing efficency to make more money, as to get more they need only tighten the squeeze on Joe Public, who will not be able to do a thing against their monopoly. Nor do they project a need to responsibly minimize the canal's load on the environment, as impacts to it probably won't become a problem until after they are dead. They will undoubtedly improve details that threaten to delay the flow of money into waiting pockets, but not likely ones negatively effecting efficiency and/or the environment.

That is, unless those using the waterway or those bearing the ultimate costs -- Joe Public -- take action now to change the outcome.

While improving the canal for the benefit of future generations appears irrelevant to their goal (which seemingly is to get very rich, very quick, and die happy), a good time to put a stop to the con would be now -- before it becomes virtually impossible once cast in concrete!

However, as the canal's new owners likely see it, their monopoly will not be challenged in their lifetime, so they are sitting pretty. Disasters left to future generations are of no concern. They are takers, and they are taking us all to the proverbial cleaners.

The con that beats all cons has been run, having successfully used public funds to fleece suckers the world over.

This historical feat will live forever in infamy.