Save the Cruces Trail and Panama Canal Watershed

Miraflores Lake Bypass Minimizes Transit Time at a Big Cost

2011-08-31T11:15:00.000-07:00

www.chagres.com

by Bert G. Shelton, Professional Engineer & Research Scientist August 25, 2011

During a series of short presentations by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) seen on U-tube last week, the rumored reason for merging the three steps planned for the Pacific end of the canal into a single lock unit – bypassing Miraflores Lake – was made fact.

In today's canal, Miraflores Lake separates the top step of the locks from the other two to avoid building critical structures on unstable ground crossed by a system of active faults. In the prior expansion plan it was also included for that reason.

Yet, apparently the choice to exclude Miraflores Lake was made to reduce transiting time through the new lock configuration by about an hour.

Today, with Miraflores Lake included, Canal Residence Time is typically 27 hours during the rainy season and 36 hours during the dry. That time would be 26 and 35 hours, respectively, had the canal been built without it.

However, a significant seismic risk that could shut the entire canal down – for 4 years, at minimum, based on how long it would take to refill Gatun Lake – is added by leaving out Miraflores Lake.

Furthermore, advantage cannot be taken of the protection against salt-intrusion Miraflores Lake has been seen to provide throughout the last century of canal operation.

Opting for the time savings (i.e. cost savings) perceived to become available by bypassing Miraflores Lake may seem logical from a short-term profitability viewpoint – considering that salting-up the lake does not hamper ship-traffic and no earthquake has happened along those faults since 1882 – but it is not the right choice to make.

There is very much more to consider with respect to this project's long-term profitability than obtaining that one-hour shorter Canal Residence Time.

The Rest of this Expansion's Equation

The planned single-lane of locks with three water-saving tanks per step generally needs to be operated in such a manner that during the first half of the day up to 7 ships will be lifted at each end of the canal to the level of Gatun Lake, which represents the pathway across the Isthmus of Panama. During the second half of the day those ships will be lowered at the canal's other end to sail onto the other sea.

That process sets maximum number of daily transits, the Canal Residence Time for each transit, and the amount of water consumed in operating the locks.

That lock configuration – which includes building a dam across the faults that pass beneath Miraflores Lake, in addition to the locks themselves – will cost a given amount and require a certain level of repeated maintenance in the future.

A two-lane lock arrangement – based on the lock system of the century-old Panama Canal – is an alternative that would provide a much greater return-on-investment without these risks and without yet other risks inherent to the single-lane about to be built.

By building a two-step two-lane system now – at a comparable cost to that of the planned three-step single-lane – that would occupy about the same real-estate:

the maximum daily post-Panamax transit capacity would increase from 14 to 24,

operating water required would reduce to 73% of what the planned one-lane needs per transit, which means 19 ships could be transited with water now slated to transit 14,

the need to expand the watershed would become less immediate, allowing for other possibilities for improving the water storage capacity of today's watershed to be adequately investigated,

the possibility of an accident in a lock chamber bringing the whole post-Panamax lock system to a standstill would be averted,

the increased risk of total system loss due to earthquake would be removed, along with damages to third parties that come with that,

salt-intrusion would be effectively controlled averting damages to ocean ecology,

the cost of maintenance would be reduced due to fewer parts and fewer water manipulations needed in performing transits,

provisions to add water-saving tanks later could be incorporated – to permit up to 22 transits a day with the water that the planned one-lane locks will use to transit 11,

need for watershed expansion relative to this expansion would be bypassed, and

chambers could be enlarged to increase the canal's customer base.

These are some of the benefits that expanding the Panama Canal with Miraflores-type lakes bring which far outweigh the perceived “benefit” of marginally reducing Residence Time.

The Follow-up Expansion Plan

To eliminate another hour of Canal Residence Time, a second post-Panamax lane – similar to the first – is planned. Once that one is built, the plan would be for each lane to be dedicated to one direction of transits, which maximizes that system's number of transits and minimizes its water-use.

The most serious problem with this follow-up plan is that operating this lock configuration in that manner will produce the highest level of salt-intrusion imaginable. It will still use 7% more water per transit than the simpler two-lane system without tanks, and 60% more water than the simpler two-lane system with tanks.

By building a higher-capacity/lower water-use two-lane configuration now, the need for a future follow-up expansion would be postponed and, when needed, a similar two-lane system of comparable cost could be built.

The expanded Panama Canal in the future could have – for the same investment – four larger, less-contaminating lanes in the space now planned to occupy only two.

Conclusion

None of the risks and planned watershed expansions can be justified.

For the size of lock chamber now planned – without any of the added threats to people and the environment – daily transits could be increased between 36% to 57% with an alternative configuration that uses an equal or lesser volume of water per day than what the current plan will use.

The side-tank lock system's efficiency cannot be enhanced to enable the project to reduce its impact on third-parties and the environment.

However, with the two-lane alternatives, enhancements and special services – such as reduced Canal Residence Time transits – are possible. When time-sensitive or emergency transits arise, special handling can be arranged to reduce Canal Residence Time when needed.

Today's unacceptable plan appears to be tailred for the desires of an elite group of shippers at the expense of everyone and everything else.

The Real Reason Behind “Expanding” the Panama Canal

2011-07-25T10:03:00.000-07:00

http://www.fox10tv.com/dpps/news/international/flooding-closes-panama-canal-wd10-jgr_3672955

by Bert G. Shelton, Professional Engineer & Research Scientist July 20, 2011

Those who have been following the progress of the Panama Canal Expansion project will recall that the lock design to be used was included in the plan's announcement. That the project's key system had been preselected was most unusual, a shock to lock design experts familiar with Panama Canal expansion issues.

Beyond pronouncements assuring that all possible lock configurations and ship lifting mechanisms had been thoroughly assessed prior to selecting the most appropriate water-saving locks for the project – and claiming that, due to those locks, the new system would be environmentally friendly – no technical reports that truly back those assurances have ever been produced.

Given the project's reluctance to make available details of their system selection process, outsiders have had to rely on deductive reasoning to figure out why locks are being built that – relative to other layouts – will forever operate inefficiently, increase the likelihood of transits being delayed, magnify the potential for damaging the environment irreversibly, plus deliberately introduce an extreme seismic risk that previous Panama Canal projects specifically avoided.

Building a dike that crosses a well-documented active fault-line, known to have ruptured significantly twice during “modern” times, which should it rupture again would surely result in the catastrophic loss of the entire canal, plus wash to sea everything proximate to the canal's Pacific entrance, is insane, pure and simple.

Under detailed scrutiny, making sense seems not to be a project requirement from neither technical nor financial perspectives.

The Real Reason Behind this Project

Rather than a plan aimed at improving this waterway's capacity and capabilities, the reason for launching the Panama Canal Expansion appears to have been to trigger – in short order – a multitude of port improvement projects worldwide, and also to energize the ship-building complex. Why this is so is elementary. The aim seems to have been to convince communities around the globe that it would be prudent for them to begin upgrading their ports, or their fleets as the case may be, now in order not to lose out on the coming increase in trade the canal's expansion would be generating.

In other words, the canal expansion's purpose was to be the domino that would cause all the rest to fall. One need only look at all the port expansions and ship-building activities launched in step with this project to realize that this strategy to tap into public fund in a big way has worked to perfection.

The problem is that – as determined through a more in-depth assessment of the technical merits of the system – the planned Panama Canal Expansion does not appear to have what it takes to meet the claims marketed.

The disparities noted between system capabilities and promotional claims go a long way towards explaining why a visibly spectacular and very expensive media campaign was carried-out for the expansion of a world-important canal that would otherwise have sold itself. It also explains why efforts to publicize questionable issues with the project in mainstream media continue to be blocked.

There are clearly many powerful organization profiting from the resulting upswing in business who would suffer significant losses if the canal expansion's aura of perfection were to be tarnished or its pace slowed.

Not having been preceded by the usual signs that the planning of a major project was afoot – such as the hubbub produced by lock system selection studies – this canal expansion's announcement came as an abrupt surprise. How it thereafter proceeded – virtually unquestioned – continues to be very disconcerting to those familiar with the technical aspects of that canal.

And, it would seem, the game has grown beyond expanding the canal, and generating port and shipyard work. Because no governments or reputable organizations have seriously questioned any significant elements of the plan, the “green light” has in effect been given for the unscrupulous to go after as many natural resource in developing nations as possible, which is destroying those nations' ability to become self-sufficient. Panama itself is being severely impacted by that plague, all of which is being bank-rolled by the world's developed nations whose governments appear to be “in bed with the mob”.

The goals of this seemingly “globalized con game” have clearly been met. Many of the publicly-funded income streams that were pursued have been captured – with commitments for many major projects within first-world nations obtained – plus vast amounts of cash from major financial institutions have been accessed. Rest assured that everyone “entitled” to a cut of that bounty has already gotten a share.

This money-game is simply another chapter of the financial scandal from which the world is still reeling.

From the perspective of those controlling the game, the expanded Panama Canal's profitability, efficiency, sustainability, and safety are not relevant.

The above assertions will, obviously, seem outlandish and absurd to those who are either unaware of, or misinformed about what is going on beyond the borders of first-world nations. Clearly, there is enough going on within the first-world to keep everyone in those countries busy with problems at home; so, their citizens will tend to say “let the people over there handle their own concerns”.

The problem with that is that third-worlders do not have the funds needed to fight of the abuses that first-world citizens are unknowingly funding, and in some cases supporting by force.

In the case of Panama – where the Panama Canal Expansion plus over a hundred of hydroelectric installations and dozens of highly contaminating open pit mines are either approved, under construction, or are already in operation – its common folk are generally being “benefited” negatively.

Despite all the projects having been promoted as sustainable to qualify for “development” loans, the effects of lost arable land and of drinkable water that those projects are causing are already being felt by the masses. Besides causing food shortages in-country, that drop in farm production will lead to fewer exports, which will cause first-world food prices to rise even more than what they've been driven to by the higher cost of fuel. Those shortages will lead to more people attempting to migrate in search of better opportunities, which already is a sore issue in first-world countries. In addition, the quickened pace of the global rise in temperature and sea levels caused by the unfriendliness of all those “sustainable” projects is already being noted.

Thankfully, enough people in first-world nations have caught on to the reality that their money is funding destructive mining operations and shoddy hydroelectric projects, which means there is a chance that the most damaging of them will be stopped.

With respect to the Panama Canal, the purpose of the balance of this document is to present a series of facts and observations made of its expansion in the hopes of convincing the silent majority that it is still possible – and in the best interest of the global community – to salvage the project.

To that end, key concerns with expansion of that waterway will be noted first, followed by a description of how the present project handles them. The shortcomings inherent to each component chosen will be interjected in parallel. The most appropriate technical solution for overcoming problems with the present plan will follow.

Physical and Psychological Factors Shaping the Current Canal Expansion Plan

During the joint US-Panamanian Canal administration that preceded the final gifting of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, a several-year-long study – manned by international experts – was commissioned to assess the immediate and future needs of the canal and to set forth recommendations for ensuring its future viability. In addition to recommending appropriate watershed land-use strategies – necessary to maintain the rainfall quantities and storage capacity for present and future canal operation – the report prepared by those experts also noted that any future expansion of the waterway would require the development of water-saving locks. It also stressed the importance of minimizing the effects of salt intruding into the canal's lakes so as to safeguard the environment.

Independent technical assessments of the project plan currently underway for expanding the Panama Canal and of corresponding changes of legislation that have occurred, have found that the project does not really meet the spirit of any of that study's recommendations. In fact, other than using all the “right buzz-words” and fervently claiming to have found a “lost” water-saving method – supposedly missed by the US and other experts – that “resolved” the most important canal expansion issue, the other major concern with salt-intrusion has in effect been swept under the rug. Additionally, a previously resolved seismic risk issue has been reintroduced.

Investigations into project financing have led to the conclusion that the canal, like many other projects in Panama, has received development funds that it really should not have. Considering those points, and having experienced 8 years of mainstream media ignoring all questioning of the project, it became clear that the intent of this project was to develop a quick-and-dirty, but seemingly plausible plan, with which communities around the globe could be convinced to launch related projects, and, most importantly, convince the citizens of Panama to give the project the go-ahead vote.

The approach apparently seen as the shortest path to the goal of launching lucrative projects worldwide – all contingent on launching this one without delay – was to use as much of the US's 1930's attempted canal expansion work as possible.

Given that adding side-tanks is the only way to add water-saving capabilities to the single-lane lock layout chosen in the 1930's, that choice was locked in and a campaign was planned to convince everyone that the 1930's locks enhanced in this manner were the only possible ones – which they are not – for expanding the Panama Canal.

To achieve the true goal of capturing cash-producing contracts ASAP, it was paramount to avoid the longer but proper selection process of developing viable alternatives from which the one that best balanced sustainability and cost could be selected. To follow a more responsible time-line – that would delay the kick-off of canal expansion work, as well as the innumerable other public works projects worldwide – was unacceptable to the game afoot.

The only choice to get rich quick was to, effectively, execute a con. And, were public funds ever spent to achieve that goal!

Convincing the shipping-world that the new locks' chambers could at most be about the size of those defined in the 1930's plan was one of the first tasks to perform. It was claimed that even with the "best and only" water-saving solution having been identified, there just wasn't enough water to be had to contemplate anything bigger. Propaganda in parallel was used to hammer home the message that no other feasible or better lock solutions existed.

To get around shippers balking at the proposal to only build one lane, the sales pitch given them was that this was just Phase 1 of a two-phase project. Essentially argued was that such phasing was necessary because only sufficient financing could be gathered to launch half the work; if all had to be done at once, nothing would be done for lack of money. Promised was that Phase 2 would begin in about 10 years, about when the first phase became operational.

But, a whole different story was told to the people of Panama. Given vociferous objections from the public to the plan to expand the watershed in order to add the one lane, the local sales pitch focused on defusing the political problem that had arisen. To resolve it, it was “suddenly” realized that the water availability dilemma could be “solved” by adding a third side-tank to each chamber. Additionally, Panama's president declared that a law against new reservoirs would be enacted.

Two crowds, two stories, and neither of them really true.

What nobody has paid any attention to is that even the 11th-hour switch from two side-tanks to three was a preplanned ploy. As discussed in the section that follows, the two smaller side-tank locks being built in Germany at the time – which would serve to “validate” this project's selection – had three tanks beside each chamber., which is not believed to have been by coincidence. Along with the third tank, the revised plan also entailed changing lake operating levels. Doing that impacts every existing facility or developed property on the shores of enormous Gatun Lake, not to mention the lake's many dams and spillways, and the original locks. Additionally, the uppermost chambers of the new locks need modifications and lock operations need to be reassessed. Yet within a month, all of this revising was declared fully completed and the process moved on to the referendum vote. Unbelievable.

At the Atlantic end of the canal – where the US had effectively completed the rock-blasting and digging efforts needed for building their locks – virtually all the 1930's work could be taken advantage of by the planned approach.

However, to minimize construction efforts at the Pacific end of the canal a relatively “simpler” lock arrangement was decided upon which did not use the work done previously by the US.

What was decided was to build the single-lane Pacific locks with all three steps joined together – like those on the Atlantic side – rather than follow the US's lower-risk layout. To do that, a new site was identified to the west of both today's Miraflores Locks and the lock site the US prepared in the 1930's, from where an elevated channel could be lined up with the canal's uppermost waterway – Gaillard Cut at Gatún Lake level – in order to bypass Miraflores Lake along its west bank. That plan requires building a dike across fault-lines that traverse unstable ground under Miraflores Lake.

Miraflores Lake's primary function is to protect the waterway from an earthquake-generated catastrophe. Yet included among various arguments presented has been that such a risk does not exist, because Panama “doesn't have” earthquakes. Thus, no attention is called to the sizable earthquake-induced fault displacement that used to be observable just east of the canal – where those fault-lines cross the Las Cruces Trail built by the Spaniards and that inexplicably seems to have been obliterated. Nor is it mentioned that in 1882 – during the French canal construction effort – a quake along those faults killed some workers, and project leaders sent squads into Panama City to help with repairs in the hopes of minimizing negative press reaching France that could kill the project.

Miraflores Lake's other function – that is not officially mentioned – is that it serves as a barrier to the progression of saltwater into Gatun Lake. That function has already been diminished by expansion work.

Bypassing both protective functions of Miraflores Lake goes solidly against historical fact, expert wisdom and logic. Doing so puts the canal itself, its clients and its neighbors, as well as ecology in and beyond Panama, at great risk, just so a few can make big money fast and walk away with the gamer's prize of having pulled off the world's greatest con.

Side-Tank Lock Validation

As past attempts at using side-tank locks were not exactly glowing successes, an additional project task was to establish new credentials for that system.

Virtually in concert with the Panama Canal Expansion's announcement, the two side-tank lock units being built in Germany were brought into the limelight to add credibility to Panama's plan. As the decision to use side-tank locks at the Panama Canal had clearly been made before those “validation locks” were up and running, speculation exists – that is not farfetched – that Panama's decision to use side-tanks was actually made prior to Germany “choosing” them.

If not for the Panama Canal Expansion Project needing a “successfully-operating example” of side-tank locks, it is doubtful that the Germans would have decided on their own to build new locks with tanks. After all, a simpler, cheaper, and lower maintenance two-lane single-step lock layout exists that offers comparable water-savings. The Pedro-Miguel Locks of the Panama Canal are a well-known example of such a layout. Without tanks it can operate using either 25% or 50% of the operating water normally used, dependent on the momentary traffic flow pattern. The new German side-tank locks reportedly reduce water-use to 40%.

If a more efficient two lane lock design was being sought in Germany at the time, a more likely choice would have been to move technology forward. They would have figured out how to add tanks to a set of Pedro-Miguel styled locks – as was done soon after Panama's expansion plan was announced – instead of regressing to a system choice that is proving problematic as were its past versions.

Winning the Lock Construction Bid

There is much that can be said about the delays and confusions that occurred during the bidding process, but the outcome is all that really matters.

From day one, when the consortia participating in the contest were announced, virtually everyone in Panama was certain of which group would win. And, so it was.

The victorious consortium had, as one of its members, the company that the reigning Canal Administrator headed prior to assuming his current post, a company that was already doing the lion's share of the expansion's dry excavation work. That consortium's bid was about $1 Billion less than the next lowest bid. The bid was about three quarters that of its nearest competitor, which is a very significant difference considering that all the goods and services needed must ultimately come from sources that are, in effect, themselves competing for individual pieces within the project.

Nonetheless, although quite clearly something was amiss, the low bidders were rather quickly confirmed as the winners without a bid-conditioning exercise being performed to verify the validity of the assumptions made by the various bidders that resulted in such a large gap between the two lowest bids, and also the even vaster gap to the third-lowest bid.

The fact that nobody squawked made it unquestionable that the bidding exercise was just window-dressing devised – and clearly decided well beforehand – to give the process an air of legitimacy.

It became very apparent that even the firm that managed the bidding process, a firm touted as ecologically friendly, had been chosen to add credibility to the plan. It is most likely that the expansion project was planned around shares of work that partners in the scheme had negotiated far in advance of launching it.

Rumors are that none of the contractors in the winning consortium have the know-how or the in-house experience necessary to build a first-class lock system, a job that would require far more complicated site preparations and demanding construction than the system now slated. If true, that explains why the more complex work left undone by the US in the 1930's of blasting a lane next to the Pedro Miguel Locks has been avoided, and why the relatively simpler bypassing of Miraflores Lake – although it significantly increases the seismic-risks to the waterway – was preferable.

Having to do it right would certainly take a chunk out of targeted profits.

Seeming that the Panamanian partners' prize in the apparently much bigger game afoot was to receive most of the canal expansion's on-site construction work, it was imperative that the lock construction bid look credible, so a “watered-down” lock arrangement that any run-of-the-mill contractor could tackle was essential. The “simple concrete construction” theme was often repeated to promote the project as such.

While all the solutions chosen and assurances given have been tailored to make this canal expansion appear acceptable and affordable, the price to pay in the long run – unless it is re-directed and modified – will be to forever struggle with operational problems, relatively low throughput, poor use of water resources, contamination of the lakes by salt, and eventually permanent impacts to fauna of both oceans, if an earthquake doesn't finish off the waterway first.

Salvaging the Panama Canal Expansion is Still Possible

The Panama Canal Expansion Project can still be salvaged if lock construction is halted before too much concrete has been cast. Letting it ride without challenge will only confirm that con-men are firmly in control of this planet, and leave future generations stuck with the tab!

Returning to the recommendations of the experts, a successful canal expansion requires highly efficient locks to minimize the expenditure of water and, simultaneously, a lock layout that effectively disrupts the progression of saltwater up the steps. Adding an earthquake related risk by putting a dike across an active fault-line is clearly something not to do.

Stopping salt-intrusion and minimizing the earthquake risk are the easiest concerns to attend. Proven solutions for both issues are already present in the Panama Canal and have been working without a hitch for the last 100 years.

The resolution to those problems is, then: don't break what has already been fixed!

Reducing water-use requires a little more thinking, as there are four standard approaches for saving water. Finding the best combination of these for this job requires a bit of mixing and matching. But, even that is no big deal as that work has already been done.

Whereas the one-lane three-step side-tank locks now chosen combine two of those water-saving approaches (steps and tanks), the Panama Canal's Pedro-Miguel Locks combine two other approaches (side-to-side water-sharing and transit-by-transit lane reversals). Together, these two systems include all the water-saving techniques ever invented for gravity-operated locks.

Using the volume of water today's Panama Canal Locks expend during normal operations – adjusted for the relative size difference between the old and the new chambers – as the baseline for comparing competing layouts , the planned side-tank locks will use 40% of that baseline volume. The planned side-tank locks are to have a total of 6 chambers and 18 tanks.

Alternatively, a system comprised of two Pedro-Miguel styled lock units – with a Miraflores-like lake between them (serving to reduce water-use, block salt-intrusion, and avoid the Pacific-side fault-lines) – at each end of the canal, would use 35% of that base-line volume, incorporating all the layout and operational differences between the systems. This arrangement would have a total of 8 chambers, with no tanks; and, best of all, it would have two lanes.

With the single-lane three-step planned locks, a given number of ships must transit single-file in one direction until the lane is cleared and the direction of transit reversed. With a separated-two-step two-lane Pedro-Miguel styled lock arrangement, transit direction through each chamber switches after every ship to maximize efficiency.

The operations of either layout are essentially the same. Thus, comparing transit times of the two is a relatively straight forward exercise, because operating times for similar actions are virtually equal for both. Thus, whereas it was estimated that the throughput of the side-tank locks will routinely be 12 ships in 24 hours (14 when everything goes perfectly), a Pedro-Miguel styled lock arrangement would be able to routinely handle about 20 ships (24 when everything goes perfectly).

To maximize the number of transits through this two-lane arrangement water use can be reduced to 23% by adding just two tanks to each Pedro-Miguel styled lock unit. That's 8 tanks in total.

A system with enhanced Pedro-Miguel styled locks can complete 20 transits with the water the planned side-tank locks will use for 12 transits; that's 8 more transits a day without chopping down a single tree and spending more money to build new dams and lakes.

What's more, the tanks can be added later, if planned for, which additionally lowers up-front cost.

Finally, a two-lane system would be less vulnerable to total shutdown than a single-lane system. Also, the serious difficulties with blasting out a second-lane next to the first one – while it is operating – will be avoided.

Additional Comments

After the Panama Canal was fully gifted to the people of Panama, the hype has been that Panama is running the canal much better than the US ran it. What exactly does that mean?

The number of ships that can transit it today are the same as the number that could transit it just before it was handed over, which is about the same number as it could handle when it was brand new. The US performed a great deal of widening and deepening in parts of the waterway to keep up with the ever increasing number of ships that just barely fit though the locks and various channels. And, Panama continued doing pretty much the same until announcing the plan to expand.

The question is how doing pretty much the same thing translates into the claim that the Panama Canal is being run better today than in the past.

The fact that ten to twenty times more money is being made appears to be the justification for that claim.

That, however, is no extraordinary feat considering price-gouging was not permitted during previous administrations of the canal, while the present policy is to charge what the market will bear.

When the Canal Zone was administered by the old Panama Canal Company and then the joint US-Panama Canal Commission, all goods and services were under the administration's control and payroll. Everything – be it schools, libraries, clinics, hospitals, police, fire-stations, emergency services, recreational facilities, roads, bridges, power, lighting, phone services, lawns, employee housing, commissaries, postal services, port and maritime services, travel services, and on and on – was managed and maintained by the Panama Canal Company, in addition to running the canal.

The present-day Canal Administration primarily attends the canal and but a fraction of what its predecessors administered; the nation and some other private firms now take care of most of the list given above. Yet, even before the canal's expansion was announced, that organization was busily fanning out to more and more buildings, filled with progressively more personnel. Naturally, after the expansion was announced the number of buildings and occupants seemed to grow even faster.

Expansion work was obviously already afoot before the plan was announced and a lot appeared to be well underway before the vote to expand was cast, even though doing expansion-related work was inappropriate before being approved by that vote or some interim approval mechanism.

Not only did “getting” the vote pardon the work done prior to the vote, it blessed the multi-multi-million dollar promotional campaign and all the lavish marketing trips and presentations. None will ever need to be justified.

To anyone truly paying attention, the voting process for the canal expansion's approval was far from transparent and campaigning was lopsided beyond belief. Public forums were managed very tightly. They were pretty much dog-and-pony shows with set scripts. There were panelists for the expansion and there were panelists for the "alternative" rail/port facility complex. Straying from that black vs. white script was, for all purposes, disallowed. All attempts to get at “how-to” specifics of the canal plan were nipped in the bud with the use of assorted tactics, such as claiming “that's rather complicated to explain and not worth getting into as it will go over everyone's head” or “the expert on that is not present, so save it for next time”.

On one particular occasion, when a forum attendee asked why it was that the intrusion of salt had made Miraflores Lake quite brackish, but not Gatun Lake, or something to that effect, the panelist for the canal noted he wasn't quite sure, but that there was something “magical” about the third step. Thereafter, it was quite common to hear that, because the new locks will have three steps, salt-intrusion is not a concern. That, of course, is nonsense, but taking liberties with the interpretation of data and the truth was clearly considered acceptable.

Making declarations in direct contradiction to known facts – like stating that in Panama there are no earthquakes so the risk of failing the dike to be built across fault-lines is very low, when at least two major movements at those very faults have been experienced since the Conquistadors arrived in Panama – demonstrates an air of confidence among project promoters, even when the truth is not being told. This appears to illustrate why terms like confidence men or con artists have evolved.

Conclusions

A highly inefficient and very risky expansion is being pushed ahead for the Panama Canal that is clearly not in the best interest of Panama, nor of the rest of the world. Rather it is in the interest of those who have promoted the plans and of those who are directly benefiting from one or more of the enhancement projects underway elsewhere in the world as a result of it. Whether this project achieves its promoted purpose or not – or whether do any of the others – appears not to be a concern as long as this well-orchestrated scheme meets its true goals.

What happens after construction profits are pocketed seems to be of no concern either. For this reason questions about technical choices – the merits of which were highly advertised – have never been answered, as dialogue has been essentially disallowed. To this day, those with the power to demand accountability have not done so.

As a result of design choices made, risks to the Panama Canal and to the ecology – both on land and in both seas – will be increased without justification, plus its fresh water resources will be needlessly polluted and wastefully used forever.

The assertion that the Panama Canal is now being run as an efficient business is either misguided or could be an attempt to keep the game alive.

As is, this expansion is not a sound long-term business venture. It was not planned to be one.

Nonetheless, it is still not too late to make it sound.

The “know-how” to expand the Panama Canal – efficiently and sustainably – has existed all along, but not the moral fortitude to stand up for what is right. Transforming this project into one that is truly worth completing will require the intervention of people of stature – or power – equal to that of the leaders of all developed nations that have by default colluded with those behind this money-making scheme. Turning the tide will require faith and resolve, and a lot of hard work.

The Danger of Salt Intruding into the Panama Canal

2011-03-07T04:55:00.000-08:00

*also published in The Panama News

No se puede exagerar la urgencia de revisar todos los aspectos de este proyecto de inmediato. Sus repercusiones se extenderán mucho más allá de las fronteras de Panamá. No es demasiado tarde para mejorarlo... si actuamos ya.

The urgency for reviewing every aspect of this project immediately cannot be over-emphasized. Its impact will extend well beyond Panama's borders.
It is not too late to improve it... if we act now.

Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún -- Gatún Lake Defense Committee

El Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún aboga por una ampliación realmente responsable y sostenible del Canal de Panamá, que usa sus recursos valiosos efectivamente y los deja sin daños para el beneficio de esta y de generaciones futuras. (Visite www.crucestrail.com) The Gatún Lake Defense Committee advocates for a genuinely responsible and sustainable expansion of the Panama Canal, where its valuable resources are used effectively and left undamaged for the benefit of this and future generations. (Visit www.crucestrail.com)

source:navis.gr

The Danger of Salt Intruding into the Panama Canal*
Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer
Leila R. Shelton-Louhi, Economist and Ethics Consultant
25 February 2011

The purpose of this document is to describe why increasing the intrusion of saltwater into the Panama Canal as a result of its expansion is not desirable, and to outline how the process can be efficiently and sustainably avoided.

Background on the salt-intrusion issue is given as it relates to today's waterway. An explanation is offered of why – because of how salt works its way “uphill” through locks – Gatun Lake's salt concentration will exponentially increase if the locks planned for the Panama Canal expansion are built and begin to operate.

Lessons learned from the existing Panama Canal salt-intrusion records – which provide a wealth of information about what does and what does not work with respect to managing it – have been drawn upon. An independent projection of the magnitude of the salt-intrusion problem the current expansion plan will create is presented, along with viable modifications to that plan that – for the same cost and using even less water – improve service reliability, plus increase the capacity added, without inducing excessive levels of salt-contamination.

Included is an overview of how an issue this serious was handled in order to gain public approval for the expansion project. Motivations perceived to be behind choices made for this project, and the lack of official concern for the negative impacts to third parties and the environment created by this project, in its present form, are discussed within the context of other damaging actions that continue today in Panama unimpeded, and even supported by questionable and unpopular changes to legislation.

This report is intended to serve as a call to influential people to intercede and bring about urgently required improvements to the Panama Canal expansion.

-Background to the Salt-Intrusion Issue-

Since the Panama Canal opened in 1914, salt has been intruding up its locks at both ends into the freshwater lakes that ships sail upon to cross from ocean-to-ocean. Canal administrators became aware of a problem with salt-intrusion relatively soon after it opened, when potable water produced at the purification plant next to Miraflores Lake began tasting salty.

The intake to the Miraflores plant had to be moved to a location above the Pedro Miguel locks, specifically to the level of Gatun Lake at that end of the canal, where salt-contamination levels were insignificant.

Recognizing that the salt-intrusion process was an issue that needed to be understood, the canal's US administration established a salt-intrusion monitoring program. From then on, until the canal was fully transferred to the Republic of Panama, salt concentration measurements were taken at selected locations throughout the waterway. The status of that program is presently unknown.

The realization last century that salt-intrusion could potentially raise canal salt concentrations to such levels that could turn the waterway into a migratory pathway – for sea creatures to cross from one ocean to the other – prompted studies of how the meeting of different species could affect their survival. The Smithsonian Institute studied the issue for years with reports indicating that preventing that scenario was paramount.

The differences in salt-concentration measurements noted at each end of the canal, besides confirming that salt was entering through the locks at each end, suggested that salt accumulation was a function of the layout and operation of the locks, plus the mitigation methodology present at each of those ends.

-Differences in Intrusion Rates-

At the Caribbean end – commonly referred to as “the Atlantic Side”, and where the three-step, two-lane Gatun lock unit is located – the recorded data shows that salt concentration levels within Gatun Lake have been rising steadily throughout the canal's many decades of operation, increasing at rates low enough to not pose a threat.

On the other hand, the levels in Miraflores Lake on the Pacific Side – located between the two-step, two-lane Miraflores Lock unit and the one-step, two-lane Pedro Miguel Lock unit – rose relatively quickly, but salt-intrusion has seemingly been confined to that lake itself. That small lake's presence – bolstered by its own small watershed and spillway – limits salt accumulation and creates a barrier that keeps that salt from passing onward through Pedro Miguel Locks to reach Culebra Cut, the arm of Gatun Lake crossing the Continental Divide.

Differences between existing lock layouts at each end of the Panama Canal, in combination with measurement records, are sufficient to determine not only how the process works, but what will and what won't work to control it.

With that knowledge, a projection was prepared for the expansion's currently selected lock layout. Its estimate of what will happen to the canal's freshwater Gatun Lake – if that layout is actually built and begins to operate – is quite damning.

-Layout of Current Lock Selection-

The locks now planned – one set to be located at each entrance to the canal – are, in essence, enlarged one-lane copies of the three-step Gatun Locks, with three “recycling” tanks, referred to as the side-tanks, added alongside each step.

The selected lock layout together with its most appropriate operating mode, in terms of using the least water, form possibly the worst combination to use in the Panama Canal with respect to the salt-intrusion issue. This is unconscionable considering what can be achieved with engineering that addresses this issue.

Additionally, by opting to expand using a lock layout similar to the one on the Atlantic Side – a known saltwater pump – instead of using a layout similar to that on the Pacific Side – known to control salt-intrusion – Miraflores Lake will be bypassed. This eliminates one of this lake's key functions which is to serve as the Pacific Side salt-intrusion barrier.

Changes have already been made that reduce Miraflores Lake's effectiveness. A portion of the canal's operating water supply, that also serves to mitigate salt-intrusion today, has been permanently eliminated!

-Saltwater Movement & Controls-

Knowing how ships and water interact in locks is key to understanding how salt-intrusion through locks occurs.

When a ship enters a chamber, it forces water out. The only place for that water to go is around to the back of the ship. The example that follows – of ships exiting in series, i.e. one after the other, from a set of locks – illustrates why salt intrudes when ships go down locks on their way to sea, not when they go up locks headed into a freshwater canal.

-Salt Enters When Ships Exit-

Consider what happens in a typical set of locks, with three contiguous steps, that is located between a freshwater canal and the ocean. As Ship 1 exits the lowest chamber – the one at the ocean end of the lock unit – seawater rushes in behind it to replace the volume it occupied.

The seaward gates of that lowest chamber are then closed and water is let in from the one above – the middle chamber – where exiting Ship 2 waits. That operation simultaneously raises the lowest chamber's water level and lowers that of the middle one. The process stops when their levels match.

Then the gates between those chambers open and, as Ship 2 pushes into the lowest chamber, a volume of the brackish water – equal to what the ship displaces – is forced from the lowest chamber into the one above, i.e. “uphill”.

That process is again repeated when Ship 3 in the uppermost chamber is lowered a step and moves ahead, forcing the brackish water into the uppermost chamber from which that ship left.

As Ship 4 enters the uppermost chamber, it displaces salty water into the freshwater canal. What Ship 4 and the subsequent ships in the series inject into the lake is what the salt-intrusion issue is all about. The salt content in the water that Ship 4 forces into the lake will be the lowest of its series; the salt content of the water injected into the lake will rise with each ship exiting after it.

Eventually, as a result of the intrusion process, the canal and ocean salt concentrations equalize.

How much salt intrudes into a canal system is dependent on the layout of its locks and on how they are operated, as illustrated by the Panama Canal.

Today's Panama Canal locks contain two lanes in every unit. As previously described, Gatun Locks is a unit with three contiguous steps. Between it and the two units on the Pacific Side is man-made freshwater Gatun Lake, the largest in the world when the canal was built. Miraflores Locks also have contiguous steps. In its case, two instead of three, while Pedro-Miguel Locks have only one. Between these two units is the protective body of water, known as Miraflores Lake.

-Effect of Operating Choices-

By good fortune, it was too costly to make Culebra Cut wide enough to permit continuous two-way traffic through the Panama Canal when it was originally built. Were it not for the limitations created by “the Cut”, the worst operating sequence in terms of salt-intrusion – transiting a lane continually in one direction – might have been adopted in order to use the time and water spent in reversing lanes to transit a few more ships.

Culebra Cut forced a somewhat less efficient transit pattern – in terms of time and water-use – to be adopted. Today ships enter at both ends during the earlier half of the day using both lanes and exit during its latter half, also by way of both lanes. This pattern brings in less salt than lanes continually dedicated to one direction of traffic, because salt concentration in the lock chambers must build up again each time the ship exiting sequence through a set of steps resumes.

Miraflores Lake was originally included in the canal's design to serve as a water “bridge” over active faults which ruptured during the French canal-building attempt. Later it was also found to serve as a barrier on the Pacific Side, shielding Gatun Lake from salt intruding at that end.

-The Miraflores Lake “Shield”-

Salt-concentration measurements show that Miraflores Lake's water has stratified. Unlike the saltwater in a chamber that mixes well during filling and draining operations – once it is in Miraflores Lake – the heavier saltwater tends to settle to the bottom in the absence of similar mixing.

Thus, the lake has a layer of very salty water at the bottom with a layer of fresher water on top. Near the Pedro Miguel Lock unit that freshwater layer is apparently thick enough that ships entering and exiting those locks interact primarily with it. Consequently, not much saltwater ends up in that unit's chambers.

At the rate water is drained from Miraflores Lake to operate the Miraflores Locks, salt in the lower layer is not able to diffuse fast enough upwards for the water that gets into the Pedro Miguel lock chambers during ship transits to have much salt in it. Water for Miraflores Locks is extracted at a level near the bottom of the lake and the lake is continually replenished with freshwater by way of rivers and the Pedro Miguel lock operations at the far end of the lake in a way that does not induce mixing with the deeper saltwater layer.

Bypassing Miraflores Lake entirely adds unnecessary and avoidable risks to the Panama Canal system while eliminating all of the protective benefits it provides today.

Today's expansion plan, it would appear, simply ignores a century's worth of data.

-Magnitude of the Problem-

At the Panama Canal the less-than-desirable one-way ship exiting pattern is interrupted with the daily lane reversal which repeatedly resets the salt concentration build-up process created by that problematic operating sequence.

Nonetheless, what is injected into Gatun Lake via the Gatun Locks on the Atlantic Side has resulted in a slow, but steady increase in salt concentration near them. That has occurred despite those locks not being operated in their most contaminating way, and despite releases of that contaminated water through Gatun Spillway – located just to one side of them – flushing it to sea with excess freshwater in quantities rivaling the volume today's canal expends to transit ships.

In other words, the spilling or release of about five times as much water as what originally brought up that salt through Gatun Locks is not quite enough to fully flush out all of what intrudes.

-Calculating the Volumes-

To arrive at that figure of five (5) times, recall that saltwater is introduced for the most part during the ship exiting process. Exiting ships at Gatun use up one-quarter of all the water used to transit ships, and that quarter brings in salt. On the other hand, the equal quantity of water used to raise entering ships at Gatun expels some of the contaminated water.

Each of those quarters of the transit water represent one-eighth of all the water that enters the canal from rain. If one-eighth removes salt through Gatun Locks, and four-eighths flushes it through Gatun Spillway – or through the power plant at that same location – then more than half, or five-eighths, of the total water input to the canal is involved in salt removal; and, that falls short of being enough.

Salt is extremely hard to get rid of once it gets into the canal system.

Note that because Miraflores Lake controls salt-intrusion at the Pacific Side of the canal, operations at that end are not relevant to this calculation.

If this expansion is not modified and if the side-tank locks are built and put into operation, a significant portion of the water – that today serves to flush salt from the canal – is going to be used instead to transit more ships through a third set of locks.

This would make things worse by throwing today's Panama Canal system further out-of-balance, not to mention that half of the water the selected future third set of locks use will be bringing more salt in, and both ends of the canal.

As excessive quantities of salt begin intruding at both ends of the canal, the Miraflores water purification plant – that supplies Pacific Side canal areas with potable water – and the canal's Atlantic side plant at Mount Hope, as examples, are going to lose their supply-line. This bodes very poorly for not only canal area operations, services, and residents, but also for the cities of Panama and Colón.

-Prognosis for Potable Water Supply-

Panama City has been without reliable potable water service since about December 7, 2010 when its own water plant – which gets its freshwater supplies from Madden Lake as opposed to Gatun Lake – effectively collapsed following unusually heavy rains causing turbidity that overtaxed and failed key equipment.

Problems at the Madden Lake filtration plant – reported a year-and-a-half ago to the then newly-inaugurated President – continued unattended – and apparently worsened – until the high turbidity levels in the lake caused its collapse. Managerial ineptitude is being alleged.

Even more disturbing is the perception, now being voiced on radio programs in Panama, that the mismanagement of water supplies may not be due to ineptitude.

Apparently, the plan now is to transfer management of the troubled Madden Lake purification plant to the Panama Canal Administration (ACP), whose plants weathered the storm unscathed. Reasons heard cited for this transfer of the Madden Lake plant to the ACP were that the organization is experienced in that business, plus management of Madden Lake waters does, after all, correspond to it.

If the thesis of this report on salt-intrusion dangers to the Panama Canal is correct, and Gatun Lake becomes salty, the ACP's only choice for the continued operation of its water purification plants – which today obtain their water from Gatun Lake – is to get water from Madden Lake.

It appears that the way is being paved for quietly transitioning into that eventuality.

Given the ACP's own water needs and the needs of its clients, and considering all the expertise it has at its beck-and-call, that such a critical issue – as an interruption of its potable water supply – could take that organization by surprise, is inconceivable.

Water is an important part of the ACP's business, and it is big business.

Nonetheless, a risk of having no backup supply for the entire canal region is being created by the current expansion plan.

If all purification plants end up drawing their water from Madden Lake, they will all have to be upgraded to handle that lake's high turbidity rates. However, that will not exempt them from being shut down during another extreme weather event.

Unless Gatun Lake's freshwater is protected, the consequences of the next interruption of potable water service will be far worse than the one now being experienced.

-Speedy Salinization-

It has been independently estimated that the two new one-lane side-tank lock units will together input 2.5 times the salt input by both lanes of today's Gatun Locks. That estimate is based on an average of six (6) ships entering each of the two new locks in the morning and exiting in the evening versus the nine (9) ships that enter and exit daily on average through each lane of today's canal.

When the new locks begin to operate, excess rainwater – that now takes away salt when released – will be used to raise and lower ships, bringing in salt. That increase in quantity of salt intruding, and that decrease in the rinsing process, will result in about an eighteen-fold (18x) increase in the rate at which Gatun Lake salt-contamination is rising.

When the planned subsequent expansion adds another equally contaminating lane and Culebra Cut is widened to permit continuous two-way traffic, Gatun Lake – officially or not – is going to be renamed Gatun Sea.

-Salt-up Rate Estimate Basis-

The calculation upon which the cited salinization estimate is based for the proposed expansion lock layout is, in principle, fairly simple.

Consider that a chamber of a side-tank lock will be filled three-fifths of the way with salty water from its side-tanks. This water had been drained from the chamber itself during the previous operating cycle and stored in those tanks. Only the remaining two-fifths of the fill water – that comes from the chamber a step above – will be less contaminated. More salt in the mix means more will be pushed into the lake when the next exiting ship moves into the top chamber.

By reducing the dilution of the saltwater introduced with each exiting transit, the salt concentration in the water reaching the lake through side-tank locks will be greater. This is augmented by virtue of repeatedly “recycling” brackish water through the side tanks.

The amount of salt reaching the lake per transit will be further amplified by the fact that the new locks and the ships that will transit them are much bigger than those of the original locks.

With a working knowledge in calculating and combining ratios, it is straightforward to re-confirm the magnitude of the problem by setting up a pair of spreadsheets to simulate the two cases. One spreadsheet would be for a three-step lock layout with recycling tanks and the other for one without tanks. By following the progression of the mixing ratios up the steps, the relative concentration of what is injected into the lake by each ship in the sequence is determined.

From what is known of the planned design, it would appear that water flowing between chambers and tanks will flow in and out of the bottom of the chambers where salt concentrations would be expected to be the greatest due to saltwater being relatively denser. However, when water flows into a chamber in this way its upwelling action does a pretty good job of mixing the contents, so it is reasonable to assume that the mixture in the chamber will be fairly homogenous.

If this design is built and operated, results of investigative efforts lean heavily towards the likelihood that Gatun Lake will rapidly and very noticeably salt up, as occurred at Miraflores Lake. Only Madden Lake will be left to supply potable water to Panama City, Colón and canal areas.

Official efforts to downplay the salt-intrusion issue prior to the referendum strongly suggest this expectation is shared.

-Pre-referendum “Magic”-

This report cites information about the dangers of implementing the side-tank locks which was available well in advance of initiating the Panama Canal expansion project.

Prior to the referendum in Panama that resulted in the go-ahead vote for expanding the canal, Delft Hydraulics, a reputable Dutch company, had been contracted to evaluate the project's salt-intrusion issue. Their report concluded there would be a salt-intrusion problem unless the recycling tanks were flushed at regular intervals to counteract their tendency to increase the concentration of salt in the mixture working its way up the locks.

Considering that the tanks are in the design to reduce the amount of water used by the locks to transit ships, having to periodically rinse them cancels at least a portion of their water-saving benefit. The time to perform the rinsing itself effectively reduces the number of transits.

With the potential expansion of the watershed threatening to become a major political roadblock leading up to the referendum, the Dutch report further highlighted the existing shortage of water availability for this design.

As a result, with a claim that a re-evaluation had been necessary, the Dutch report – that seemed logical and correct to independent reviewers – was excluded from those the project took into consideration. That report, allegedly invalidated due to a lack of certain inputs, was replaced by an ultimately more favorable assessment prepared by others able to meet the high-paced schedule set by the declared urgency of the project.

Many other strategies were used to obscure, discredit or downplay anything perceived to threaten the project with delays.

-Fanciful Deceptions-

Discussions on the subject that ensued, heard primarily on the radio, included several outlandish claims. In more than one program aired, water used to operate locks was equated to water flowing down a river.

This commentary alone suggested that deception was afoot. While most people know that saltwater does not travel up river, most do not know that shifting water in and out of lock chambers is nothing like water running downstream.

On several occasions spokesmen for the Panama Canal answered questions on the subject by stating the reason the present-day canal “does not have” a salt-intrusion problem was because “it has three steps”. One stated in a meeting that the ACP didn't really know why it worked, that it was “magic”. Clearly being referenced was the “third” step at Pedro Miguel, above which salt-intrusion is negligible.

Thereafter the third step was called the “magical” step more than once. Implied was that – given the new locks would have three steps – salt-intrusion would not be an issue. The deception was being honed.

A preposterous claim heard on radio, made by someone announced as a canal spokesman, was that recycling tanks actually reduced salt-intrusion.

The objective was to obtain project approval votes. As was privately expressed more than once by “supporters” of the project, each vote cast by a listener who believed any of these claims neutralized one cast by someone more knowledgeable.

As the referendum date approached, the ACP even denied existence of any salt-intrusion issues in its official publications. The campaign of denial was pervasive and effective.

Ironically, what is planned bypasses the very feature that effectively makes the original canal's Pedro Miguel step – to use the chosen descriptor – “magical”.

Nonetheless, systems of locks can be configured that avoid such a calamity and, at the same time, significantly increase transits in comparison to what is planned.

-Solutions to the Challenge-

The Panama Canal can be expanded without creating the salt-intrusion risks the current expansion plan creates, with even more capacity and greater service reliability for its customers. Independent assessments continually confirm that for the “magic” – invoked by ACP representatives during the referendum – to work, and stop excessive volumes of salt from reaching Gatun Lake, requires changing the current plan.

Without question, there must be a sacrificial body of water – like Miraflores Lake – between lock steps at each end of the canal to successfully ward off the salt-intrusion demon. And, those bodies of water must be properly managed, in order to keep them functioning optimally.

Another significant benefit – of up to 50% more transits through the Panama Canal – can be achieved when these bodies of water, combined with the best alternative lock systems for this canal, are operated efficiently. This also minimizes the quantity of saltwater involved in the intrusion process.

-More Transits, Better Water Use-

The opportunity to serve up to 50% more clients a day – with lock systems that require about the same effort to build and that use the same volume of water to provide more transits – is being disregarded, presumably in order to soothe complaints from a few customers.

While Miraflores Lake and the Pedro Miguel Lock step do not reduce the number of ships that can be transited through the canal each day, some canal clients have complained about the extra “canal residence time” that solitary lock step adds to a transit.

Apparently, eliminating their perceived “inconvenience” – which at most amounts to a handful of hours in canal waters – is being valued far and above the environmental damages to come from building a lock unit with three contiguous steps at each end of the Panama Canal.

And, what should be even more unacceptable for world commerce, is that those 50% “could-be” clients being rejected forever by this Panama Canal expansion choice will have to spend weeks – not a handful of extra hours – to circle around South America to get to the other ocean.

More competitive alternative locks – comprised of the very same components arranged and operated differently to increase efficiency and decrease salt-intrusion – could serve those clients now left without passage.

It wouldn't cost any more to have that additional capacity and the reliability a second lane provides.

What is more, benefiting from reduced water use, both lanes could have larger chambers.

These alternatives take advantage of both the lane-reversal technique – that disrupts the salt concentration buildup occurring in the chambers when ships exit in series – and the salt-intrusion preventing sacrificial lake.

-How the Alternatives Work-

A two-lane lock layout – with a sacrificial lake separating two steps at each end of the canal – operated efficiently, not only maximally disrupts the salt-intrusion process with every ship, it uses less water per transit than the ACP's single-lane side-tank system.

The simplest two-lane version – with no recycling tanks – would cost about the same to build and would use about 13% less water to operate. That would permit it to handle about two (2) more transits a day without the risks inherent to the current plan. As a bonus, when there happens to be extra water, this simplest system could handle up to ten (10) more.

Add two recycling tanks to each of the four units of this two-lane option – increasing its cost by about 20% – and the system could handle twenty (20) transits a day with the same water the chosen side-tank lock system will use for twelve (12).

Both the simplest two-lane lock layout and the one with two tanks, when operated efficiently, will maximize transits and reduce salt-intrusion because the seaside chamber will always have a ship in it. Less salt content reaches the waterway at the top of the step because the amount of salt in that chamber is minimized. In addition, the lake between lock steps blocks the progress of the salt that does manage to come up through the lower step.

The single-lane planned for the expansion today cannot compete with this. In order to operate efficiently and maximize its transit capacity, it maximizes salt-intrusion.

By contrast the two-lane alternative, when efficiently operating and maximizing transits, minimizes intrusion.

Plans already unofficially underway to build a second lane just like the one being considered for the expansion today would be a disservice to the Panama Canal, its users, investors, and the environment.

This scheme is unacceptable given how much less water-efficient single-lane lock units are in comparison to lock units with two lanes and considering the danger of contamination they add. It makes no sense to build one lane on a swath of land as wide as what an equally-priced, higher capacity two-lane design would occupy, and then carve out another equivalent swath to build a second similarly inefficient and salt-contaminating single-lane of like cost in quick succession.

The only reasonable choice for the Panama Canal is to make the change now to more suitable two-lane locks.

Given that concrete has not as yet been cast, and that all the channels being dug now would still be needed, nothing significant is lost. Yet, a lot will be irretrievably lost in the long run if that change does not happen now.

Compared to the one-lane planned – or even two of the same design – a more efficient two-lane system requires fewer components to access more water-saving techniques that allow for more transits, while reducing wear-and-tear and time spent shifting water.

In addition to the water-saving techniques built into them, each two-lane lock unit can also take advantage of the water-saving opportunity offered by the lake between steps which is also the system's salt-intrusion “shield”.

-Intrusion Shield Design-

The sacrificial lakes between locks have to include – as is the case in Miraflores Lake – a mechanism by which to input excess freshwater and simultaneously drain salty bottom waters to ensure the stratified layer of salt in each lake is adequately depressed for the salt-intrusion “shield” to function.

That “rinsing” of the small lakes can be tied to periods of excess rainfall, when volumes that cannot be stored are otherwise released at Gatun Spillway. The flows into and out of those lakes could easily be used to produce power, which would also produce revenue.

To recap, changing to a two-lane expansion will multiply service reliability, avoid damaging the environment, and eliminate other serious risks created by the current plan not addressed in this report. Fifty percent (50%) more clients can be served although every ship will be in canal waters a few hours longer than some clients might wish. All in all, shippers will save a lot more time and money plus enjoy the increased variety and size of vessels which would be able to fit through the expanded Panama Canal system.

The value of a change to better locks – in benefits to consumers, canal area inhabitants, and the environment – is incalculable.

-Institutionalized Environmental Disregard-

Future success of the Panama Canal expansion – in any form – is, paradoxically, under continual threat in Panama. Studies have warned for decades of the importance of protecting its watershed, yet no effective actions appear to have been taken to do so.

Laws protective of the canal watershed – based on recommendations of an official study involving international experts – were essentially annulled immediately after approval for expanding the Panama Canal was won via the referendum. This allowed business and housing projects into that critical recharge zone, seriously diminishing its function.

Since then numerous other questionable projects have been approved, along with additional changes to legislation. Their effects make protecting Gatun Lake's freshwater even more crucial.

Besides employing tactics prior to the referendum, such as misrepresenting the salt-intrusion issue – in order to improve the likelihood of gaining the project's approval vote – as previously described, Panama has seemingly taken a solid stand against self-sustainability, which threatens others as well.

-Collateral Effects and Impacts-

For example, over 85 hydroelectric projects – granted water rights using highly questionable and even illegal methods – have tied up most of the country's rivers. Impacts to agricultural production along affected rivers are already being noted.

Most recently, unpopular modifications to mining laws have been passed that will facilitate the start-up of open-pit mining that will encompass about 45% of the total surface area of Panama.

That move jeopardizes world-renown wildlife sanctuaries, creatures already on the endangered list, and the Meso-American Biological Corridor as a whole, not to mention remaining freshwater resources. Such mines sterilize vast areas, which – on the narrow Isthmus of Panama – translates to a threat of total annihilation.

Original inhabitants of Panama are already being forced off of their ancestral lands, where most of the mines are to be located. Their traditions, customs and methods of sustenance are already being systematically obliterated. Propaganda promoting racial hatred, presumably to turn the uneducated masses against the natives and gain popular acceptance of the mining plan, is on the rise.

To those actions – all detrimental to the environment and the agricultural capacity of Panama – can be added the reduction of old-growth forests from about 50% coverage to about 10% – much caused by misapplication of “reforestation” funds – over the last two decades. Clandestine gold mining reportedly afoot in most of the country's remote rivers on the Caribbean coast is also damaging resources.

All of the above illustrates why it is more than a perception that in Panama there is a continuing desire to reap short-term benefits as quickly as possible.

In the case of the canal, salt-intrusion problems do not diminish the planned expansion's projected income stream. From that perspective, there is no benefit in doing anything about salt-intrusion. Given that steps to properly resolve it would have caused “unnecessary” delay, it is clear why the problem was obscured.

In general, long-term environmental protection incentives continue to be set aside in Panama not only without the consent of the people, but despite their increasingly vocal protests which have begun being repressed with violence.

It would be unwise to accept, at face value, claims that all was thoroughly assessed in determining how the Panama Canal should be expanded and that the best solution was chosen.

-Apparent Motivations-

The physics behind the salt-intrusion process is too basic, and comparisons like those presented in this report too easy to devise, to have gone unrecognized by engineers developing the project. Yet, the subject remained unaddressed prior to the referendum, skirted with claims of its complexity. Why the smoke and mirrors?

The seeming lack of attention paid to knowledge gained over the centuries with respect to identifying effective lock designs and methods of operating them, in combination with the effort expended to downplay the salt-intrusion issue, strongly suggests that the true objective is to move the expansion as quickly as possible to and through the “money-making” construction phase.

A growing perception, confirmed by even Panamanian politicians calling the expansion a “disaster”, is that the real plan was to hastily piece together a marketable lock layout, cleverly promote it via an expensive worldwide propaganda blitz in order to gain desired construction loans, and get on with building it to “spend” that money as quickly as possible.

For such a scenario, the quality of the end-product is irrelevant.

Not many project outsiders with real knowledge of major projects even smaller than this one could believe the 5 to 6 billion dollar project price estimate being officially declared. A so very “low-balled” price-tag suggests a less-than-serious interest in a truly successful expansion.

Set within a background of a less-than-exemplary record with respect to global environmental challenges with which all nations are struggling, where by manipulation and against the wishes and desires of its people Panama's natural resources are being concessioned-off – all at once – and at fire-sale prices, the Panama Canal Expansion Project today appears to be all about receiving the commission for brokering major deals and, disappointingly, not about creating a product beneficial to the global economy and to the environment and society in the long-term.

-Conclusion--

The Panama Canal is a piece of global infrastructure that impacts more than just the shipping industry.

Unnecessary risks created by the way the Panama Canal is being expanded today will reach well beyond the coasts of Panama. They can be avoided, including the undesirable threat of creating a migratory saltwater pathway due to excessive salt intruding into freshwater Gatun Lake.

Independent studies and experiences at the Panama Canal to-date give us the knowledge needed to configure a lock layout that maximizes service capacity and reliability, while minimizing salt-intrusion. A truly optimized system – configured from the same proven components, built for the same money and on the same site – would yield far greater returns by using water resources more effectively.

Considering that this project is being funded by taxpayers of many developed nations, the right and responsibility of making decisions concerning the Panama Canal should transcend Panama's borders to include Panama's duty to the global community.

Citizens of the world, including Panamanians, should feel free – better yet compelled – to demand accountability from their leaders to ensure that what is built in Panama is worth the price they will pay.

Given that this major modification to the Panama Canal was initiated without a proper design selection phase – particularly inappropriately for an engineering project of this magnitude – the “chosen” design along with its operational choices were never independently verified by qualified experts with impeccable credentials.

When the rushed and undemocratic referendum process – put in place to comply with treaty requirements for obtaining project approval – is viewed together with the sudden changing of laws that had protected the canal watershed from development, this expansion takes on the appearance of a sophisticated con devised to transfer wealth quickly rather than to produce a serious canal upgrade. That even Panama's own engineering society was excluded from involvement, and key politicians have called the project a “disaster”, does nothing to dispel that perception.

A lot of trade within the western world, and between it and the orient goes through the Panama Canal. Consumers worldwide will end up subsidizing higher tolls if inefficient new locks are built.

To avoid converting global investments into losses, no concrete should be poured until real engineering is done.

*also published in The Panama News

Why a Damaging Panama Canal Expansion is Being Advanced

2011-01-31T18:22:00.000-08:00

In view of the recent revelations regarding the Panama Canal expansion project, the report below provides a valuable and timely contribution.
En vista de las recientes revelaciones acerca del proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá, los aportes del informe a continuación son muy valiosos y puntuales.
Highly negative assessments of the Panama Canal expansion project by the current President and Vice-President of Panama reflect facts, not opinion.
Las evaluaciones muy negativas del proyecto por el actual Presidente y por el Vice-Presidente de Panamá reflejan hechos, no opiniones.
Deliberately hiding this“disaster”, as it was characterized, behind hype and politics is unpardonable.
Deliberadamente ocultar este “desastre”, como se caracterizó al proyecto, detrás de propaganda y política es imperdonable.
For the world to allow it to proceed unchallenged and unchanged, would be to commit financial, commercial and environmental suicide with international repercussions.
Que el mundo permita que proceda sin impugnarlo y sin cambios, sería un suicidio financiero, comercial y ambiental con repercusiones internacionales.
Please distribute this document. The urgency for reviewing every aspect of this project immediately cannot be over-emphasized.
Favor distribuir este documento. No se puede exagerar la urgencia de revisar todos los aspectos de este proyecto de inmediato.
Gatún Lake Defense Committee -- Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún

The Gatún Lake Defense Committee advocates for a genuinely responsible and sustainable expansion of the Panama Canal, where its valuable resources are used effectively and left undamaged for the benefit of this and future generations. (Visit www.crucestrail.com)El Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún aboga por una ampliación realmente responsable y sostenible del Canal de Panamá, que usa sus recursos valiosos efectivamente y los deja sin daños para el beneficio de esta y de generaciones futuras. (Visite www.crucestrail.com)

Why a Damaging Panama Canal Expansion is Being Advanced
Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer, 5 January 2011

Without a doubt the feat of completing the Panama Canal nearly a century ago created the eight wonder of the world. The service the canal offers world markets has grown to such an extent that – despite tolls having been raised more than 1000% in just over ten years – more cargo transits it today than ever before. Clearly, it's worth expanding.

Precisely because its service is in such high demand, it is paramount to ensure that it is expanded as effectively as possible, taking into account all costs, which should fully include impacts to third parties and to the environment. A mediocre expansion, or worse yet what is being built today, is not acceptable.

Unjustifiable Costs & Damages

The plan today is to build a set of locks with three steps at each end of the canal – a single-lane with a total of 6 chambers and 18 “recycling” tanks – that will be too expensive and complicated for the service it will provide. There are far more effective designs – that incorporate similar parts and equipment, but which are more modern by one or two generations – that can markedly increase service while using less water. Moreover, with their more effectively meshed parts and operations, the more modern locks require fewer mechanical operations and less water transfers to accomplish their function than the one planned.What is being constructed has additional drawbacks. With more manipulations to perform, the locks now planned will require more maintenance than more modern locks. Furthermore, the dam over active faults required in conjunction with these locks will put the entire canal at risk, which is totally avoidable with the more efficient and more profitable newer locks.

If those facts were not cause enough to opt for better locks, what is being planned today – should it be built and begin to operate – will quickly turn Gatun Lake salty and create an avoidable saltwater migratory pathway across the Isthmus of Panama putting many marine species along both sea coasts at risk of extinction.

That could irreversibly reduce the variety of Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean catches.

Additionally, Gatun Lake's invaluable fresh water will be contaminated for no reason, other than to transfer the business of supplying Panama's public drinking water into the hands of those who recently acquired water rights to the rest of the country's rivers.
Finally, once this expansion farce is completed and the new system is operational, it won't be possible to convert it into one less harmful nor to undo damages it inflicts upon the oceans – we don't have that magic.
Knowing all this, one must ask how this expansion ended up with this plan, and why it continues on this course?

Personal experiences recounted below should shed some light.

Framing the Deception

Decisions on what would be built had apparently been taken two years prior to Panama announcing its intention to expand the canal. I conclude this from what I experienced.Two years after the plan to expand the canal had been announced – which occurred in late 2002 and was followed in early 2003 by the Discovery Channel program on the subject – I presented to the engineers of the Panama Canal Authority (known as the ACP) a mechanical device for lifting ships. When I concluded my presentation, I was informed that I had arrived four (4) years “too late.” That is to say, the decision on how the canal would be expanded was taken shortly after the U.S. fully relinquished control of the canal to the people of Panama.

One has to wonder during what space of time the process of identifying, configuring, assessing and comparing possible lock options was undertaken that led to choosing those with side-tanks?

During the years that Panama shared canal management with the United States no such studies were performed. If some cases were actually evaluated but not publicized, when was that and where are the details of those assessments?
Those presented in the project's Master Plan as the “alternatives” evaluated are absurd.
Astoundingly, the Master Plan doesn't even list the challenges and requirements on which to base the design of the chosen locks, or of any other options. Without that data, “designing” anything isn't possible; much less preparing comparative studies.
There is no evidence of any definitive studies actually having been made.

Misleading the Public

Those attending public forums held before the referendum were repeatedly reassured that – once the expansion was approved and funding became available – project details would be more fully evaluated and that their concerns would be satisfactorily resolved before proceeding. But, those assurances vanished into oblivion once the go-ahead vote was obtained.

These facts are not in keeping with the project's claimed high levels of “transparency”.

From the technical point of view it was very difficult to grasp why things were following such a seemingly illogical path. However, the reason became quite clear when considering that financial manipulations were likely afoot to get development bank loans as soon as possible.

Based on the observable, it appears that just one option – one that banks would accept as valid – was “prepared”. It seems what only mattered was to meet initial loan application requirements and to submit those without delay. That goal was achieved using the side-tank locks.

From that point forward all has seemingly been a “media show”, staged to direct attention away from project details containing discrepancies that contradicted statements made to the banks, thereby avoiding discoveries that would jeopardize receiving the desired funds promptly. Concluded from that is that this is why discussions of critical technical points were evaded during the public forums.

Out of the propaganda fog, the plan that has emerged appears to be based on falsehoods.

Perpetuating the Deception

In order to distribute contracts as soon as possible it was most important that nothing delay the receipt of the loans from the development banks. The disclosure of any issues at odds with “use” requirements tied to such development loans would have called for actual assessments to be performed, which would have caused the loans to be delayed or even canceled.

What is disturbing is that – while the moderators of forums held across Panama freely dodged discussing key technical issues, going so far as to ridicule people that asked serious and pointed questions – other entities, such as international banks, apparently accepted all assurances of clear sailing with little or no questioning.

The way it looks, to expose what is convenient – and not what is not – is how transparency is being applied. That this attitude is not confined to only Panama, the “WikiLeaks” made quite clear.

From the announcement of this project to this day – and true in Panama, as well as in most of the “developed” world where there are projects underway that depend on this one being “successful” – there has been no coverage in major national or local news media critical of the present canal expansion project or presenting other views or considerations. Even recent failures around Panama of infrastructure – built by companies tasked with important aspects of the expansion – have failed to elicit even mild reactions. That all suggests that major interests are at stake everywhere.

That a public works project – and in particular one as large as the Panama Canal, and of such importance to the world – should proceed to construction without having ever held any truly open and frank discussions or debates, at least with respect to its most critical element, is thoroughly unacceptable.

Never before on this planet has a project of this magnitude come into being with the “perfect” solution already identified, nor is this the first to do it despite what its promoters wish to claim.

Locks with side-tanks as applied in this project are highly inefficient and very harmful. Nonetheless, the project is proceeding as is and without hindrance – in full denial that much more appropriate lock arrangements do exist – presumably due to a plethora of third-party interests.

A More Profitable Expansion

Present-day discussions regarding this expansion continue to principally focus on financing and profitability, as they've done since 'Day One', but never has it been brought to light that – for an equivalent investment – expected revenues could be substantially greater with other locks. Beyond repeatedly declaring that the chosen locks were the only possible and most appropriate for the project, in what can only be characterized as pure propaganda, technical arguments to validate that assertion were never presented nor discussed, nor were the superior economic benefits attributed to them ever substantiated.

Developing locks that reduce water-use most effectively has – for decades – been considered the key to a successful expansion of the Panama Canal. Yet, this expansion's promoters have offered no proof of ever having truly performed the assessment studies necessary to identify the most effective locks.

There are four techniques that have been around since before the previous century for reducing the volume of water locks expend to raise and lower ships. But, personal experiences with the project have led me to conclude, that those putting the project together either did not know of all of these techniques or, for some irrational or obscure reason, chose to ignore them.

The locks selected for this Panama Canal expansion contain only two of the four water-saving techniques. The canal's original locks contain three.

Independent studies have identified alternative lock arrangements of comparable cost that use other combinations of those techniques more effectively. With the most effective combination, the number of daily transits could be increased by at least two-thirds, with each transit using less than two-thirds of the water the planned locks will use.

Promoters claim that the planned locks will use 40% of the water a “normal” lock would expend when operated like those of today's canal. But, in reality – given that they have only one lane – they will use closer to 45%, because the claimed 40% does not include the water expended to periodically reverse traffic.

In contrast, the simplest of the better alternatives would reduce water use to 37% of “normal”.

This simplest lock alternative would consist of four enlarged copies of the canal's present-day Pedro Miguel Locks (a one-step, two-lane lock unit), but with each copy including an uncomplicated culvert layout change. Designers had originally considered using that layout over a century ago, but with saving water not an issue in their day, and since using it would have cost more, it wasn't. Now, it would be worth it.

Two of those enlarged and modified units, with a short channel segment – comparable to today's Miraflores Lake – between them, would be used at each end of the canal in this simplest two-step alternative.

About the same volume of concrete, needed to build the single-lane locks with recycling tanks now planned, would be needed to build this simpler two-lane alternative that has no recycling tanks. Additionally, this option would require less maintenance by virtue of having fewer parts. Plus, it would avoid the planned one-lane system's potential for a complete interruption of service.

An even more efficient option would be one similar to the Pedro-Miguel type just described, but this version would have two recycling tanks added between each of its unit's chambers. About 20% more concrete would be required to build this layout, but it would use only 25% of the water that “normally” operated locks would use as compared to the 40+% that the current selection will use. This layout uses tanks much more effectively than the planned design.

Due to the sharp reduction in water expended per transit by this most efficient lock option, which is less than two-thirds of what the planned locks will expend, 20 ships a day could be transited with the same water that will be used to transit 12. Plus, up to 22 ships could be transited whenever extra water happened to be available.

In short, with little additional investment at least 160% of the revenue now expected could be realized.

More Capacity, Better Future

Considering all the lock capabilities that exist, there's no doubt that the current expansion's return-on-investment can be improved while reducing its complexity. Known risks and unacceptable damages can be avoided by applying proven technology much more effectively. Without adding much to the cost now, better performance can be achieved and maintenance needs reduced. However, if not addressed now, making changes afterward to attain equivalent capabilities will be impossible or prohibitively expensive.

The current plan makes no sense from the perspective of rational long-term goals, which are what the project should be targeting. What is the benefit of, or who is benefited by, adding a catastrophic risk to the Panama Canal and irreparably damaging the environment?

More modern lock arrangements would offer yet more advantages. Occupying less space, coupled with greater efficiency, they make future expansions more feasible. A risky dam over active fault lines – that could cause the loss of Gatun Lake – would be unnecessary. Using better arrangements would also result in markedly less saltwater intruding into the lake. As a bonus, they include an effective method to mitigate salt intrusions over the long haul, made possible by the system's better integration of parts and operations.

The alternatives presented above would be compatible with loan requirements, with no need to contemplate deception. They would also improve possibilities for future growth.

With so many advantages within reach one must question the benefit to the canal and to shipping to spend so much money – resulting in higher toll charges – to add one lane of locks that will yield only two-thirds of the transit service that would be offered by an expansion that uses the best locks available. Throw in the avoidable negative impacts that the current plan will inflict on Panama's population, which will further add to the project's true cost, and one must ask how is Panama benefiting from all this?

Again, what is the logic of this project on its present course?

Water Availability

It is now being heard that in the areas west of the canal's Trinidad River Basin – waters of which have always been considered the canal's reserve for when “all else fails” – residents are being told to begin preparing to abandon their homesteads to make way for the area's incorporation into the canal's watershed.

This is not acceptable.

Prior to the referendum it was declared that the canal's watershed would not have to be expanded for this project. As the present-day canal basin receives more than enough rainfall to supply this expansion, the planned locks were modified – by adding the third side-tank to each chamber, which reduced their water-use to the “40%” noted earlier – and the range over which Gatun Lake's level fluctuates was increased so as to augment the volume of water that is “usable” in lock operations.

But, the validity of this rather complex plan was never substantiated, nor was its cost ever estimated.

Nonetheless, on the basis of this “revised” plan – and with the approval of a law “against new reservoirs” – it was nationally declared that the concerns of those residing in the area in question had been addressed, and the process moved on to the casting of the votes that “approved” the project.

Now, with vote in pocket, it would seem that the project intends to proceed with expanding the canal's watershed, thus sealing the deception.

These developments suggest that there was never any intention of making adjustments within the boundaries of the present-day canal watershed to make up for the projected operating water shortfall.

In the same way that a proper lock selection study was seemingly by-passed, reviewing and evaluating ways to augment current watershed usable water volumes also appear to have been skipped. Both efforts must be done before any responsible decision on enhancing the watershed can be taken.

A Fraudulent Plebiscite

What Panama's people were asked to decide was whether or not they wanted the canal expanded. They weren't asked anything else. However, it appears that – in a referendum where very few citizens showed up to decide the fate of their most important asset – the “yes” they gave to kick off the project has seemingly been construed as a signing-over of that asset to the project's promoters.

The people have, in essence, lost all rights to intercede in affairs of the project, regardless of how it impacts them and how much they object. As they say in Panama, “va como va porque va”, meaning “it's going as is, because it's decided”. Effectively, there are no independent review mechanisms in place to protect the best interests of the asset's supposed owners. The foxes are in charge of the hen house.

The plebiscite I denounced as undemocratic, because in a true democracy the government cannot officially promote one side of an issue that requires a popular decision as was done in Panama. Political parties can take sides, but the government must remain neutral.

I also denounced the public forums that preceded the plebiscite for having been partial, alleging they were manipulated so as to evade disclosing issues that could have turned the vote.

Moreover, prior to the referendum all information relevant to the important decision soon to be made was not freely accessible. One had to file a request for additional information and explain why it was required. This not only discouraged research of the project's details by third parties, it reduced the likelihood that those who pressed on would discover all the details.

As the process was structured, critical details could be left out of the response to a researcher's request. As a researcher had no way of knowing in advance precisely what to specify in a request to ensure receipt of potentially contentious details, it was virtually impossible to receive those details.

The process leading to the referendum was not transparent, and nothing has changed since then.

Improvement Still Possible, Without Fraud

Based on the foregoing, I reject outright the notion that it's “too late” to roll back the locks that were chosen for this expansion of the Panama Canal. Most disgusting is the manipulative attempt afoot to make the project's on-time completion a matter of national pride in order to gain the public's backing of a second rate, ineffective and harmful plan.

Irresponsibility is never acceptable and should not be rewarded.

To say it is no longer feasible to make changes because that time “has passed” is nonsense.

Considering the time value of money, if the value of the time it would take to reconsider the present plan were measured against not only the value of the increase in transport services that could be attained with another plan, but also against the reduction of other work along the way, there is no doubt that better locks would make this expansion much more profitable.

Be it known that there is a second expansion already planned – which is something that was not disclosed to the Panamanian people, but is not a secret overseas. Being a clone of the first, that second expansion will be equally ineffective and damaging.

The same cost-reducing and service-increasing improvements that would benefit the current expansion would also benefit any future expansion. What is more, by changing the chosen locks now to ones that perform better, the projected subsequent expansion could be postponed indefinitely.

However, if the project proceeds as planned, the canal’s future growth will be cut short severely, and that will be irreversible. Quite frankly, it would be preferable to pay the contractors to build nothing than to bring to fruition what is presently planned.

Only the project's choice of locks is being argued in this document. The casting of the concrete that will form them has not begun. None of the digging of new navigation channels would be lost, nor would the work already done to enlarge existing ones go to waste, by changing the choice of locks.

In addition to the presented arguments against the chosen locks, I denounced the planned incorporation of territories to the west of the canal's Atlantic entrance because the need for more water is integrally linked to the choice of locks and because a proper assessment of the many enhancements that could be made to the existing watershed to increase its yield has not been done. These shortcomings must be attended before launching any watershed expansion.

Conclusion

It would seem that the current Panama Canal expansion plan has everything to do with maximizing construction efforts, be that by way of excavating channels and casting locks, or by way of enlarging the watershed. Getting after all of it as quickly as possible is clearly of paramount importance to someone.

Maximizing the potential of the canal appears irrelevant to the plan. Likewise, damages to third-parties and the environment are not relevant. That work advances, and that money flows without delays, seems to be all that matters.

The rush to distribute lucrative contracts, along with the rush to take advantage of all of the country's other resources at one go – something that would never be done by truly first-world countries with responsible leaders – creates the strong impression that what motivates those who are actually running Panama is to become multimillionaires at the public's expense.

We must put a stop to all these scams. If this course is maintained, there will be little left of the jewel that was Panama in the last century. All the flora and fauna that Panama is famous for is about to be wiped out, along with most of its rural and indigenous cultures, just to feed the greed of a few powerful men.

Expanding the Panama Canal is worth doing. We have the knowledge and the technology to do it right.

There is no argument with which to justify advancing an inefficient expansion of the Panama Canal that will forever expose it to the danger of being flushed to sea – along with everything on its banks – because of a dam being irresponsibly built atop active faults. Furthermore, to permanently put this canal's maximum potential permanently out-of-reach, and to risk eradicating marine species due to unjustifiably pushing ahead a bad choice of locks that will salt-up Gatun Lake, would be to disregard – with total contempt – more than a century of responsible studies and evaluations.

Ingeniero Shelton denuncia hechos graves de la ampliación del Canal de Panamá

2011-01-13T21:22:00.001-08:00

En vista de las recientes revelaciones acerca del proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá, los aportes del informe a continuación son muy valiosos y puntuales.
In view of the recent revelations regarding the Panama Canal expansion project, the report below provides a valuable and timely contribution.
Las evaluaciones muy negativas del proyecto por el actual Presidente y por el Vice-Presidente de Panamá reflejan hechos, no opiniones.
Highly negative assessments of the Panama Canal expansion project by the current President and Vice-President of Panama reflect facts, not opinion.
Deliberadamente ocultar este “desastre”, como se caracterizó al proyecto, detrás de propaganda y política es imperdonable.
Deliberately hiding this“disaster”, as it was characterized, behind hype and politics is unpardonable.
Que el mundo permita que proceda sin impugnarlo y sin cambios, sería un suicidio financiero, comercial y ambiental con repercusiones internacionales.
For the world to allow it to proceed unchallenged and unchanged, would be to commit financial, commercial and environmental suicide with international repercussions.
Favor distribuir este documento. No se puede exagerar la urgencia de revisar todos los aspectos de este proyecto de inmediato.
Please distribute this document. The urgency for reviewing every aspect of this project immediately cannot be over-emphasized.
Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún
El Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún aboga por una ampliación realmente responsable y sostenible del Canal de Panamá, que usa sus recursos valiosos efectivamente y los deja sin daños para el beneficio de esta y de generaciones futuras. (Visite www.crucestrail.com)
The Gatún Lake Defense Committee advocates for a genuinely responsible and sustainable expansion of the Panama Canal, where its valuable resources are used effectively and left undamaged for the benefit of this and future generations. (Visit www.crucestrail.com)

Publicado el enero 11, 2011 por Burica Press

El por qué se avanza con una ampliación dañina del Canal de Panamá

Bert G. Shelton, Ingeniero e Investigador Científico

No hay duda que con el logro de completar el Canal de Panamá cien años atrás se creó la octava maravilla del mundo. El servicio que le ofrece al mercado mundial ha crecido a tal grado que a pesar de que sus peajes hayan aumentado más del 1000% en poco más de diez años, hoy la transita más carga que nunca. Está claro que vale la pena ampliarlo.

Precisamente debido a su alta demanda hay que asegurar que sea ampliada de la forma más efectiva posible, teniendo en cuenta a todos los costos junto a los impactos a terceros y al medioambiente. Una ampliación mediocre, o peor aún la que se construye hoy, no es aceptable.

Las esclusas de Miraflores, frente al Oceáno Pacifico tienen la misión de mantener el nivel del Lago Miraflores, ascender y descender barcos que las atraviesan y mantener regulada la intrusión de agua salada al sistema de agua dulce del Lago Miraflores. En los últimos la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá ha tenido que reconocer que las aguas del Lago Miraflores se han salinizado, excepto el sector del Lago adyacente al Parque Nacional Camino de Cruces. Hasta la década de 1970 la intromisión de agua salina por estas esclusas fue poca y manejable, dado el menor nivel de tráfico de barcos que cruzaban diariamente la vía. En la última década y media con el aumento de frecuencias de esclusajes la intrusión salina ha sido evidente y demostrada con la nueva biota acuática que forma parte del Lago MIraflores. Se desconocen los niveles de contaminación salina actuales en el Lago Miraflores. Foto: http://psych.fullerton.edu/navarick/index.html

Costos y daños injustificables

Ahora está en construcción un sistema de esclusas con tinas de reciclaje que es demasiado costoso y complicado para lo que proporcionará. Hay otros sistemas confeccionados de los mismos componentes, y más modernos por una o dos generaciones, que rinden significativamente más servicio usando notablemente menos agua. Es más, por como se han engranado más efectivamente los componentes y sus operaciones, sistemas más modernos logran reducir el número de manejos mecánicos y de traslados de agua.

El sistema en construcción tiene desventajas adicionales. Requerirá más mantenimiento que los sistemas más modernos. Es más, el dique que se construirá encima de fallas activas arriesgará al canal entero, lo cual es perfectamente evitable con sistemas más modernos de mayor rendimiento y más rentables.

Si lo antedicho no fuese suficiente para optar por otro sistema, lo que hoy se construye salinizará al Lago Gatún rápidamente al ser operado, poniendo en riesgo de extinción a muchas de las criaturas marinas de ambos mares. Dañará la valiosa agua dulce de este lago sin necesidad alguna, a excepción de la de pasarles el negocio de abastecerle agua al pueblo a los que recientemente obtuvieron las concesiones del resto de las aguas dulces de los ríos del país.

Finalmente, una vez que esta farsa concluya y el sistema comience a funcionar, no podrá ser transformado a uno menos dañino y los daños a los mares no se podrán anular – no poseemos esa magia.

Sabiendo todo esto, hay que preguntar ¿cómo acabo la ampliación con este plan, y porqué sigue en este rumbo?

Lo explicaré con el siguiente relato.

Armando el Engaño

Dos años antes de que se divulgara la intención de ampliar el canal, ya estaba decidido lo que se iba a hacer. Esta conclusión la baso en mi propia experiencia con el proyecto. A los dos años de haberse anunciado la intención de ampliar al Canal de Panamá – que ocurrió a finales del 2002, seguido al comienzo del 2003 por la presentación en el Discovery Channel – les presenté a los ingenieros de la ACP otro tipo de alzador de naves. Al cabo de mi presentación me informaron que lo que presenté llegó cuatro(4) años “muy tarde”. Es decir, la decisión de cómo se ampliaría el canal se tomó poco después de que los Estados Unidos cedió al Canal en su totalidad al pueblo panameño.

Pregunto entonces, ¿en cuál espacio de tiempo identificaron, formaron, evaluaron y compararon las mejores opciones para alzar naves de las cuales escogieron las esclusas con tinas?

Durante los años del manejo compartido con los Estados Unidos no se hicieron tales estudios. Si en verdad evaluaron algunos casos, ¿cuándo lo hicieron y adónde están los detalles de esas evaluaciones?

Lo que se presentó en el Plan Maestro como las “alternativas” que fueron evaluadas es una burla. El Plan Maestro ni siquiera incluye un listado de los retos y requisitos en cuales basar un diseño de esclusas u otras opciones. Sin esos datos no es posible “diseñar” cualquiera de las alternativas, incluyendo la escogida, y mucho menos hacer comparaciones.

No hay prueba alguna de que los estudios necesarios fueron hechos.

Despistando al Público

Repetidamente durante los foros públicos previos al plebiscito se les prometió a los que asistieron que – una vez aprobada la ampliación y una vez conseguido el dinero para hacerlo – sus preocupaciones serían resueltas a su satisfacción antes de comenzar a construir. Pero esas promesas quedaron en el olvido al obtenerse el voto.

Estos hechos son incompatibles con los discursos del alto nivel de transparencia en el manejo del proyecto . Desde el punto de vista técnico y de la lógica era muy difícil entender porqué se gestionaban las cosas de esta manera.

Sin embargo, el porqué quedó muy claro al considerar que todo era una jugada financiera para obtener préstamos de los bancos de desarrollo rápidamente.

En base a lo observado, pareciera que sólo una opción – una que los bancos aceptarían como válida – fue creada. Por lo visto, lo único de importancia era poder cumplir con los requisitos iniciales para completar y presentar las solicitudes de préstamos con prontitud. Esa meta se alcanzó usando las esclusas con tinas.

A partir de ese punto todo parece haber sido un “show mediático” para asegurar que no surgieran discrepancias en la “sustentación” de las declaraciones hechas a los bancos para así obtener los fondos anhelados lo antes posible. Se concluye que ésta es la razón por la cual fueron evadidas las discusiones de puntos técnicos críticos durante los foros.

A todas luces, pareciera que el plan actual está fundado en falsedades.

Perpetuando el Engaño

Para poder repartir los contratos lo antes posible, era de suma importancia que no se retrasara la obtención de los préstamos provenientes de los bancos de desarrollo. La revelación de cualquier problema en desacuerdo con los requisitos de los bancos hubiera requerido evaluaciones reales y hubiera causado el retraso, o la cancelación, de dichos préstamos.

Lo curioso es que – mientras que en Panamá se permitía que los moderadores de los foros esquivaran discusiones claves llegando hasta burlarse de personas que hacían preguntas serias y puntuales – otras instituciones, los bancos intenacionales en particular, daban la impresión de aceptar todas las garantías del proyecto sin, o con un mínimo de cuestionamiento.

Pareciera que se considera que para ser transparente sólo hay que poner a la vista lo que conviene, y simplemente no mencionar lo que no. Por lo visto esa actitud no se limita a Panamá, como fue dejado muy claro por los “WikiLeaks”.

Desde que se anunció el proyecto de ampliación y hasta la fecha – ni en Panamá, ni en paises “más desarrollados” en donde han lanzado proyectos propios que dependen de que se realice este a tiempo – no se ha publicado en medios de alta circulación, ningún artículo que lo critique o que presente otros puntos de vista. Sugiere que todos tienen intereses de por medio.

"Que una obra pública – y en particular una tan grande como es la del Canal de Panamá, y de tanta importancia para el mundo – avance a su construcción sin discusiones ni debates abiertos e interactivos, por lo menos con respecto a su elemento más crítico, es inaceptable."
Bert Shelton

En el mundo, nunca ha nacido un proyecto de esta magnitud con la solución “perfecta” ya identificada. Tampoco es éste el primero que lo haya logrado, aunque así pareciera que lo intentan declarar sus promotores. Las esclusas con tinas son altamente ineficientes y dañinas. No obstante, aunque se sabe que hay otras mucho más indicadas, el proyecto avanza tal y como está, sin impedimentos, presuntamente debido a los intereses de terceros.

Una ampliación más rentable

Discusiones acerca de esta ampliación siguen, como desde el inicio, centrados principalmente en su financiamiento y en su rentabilidad, pero jamás se ha divulgado que — por la misma inversión – los ingresos previstos pudieran ser muchísimos más. Más allá de haber sido repetidamente declaradas las esclusas más apropiadas para esta ampliación, en lo que se puede caracterizar como propaganda, los argumentos técnicos para sustentar esa calificación jamás fueron presentados ni debatidos, ni tampoco sustentaron los supuestos beneficios económicos superiores que aportarían.

Desde el siglo antepasado las cuatro técnicas con las cuales se puede variar la cantidad de agua que se desgasta al alzar o bajar buques que transitan sistemas de esclusas se ha conocido. Las esclusas seleccionadas para esta ampliación del Canal de Panamá sólo contienen dos. Las esclusas originales del canal contienen más.

Estudios independientes demuestran que hay arreglos de esclusas de costos comparables que contienen otras combinaciones de las cuatro técnicas. El mejor de estos arreglos aumentaría los tránsitos diarios por al menos dos-tercios, con cada tránsito usando menos de dos-tercios del agua que usarán las esclusas seleccionadas.

Se ha dicho que las esclusas con tinas usarán el 40% del agua que usarían esclusas “normales” operadas como a las actuales. Pero en realidad éstas usarán más cerca al 45%, porque ese 40% no incluye el agua que se gastará de rutina al cambiar la dirección de los tránsitos.

En comparación, el arreglo más sencillo de las mejores alternativas reduciría el uso del agua al 37% de lo “normal”. Este arreglo consistiría meramente de cuatro copias agrandadas de las esclusas de Pedro Miguel, las cuales contendrían una modificación simple – conocida por más de un siglo – a su sistema de ductos internos.

Esta opción de dos carriles, sin tina alguna, requeriría casi la misma cantidad de concreto para construirla y necesitaría menos mantenimiento. No presentaría el riesgo de un cierre a tránsitos como tendrá el sistema de un carril.

Otra opción, similar a la descrita de tipo Pedro Miguel tendría dos tinas entre sus dos carriles, y requeriría cerca de 20% más concreto para construirla. Sin embargo usaría sólo el 25% del agua que usarían esclusas “normales” operadas como las actuales, comparada a la selección actual que usará 40% más.

Debido a la marcada reducción de agua consumida por cada buque transitando a esta opción más eficiente, se podrían transitar hasta 20 barcos al día con la misma agua que transitará los 12 previstos para la ampliación actual, y hasta 22 cuando haya más agua. .

En resumen, con poca inversión adicional se lograría como mínimo 160% de los ingresos que ahora se prevén.

Más capacidad, mejor futuro

Considerando lo antedicho, hay varias formas para incrementar el rendimiento de la inversión que se está haciendo en esta ampliación. Sus riesgos y daños se pueden evitar con un mejor uso de la tecnología disponible en la actualidad y un mayor rendimiento se puede obtener sin costo adicional de importancia. La selección actual no tiene sentido así que ¿cuál es el beneficio de introducirle un riesgo catastrófico al sistema canalero y de dañar al medio ambiente irremediablemente?

Mejores arreglos de esclusas añadirían otros beneficios. Ocuparían menos espacio, permitirían eliminar el dique peligroso sobre fallas activas – que podrá ocasionar la pérdida del Lago Gatún – y reducirían marcadamente la entrada de agua salada al sistema. Además, incluirían un método efectivo para mitigar la intrusión salina al lago Gatún, a largo plazo.

Los ejemplos presentados serían compatibles con los requisitos de los préstamos, y sin engaños. Además, proporcionarían mejores posibilidades para el crecimiento futuro del canal.

Con tantas ventajas al alcance hay que preguntar ¿cuál es el beneficio para los negocios del transporte marítimo y del canal de gastar tanto dinero en esclusas que, con peajes más altos, rendirán sólo dos-tercios del servicio de tránsitos que rendiría una ampliación que utiliza el mejor de los sistemas de esclusas hoy disponibles? Y, aún falta considerar los impactos negativos evitables a la población causadas por la ampliación en su forma actual.

Nuevamente, ¿cuál es la lógica de este proyecto en su rumbo actual?

Disponibilidad de Agua

En la actualidad se escucha desde la zona de la cuenca oriental del canal – zona cuyas aguas están reservadas para el futuro uso del canal – que a los moradores se les ha informado que ya deben empezar a desalojar el área para dar paso a la inclusión de esa zona en la cuenca.

Esto es inaceptable!

Previo al plebiscito se declaró que no sería necesario ampliar la cuenca para este proyecto. Como la cuenca de hoy recibe más que suficientes lluvias para abastecer a esta ampliación, se propuso hacerle ajustes al sistema de esclusas y cambios al manejo del Lago Gatún para mejorar la utilización de las aguas de la cuenca actual .

Pero, la validez de ese plan complicado nunca fue sustentado.

Sin embargo, con ese plan – y con la aprobación de una ley “en contra de embalses” – se declaró que las preocupaciones de los moradores de la zona oriental habían sido “atendidas”, y de allí se procedió al voto que aprobó al proyecto..

Ahora, con el voto en el bolsillo, pareciera que se pretende proceder a ampliar la cuenca, completando así el engaño.

Esos sucesos sugieren que nunca hubo intención de hacerle ajustes a la cuenca actual para obtener el agua requerida para un Canal ampliado.

No han sido investigadas a fondo las formas de mejorar el manejo de la cuenca. Eso habría que hacerse antes de decidir ampliarla e impactar áreas nuevas.

Un plebiscito fraudulento

Lo que al pueblo se le preguntó era si querían o no que se ampliara el canal. No se les preguntó más nada. Sin embargo, pareciera que el “sí” que el pueblo dio se ha convertido en una entrega total de éste bien a los promotores de la obra. En efecto, el pueblo panameño ha perdido todo derecho de involucrarse en asuntos de la ampliación; no importa cómo impacte al público, ni que el pueblo se oponga, “va como va” porque va.

"no hay democracia en el mundo en el cual los gobernantes pueden poner todo el peso del gobierno para apoyar el resultado que ellos buscan”

Bert Shelton

Al plebiscito, lo denuncio como no-democrático, porque no hay democracia en el mundo en el cual los gobernantes pueden poner todo el peso del gobierno para apoyar el resultado que ellos buscan.

Al igual denuncio los foros previos al plebiscito por no haber sido imparciales. Alego que fueron manipulados para evadir discusiones serias que pudiesen haber cambiado el resultado del voto.

Es más, previo al plebiscito toda la información relevante para la importante decisión a mano no era de libre acceso. Había que presentar una solicitud para obtener información adicional y explicar porqué se necesitaba. Eso no sólo desalentaba el proceso de investigación por terceros, pero también impedía que uno revisara todos los aspectos libremente para descubrir todo el detalle.

Como fue manejado, detalles críticos podían quedar fuera de la respuesta a la solicitud, ya que el trámite aseguraba que el investigador no encontrara los contenciosos. Él no sabría por antemano cómo preparar su solicitud con la exactitud necesaria para asegurarse de recibir esos detalles.

El proceso que condujo al plebiscito no fue transparente, y nada ha cambiado desde entonces.

Hay tiempo para mejorar, sin defraudar

En base a lo antedicho, rechazo rotundamente la excusa de que ya es “muy tarde” para echar atrás la selección de esclusas para esta ampliación del Canal de Panamá. El convertir la tarea de completar la obra en un asunto de orgullo nacional – para ganar el respaldo del pueblo para un plan inefectivo, dañino, y de segunda – es repugnante.

La irresponsabilidad nunca es aceptable y no ha de ser premiada.

Decir que ya no es factible hacer cambios porque es “muy tarde” es totalmente falso.

Si uno asesora el costo del tiempo requerido para recapacitar y lo mide contra todo el trabajo que se puede eliminar de la ampliación actual en combinación con el aumento en capacidad que se obtendrá con la misma, no hay duda que cambiar las esclusas a unas mejores lo haría mucho más rentable.

Sépase que lo que no fue divulgado al pueblo panameño – pero que no es un secreto en el extranjero – es que hay una segunda ampliación ya planificada. Esa segunda ampliación es igual de ineficiente y dañina por ser una copia de la primera.

Las mismas mejoras requeridas por la ampliación actual – que reducen costos y aumentan capacidad – beneficiarían a cualquiera futura ampliación. Al cambiar el tipo de esclusas ahora a unas que rinden más, no tendría que hacerse una segunda ampliación tan pronto como se prevé actualmente.

"sería preferible pagarles a los contratistas por no construir nada a que se complete lo pretendido”

Bert Shelton

No obstante, si “va como va”, el crecimiento futuro del canal quedará severamente reducido, y eso será irreversible. Hasta sería preferible pagarles a los contratistas por no construir nada a que se complete lo pretendido.

Entiéndase que aquí sólo se están discutiendo las esclusas del proyecto. La colocación del concreto para ellas no ha empezado. Los trabajos de ampliar los cauces de navegación existentes y los de excavar cauces nuevos que ya están en marcha no se pierden al cambiar la selección de las esclusas.

Junto con mis argumentos en contra de las esclusas elegidas, denuncio el plan de ampliar la cuenca hidrográfica del canal hacia el noroeste porque la necesidad de ampliarla está íntegramente ligada a las esclusas que cuestiono y porque falta hacerse un asesoramiento veraz de las diversas mejoras que podrían introducirse en la cuenca existente. Hay que subsanar estas faltas antes de proceder con la ampliación de la cuenca.

Conclusión

Pareciera que el plan actual de ampliación del Canal de Panamá tiene todo que ver con maximizar la construcción en materia de excavaciones y estructuras, más asegurar la incorporación de las reservas de agua lo antes posible debido al trabajo que eso agrega. Maximizar el potencial del mismo canal no parece formar parte del plan, pero sí las ganancias de los involucrados en la obra. Daños a terceros y al medioambiente ni figuran.

"El apuro de repartir contratos lucrativos, junto con el apuro en sacarle provecho a todos los recursos del país de un tiro – algo que nunca se haría en verdaderos países de primer mundo con dirigentes responsables – crea la fuerte impresión que lo que motiva a los que están a cargo es hacerse multi-millonarios a costillas del pueblo."

Bert Shelton

Hay que ponerle un alto a estos fraudes. Si este rumbo se mantiene quedará poco de la joya que fue Panamá en el siglo pasado.

Vale la pena ampliar al Canal de Panamá y tenemos los conocimientos y la tecnología para hacerlo bien.

No hay justificación alguna para una ampliación mediocre que expone a este canal al peligro permanente de su pérdida total a causa de un dique construido irresponsablemente encima de fallas activas. Poner fuera del alcance al potencial máximo del Canal de Panamá y arriesgar a especies marinas a causa de unas esclusas mal escogidas de ineficiencia perpetua que salinizarán al Lago Gatún, sería descartar – con desprecio total – a más de un siglo de estudios y evaluaciones responsables.

***

Lea además:

Slave tank locks system for the Panama Canal

La intrusión de agua salina en el Canal de Panamá

Canal ampliado no prevé sistemas para evitar intrusión salina

El problema ignorado de la salinización

Intrusión salina en el Canal de Panamá

Evalúan contratista para compuertas

2010-12-23T23:38:00.000-08:00

Economía y Negocios Compartir

AMPLIACIÓN DEL CANAL
Evalúan contratista para compuertas

Las compuertas son parte del contrato que se adjudicó Gupc por 3 mil 200 millones de dólares y que se deben comenzar a construir en julio de 2011.

BASALTO. Gupc ya trabaja en la planta de procesamiento de agregados para comenzar a colocar concreto en el próximo verano. CORTESÍA/ACP

Wilfredo Jordán S.
wjordan@prensa.com

Grupo Unidos por el Canal (Gupc), que ejecuta el contrato de diseño y construcción del tercer juego de esclusas, canceló la carta de intención con la empresa Hereema de Holanda que iba a construir las 16 compuertas a un costo de aproximadamente 400 millones de dólares.

El subcontratista no había firmado algunas garantís exigidas por la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), fue una de las razones que evitó llevar a un feliz término la negociación, dijo Antonio Zaffaroni, director ejecutivo de Gupc.

Las compuertas son parte del contrato que se adjudicó Gupc por 3 mil 200 millones de dólares y que según lo programado deben comenzarse a construir en julio de 2011.

Tras la decisión de Gupc, los directivos del consorcio enviaron a la ACP las propuestas de Hiunday (Corea) y Cimulai (Italia), compañías que también pueden construir las compuertas.

Estas estructuras serán corredizas y de láminas de acero de 28 metros de alto, 58 metros de largo y 10 metros de ancho, con un peso de 4 mil toneladas cada una. Según había informado Gupc, el contrato incluye su transporte en barco hasta el Canal, donde deberán instalarse entre julio de 2013 y enero de 2014, meses antes de que comiencen a operar las nuevas esclusas.

La ACP está verificando las alternativas presentadas por Gupc y aplicará los mismos requerimientos que se establecieron para la selección de la empresa con la cual el contratista no pudo llegar a un acuerdo para firmar un contrato.

“Es un cambio y variación que permite el contrato”, explicó el vicepresidente ejecutivo del Departamento de Ingeniería y Administración de Programas de la ACP, Jorge Luis Quijano. Las compuertas serán diseñadas por la empresa holandesa IV Groep que tiene su sede en Papendrecht. Gupc también tiene que contratar a una empresa para construir el sistema de 140 válvulas que llevan las esclusas para el funcionamiento hidráulico de las compuertas.

----------------
Comentarios
Los comentarios expresados son responsabilidad exclusiva de los lectores.
No representan la opinión de prensa.com

Programadorcito
12/23/2010 4:11:14 PM
Señores que disparates dicen, debes ganar el contrato para poder sub contratar a otra compañía, lo único que me molesta es que se haya demorado tanto en cancelar ese contrato, pienso que el abanico de posibilidades se debio entrgar hace meses a la acp y exigirles los punto inquebrantables exigido por la acp de esa manera ya etsuviera firmado y dicha compañía debiese empezar a trabajar en esas compuerta desde el mes de enero de 2011 para que tenga olgura por si sale algún imprevisto.
3

improvi
12/23/2010 11:03:34 AM
bueno la construccion del canal se baso en la improvisación, ya que el canal de por si es unico, si esta compañia no podia hacer las compuertas, se tiene que buscar a otra...
2

Termino medio o bien cocido
12/23/2010 6:12:28 AM
O sea que sigue la improvisación. Cuando se adjudicó la obra una precondición debió ser tener todos los componentes negociados y contratados, y no empezar a hacer contratos luego de ser adjudicados. Aqui pueden darse dos cosas: por empezar tarde y apurar las cosas que los componentes queden mal hechos, o los materiales que se usen no sean de la más alta calidad, aqui no se permiten términos medios, el tercer juego de esclusas debe superar al sistema original en calidad, capacidad y durabilidad.

Turbulencia en proyecto canalero

2010-12-20T13:13:00.000-08:00

LOS CABLES DE WIKILEAKS SOBRE PANAMÁ
Turbulencia en proyecto canalero
La embajadora de EU en Panamá se hizo eco de las quejas de las empresas que participaban de una u otra forma en el proyecto de ampliación del Canal.

AL MÉRITO. El 6 de julio de 2010, Martinelli y Varela condecoraron a Barbara Stephenson. Cortesía: Presidencia de la República1484452

BETTY BRANNAN JAÉN
CORRESPONSAL EN WASHINGTON
laprensadc@aol.com
Panamá. -En 2008 y 2009, la embajadora de Estados Unidos (EU) en Panamá, Barbara Stephenson, informó en sus cables a Washington que había considerable “turbulencia” en el proceso de licitación para el contrato de construcción del tercer juego de esclusas, al punto que las empresas involucradas llegaron a dudar que el proyecto pudiera completarse exitosamente.
Pero estos problemas estuvieron escondidos del público. “La turbulencia en la licitación para la ampliación del Canal de Panamá solo se discute en círculos pequeños y no está presente en el dominio público.
Es asombroso [stunning] el mensaje y la disciplina mediática de los panameños en lo que es el más grande tema económico de Panamá”, señala un cable de noviembre de 2008.
“La ampliación de un canal es difícil”, comentó Stephenson en otro cable (octubre de 2008), dirigido a la secretaria de Estado y a los Departamentos de Tesoro, Comercio y Transporte de EU. Sin cuestionar el buen manejo del Canal por los panameños, ella señaló que una cosa es administrar la vía acuática y otra es administrar una obra de esta complejidad -y de “una escala sin precedentes”-.
Los cables hablan no solamente de múltiples demoras en licitar el tercer juego de esclusas -lo que por sí solo indicaba “turbulencia” en el proceso- sino también de interminables enmiendas a los pliegos para las propuestas. También se habla de fricción entre la Autoridad del Canal (ACP) y la empresa consultora contratada para apoyar la administración de la obra, CH2M Hill. La empresa aparentemente se quejaba con la Embajada de que la ACP estaba “estorbando” el proceso de licitación, lo cual hizo, según los cables, que CH2M Hill “advirtiera que el proyecto no podría completarse exitosamente si seguía el mismo rumbo”.
También había descontento por parte de los interesados en adquirir el contrato para las nuevas esclusas. La queja era que la ACP quería que todos los riesgos imprevistos cayeran sobre ellos sin ofrecer compensación adecuada para esos riesgos. Además, el pliego original contemplaba castigos “draconianos” por fallas de cumplimiento que podrían ser mínimas (en lugar de que el castigo fuera proporcional a la severidad de la falla). Según los cables, todo esto ahuyentó a algunas empresas; los franceses se retiraron y la empresa estadounidense, Bechtel, casi se retira. Bechtel le indicó a la Embajada que preparar su propuesta estaba costando un millón de dólares al mes, a causa de las enmiendas.
Por ello, el cable de 2008 se tituló “Agua turbulenta para la ampliación canalera” [(Rough Water for Canal Expansion). Nuevamente, Stephenson dijo que Bechtel y ACS (una empresa española) “han expresado inquietudes sobre la habilidad de la ACP para completar el proceso de licitación de manera completamente exitosa”. Ella señaló que las empresas estaban ponderando transferir sus esfuerzos hacia “proyectos más lucrativos” y que las demoras podrían provocar escasez de equipos. Caterpillar, por ejemplo, podría “perder la paciencia” y transferir su producción a otros proyectos.
Los próximos cables (se han divulgado cuatro más) ya no vuelven a mencionar esta “turbulencia”, pero sí relatan cómo la Embajada trató de ayudar a que Bechtel ganara la licitación, e incluyen críticas al proyecto por parte del presidente, Ricardo Martinelli y el vicepresidente, Juan Carlos Varela.

Declaraciones de Varela y Martinelli generan críticas
La publicación de cables de Wikileaks en los que el vicepresidente de la República, Juan Carlos Varela, calificó el proyecto de ampliación canalera como “un desastre” y el presidente de la República, Ricardo Martinelli, dijo estar “preocupado” por la posibilidad de que el administrador de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), Alberto Alemán, hubiese influido en el proceso de licitación para favorecer a Cusa, empresa de su familia, han generado fuertes reacciones.
Para el analista político Edwin Cabrera, es preocupante que Martinelli y Varela hayan puesto en tela de duda la capacidad de la ACP. “Ambos le deben una explicación a los ciudadanos. Porque una de dos: están especulando o tienen informaciones que el resto no conocemos”.
Jaime Porcell, analista político, dijo que se trató de una “ingenuidad” del presidente Martinelli. Agregó que debería dar una explicación. En tanto, el empresario Enrique De Obarrio dijo que lo ocurrido supone falta de prudencia, ya que es normal que los embajadores reporten lo que les cuentan.
JOSÉ ARCIA
Comentarios
Los comentarios expresados son responsabilidad exclusiva de los lectores.
No representan la opinión de prensa.com

sofronio
12/20/2010 10:37:08 PM Obviamente que Alemán Zubieta influyó para que el consorcio donde estaba la empresa CUSA donde su hermano es el gerente general ganara la licitación.
Quien como tu hermano para darle fuera de horas de oficina y lejos de miradas indiscretas toda toda la información clave en especificaciones técnicas y precios para garantizar la victoria en la licitación,
17

Arcadio Buen Dia
12/20/2010 6:26:05 PM Miren, la ACP mantiene una profusa informaciòn sobre la obra y su ejecucion , esta en internet tomense el trabajo de averiguar antes de hablar, incluyendo a las autoridades
16

Arcadio Buen Dia 2
12/20/2010 6:22:42 PM Bechtel no ha construido ninguno de los grandes aeropuertos del mundo, ni ninguna de las torres mas altas. Tendra sus meritos, pero ser gringos ya no lo es porque ellos no tiene el patrimonio del conocimiento y me disgusta mas que un idiota como David, que en canada debe estar lavando platos o reparando inodoros como mucho, hablando de lo que no sabe alla desde lejos. La obra se va a hacer, señores y alli participan panameños especializados a todos los niveles y yo confio en ellos.
15

alejandro
12/20/2010 2:58:39 PM Hambruna de codiciosos avaros y mafiosos que nunca han visto tanta plata y menosprecian los CONOCIMIENTOS que son los que hacen avanzar a la humanidad porque son unos IGNORANTES ladrones profesionales y punto. No les importa que del canal depende TODA la prosperidad de esta nación y tanto que ahora los nicas invaden tierras costarricenses para tratar de hacer un canal propio con ayuda de sus socios. Estos ladrones que ocupan la administración de la ACP deberían de ser botados ´!!
14

La rivera Canalera....
12/20/2010 2:01:11 PM Paisanos creo que lo comente anteriormente estas tierras en el futuro seran asentamientos para los gavachos del norte. El trabajo de mis paisanos esta terminado aplanar las tierras, Hoy dia se cuelan todos los huiracanes del pacifico y el atlantico. Ahora necesitaran los ingenieros Americanos para controlar los rios que alimentan las esclusas del Canal. Con el canal seco en el norte de lado a lado los buques de alto calado no necesitan el Canal de Panama. Usaran los oceanos Pacifico y Atlantico.
13

La rivera Canalera....
12/20/2010 1:33:22 PM Paisanos creo que lo comente anteriormente estas tierras en el futuro seran asentamientos para los gavachos del norte. El trabajo de mis paisanos esta terminado aplanar las tierras, Hoy dia se cuelan todos los huiracanes del pacifico y el atlantico. Ahora necesitaran los ingenieros Americanos para controlar los rios que alimentan las esclusas del Canal. Con el canal seco en el norte de lado a lado los buques de alto calado no necesitan el Canal de Panama. Usaran los oceanos Pacifico y Atlantico.
12

Luis
12/20/2010 11:34:35 AM ya leímos el wikileaks de los gringos, ahora quiero leer el wikileaks de los españoles. pienso que puede ser electrificante.
11

Rafael
12/20/2010 11:32:08 AM Señores, no es que los ingenieros no estemos entrenados
a diferencia de otros paises.

Radica, en la injerencia politica, las comisas, el juevo vivo y la rebusca, la falta de organizacion , todo lo que conlleva los manejos politicos para beneficiar amistadas del regimen de turno.

Esa es la diferencia, a un proyecto en Canada, Estados Unidos y Europa.
10

para David
12/20/2010 11:25:10 AM Sigo: por lo cual pienso que hay que hacer las diferencias entre construir y dar mantenimiento a infraestructuras. Los códigos y normas que usamos en Panamá en cuanto a la disciplina de la ingeniería son los códigos americanos que son unos de los más estrictos a nivel de diseño y construcción. Soy Ingeniero Electromecánico.
9

Para David
12/20/2010 11:19:30 AM La ingeniería en todas sus ramas es la misma aquí y en todos lados. En Panamá las obras que se han realizado de infraestructuras, edificios, puentes, sistemas eléctricos de potencia, hidroeléctricas, plantas térmicas que tenemos la mas grande de Centroamérica, museo de la biodiversidad con unos de los mejores arquitectos del mundo Frank Gary donde el cuerpo de ingenieros son panameños. Una cosa es construir y otra cosa es darle mantenimiento a lo cual nuestros gobiernos no están acostumbrados.
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Miguel
12/20/2010 10:29:34 AM Ellos solo han opinado lo que muchos pensamos. Cómo Sacyr va a licitar por mil millones menos??
CUSA por otro lado, tiene ya su contratito en la ampliación. El pecado de ellos fue decírcelo a extranjeros. Fue una ingenuidad,pero sus preocupaciones son válidas.
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David
12/20/2010 9:29:35 AM Con todo mi respeto, los ingenieros en Panama no estan entrenados para construcciones complejas.
Ya vemos lo del puente centenario y toda obra que hacen al final tienen miles de problemas.
Yo vivo en Canada y las edificaciones aqui nunca tienen los problemas que en Panama y eso que tenemos 4 estaciones, osea el azote a las construcciones son fuertes desde 33 grados hasta los -30 grados.
Panama necesita por ahora ingenieros, economistas,etc etc de afuera en construcciones complejas mientras
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roxy
12/20/2010 9:15:49 AM Si es cierto, que alguién me explique, Que el Señor Presidente explique porqué dijo eso a toda la Nación
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graciela
12/20/2010 9:09:04 AM Lo que no dicen es que en los cables se manifiesta que los americanos trataron de conseguir la información del contenido de la licitacion que hasta entonces era secretar para asi ello poder preparar su propuesta. No les agrado que una empresa no norteamericana tuviera a su cargo la ampliacion del canal de panama.
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WIKILIKEANDO
12/20/2010 6:05:03 AM Zapatero es amigo de Taguas que es amigo de del Rivero que es amigo de Aleman que es hermano de embajador que fue destituido por Martinelli que tiene un caso pendiente por Stanford al que Varela considera un desastre (la ampliacion) en la que particiapa CUSA del primo de Aleman que contruyo el acceso al Centenario que se derrumbo que hace halar los pelos a los panameños que ven que se quedan sin canal del que fue ministro Martinelli y ahora hace muecas por la forma que se maneja la ampliacion.
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Leila Shelton-Louhi
12/20/2010 4:27:25 AM Toda esta turbulencia se debe a q los pasos necesarios d ingeniería fueron omitidos por el apuro d empezar a repartir el pastel. Además d despilfarrar valiosos recursos hídricos &d crearle riesgos inaceptables al sistema canalero(&a la economía panameña,etc.),se limitará su futura capacidad&confiabilidad.No habrá otro chance para eliminar las amenazas del diseño(como estructuras innecesarias encima d fallas activas)si no se hacen cambios hoy. La clave para una ampliación exitosa? Los ingenieros.
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Arcadio 2
12/20/2010 1:22:17 AM Ya no importan las pretenciones de la embajadora ni las explicaciones de las autoridades, lo que importa ahora es que la obra termine bien y por este medio, pido a la ACP que informe mensualmente por los medios de comunicación sobre el estado de las obras, queremos saber cuanto progresan y si lo hacen bien o no. Es la mejor respuesta para los metiches de los gringos y los habladores del gobierno. A todos los politicos, que les sirva de experiencia, no ventilen sus excresencias en la embajada.
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Gamboa Destruction

2010-12-18T19:37:00.000-08:00

Patrimonio natural y cultural de Gamboa

2010-12-18T17:11:00.000-08:00

Panorama

OBRA. CONSERVACIÓN DE LOS RECURSOS EN EL ÁREA DEL CANAL DE PANAMÁ.
Patrimonio natural y cultural de Gamboa

Un biólogo y un arquitecto urbanista plasmaron su fascinación por este poblado en una guía que ayuda al lector a entender y apreciar su valor.

AUTORES. Jorge Ventocilla (izquierda) hace un repaso de la parte ambiental y Kurt Dillon (derecha), del ambiente construido. LA PRENSA/Jazmín Saldaña

TAMARA DEL MORAL
tdelmoral@prensa.com

El canto de las aves, ñeques paseando por los jardines, monos aulladores y gente practicando deportes y jugando frisbee es lo primero que viene a la mente al pensar en Gamboa, un poblado ubicado a 25 kilómetros de la ciudad de Panamá, con un diseño arquitectónico y urbanístico de influencia francesa y estadounidense, que refleja su legado histórico.

Por estos días, el video Gamboa Destruction filmado desde el pintoresco puente de esa comunidad (concluido en 1908) y difundido por el portal You Tube, mostraba cómo se desplazaban parches de vegetación, troncos e islotes con árboles en pie por el lago artificial Gatún, que abastece de agua al Canal de Panamá y que alcanzó niveles sin precedentes en su historia debido a las inusuales y continuas lluvias en Panamá y Colón durante la última semana. Esto, incluso, ocasionó el cese temporal de las operaciones de la vía interoceánica.

Gamboa mantiene un lazo histórico con la construcción de esta ruta marítima. Era el sitio donde se depositaba material de excavación de las obras que realizaron los estadounidenses, y entre 1934 y 1943 allí se trasladó la División de Dragado del Canal y se construyó el poblado, cuyas primeras viviendas fueron ocupándose a partir de 1936.

También se vivió ahí el sistema segregacionista de esa época, y fue la primera obra arquitectónica de paisajismo urbanístico que realizó la unidad de paisajismo del Jardín Experimental (hoy día el parque Summit) de la antigua Zona del Canal.

Podría decirse que actualmente posee una población altamente educada, considerando que gran parte de sus pobladores son científicos del Instituto Smithsonian de Investigaciones Tropicales (STRI), muchos de los cuales viajan desde Gamboa hasta la estación científica de STRI en la isla Barro Colorado. Próximamente tendrán nuevas instalaciones en Gamboa, por lo que se espera que lleguen más investigadores y visitantes.

Inspiración

El biólogo y coordinador del programa de charlas públicas mensuales de STRI, Jorge Ventocilla, reside en Gamboa. Kurt Dillon, arquitecto y urbanista que vive la mitad del año en Panamá y la otra en Nueva York, vivió allí durante su niñez y adolescencia. Desde dos ópticas distintas, ambos han plasmado su fascinación por este lugar y su interés por conservarlo, en la obra Gamboa, una guía para su patrimonio natural y cultural que será lanzada a principios de febrero de 2011 (tentativamente) en español e inglés.

“Kurt y yo nos conocemos hace años y uno de nuestros monotemas siempre ha sido Gamboa”, relata Ventocilla. “Hace más o menos cinco años le propuse que escribiéramos un libro sobre Gamboa, y él se lo tomó a pecho. Conseguimos fondos de STRI y de la Fundación Avifauna Eugene Eisenman, y comenzamos a trabajar en el proyecto”.

La obra narra en un lenguaje sencillo y ameno la historia de Gamboa, los antecedentes de su diseño urbano y arquitectónico, y posee una riqueza descriptiva de su biodiversidad, el paisaje y estacionalidad del lugar, fruto de las observaciones que desde 1994 ha registrado Ventocilla “en un cuaderno”.

Mes por mes, detalla cuándo llueve más o menos, cuándo los árboles mudan sus hojas y cuándo aparecen los primeros grillos de ojos rojos en los jardines, y las aves migratorias.

También relata las épocas en que los atardeceres son más largos y cuándo florecen especies como los tulipanes africanos, los guayacanes, nazarenos de montaña y las plantas acuáticas en la ribera del río Chagres; igualmente dice cuándo se intensifican los problemas con la humedad y los hongos, entre muchos otros aspectos.

Los autores aspiran a que esta guía sirva como referencia para todo aquél interesado en conocer este rincón del país, y, además de identificar sus elementos positivos, también señalan los retos. Uno de ellos es la conservación del lugar.

Lo conservado debe ser accesible

Las ciudades y poblados sufren procesos con mala planificación y no se toma en cuenta a los individuos ni los sistemas ambientales, señala el arquitecto y urbanista Kurt Dillon.

“Hay una fascinación por la exclusividad, por hacer de la ciudad un archipiélago de barrios privados que se venden como seguros, pero detrás está la ambición y la especulación”.

Para conservar un sitio, plantea, la gente debe tener acceso a las calles para poder apreciar la interrelación entre casas, jardines, bosques, etc. “A medida que se cierran las calles con muros, se pierde el valor cultural de esos bienes”.

Gamboa aún sigue “abierto”. “Es un modelo para los urbanistas”, opina Dillon, y añade que se debe “crear belleza desde y dentro de la comunidad para que la gente venga a verla”. Esto debe ser tomado en cuenta al elaborar planes turísticos, y en esa línea, es importante la organización local. En Gamboa la comunidad se está organizando.

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Deje su Comentario

Icela
12/18/2010 1:08:28 PM
Excelente idea lo de este libro. Creo que todavía estamos a tiempo de conservar las áreas cerca del Canal con tanta historia que tienen y ojalá algunas otras personas se interesen en hacer trabajos similares sobre ellas. Algunos promotores de vivienda en Panamá, solo han pensado en hacer dinero rápido y con la complacencia de los gobiernos nos han dejado sin áreas verdes y sin estacionamientos. Da mucho coraje ver como todo el mundo ha hecho negocio con los estacionamientos.
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egeorge
12/18/2010 11:43:03 AM
No solo Villa Lucre, esto se da en todas partes. Por un lado el abuso de los promotores en conjunto con los bancos y por otro los gobiernos que no han podido darnos la seguridad que nos permita tener casas sin muros altos y verjas de hierro en todas las puertas y ventanas que en nada embellecen nuestras propiedades. Ahora que ha disminuido la venta de propiedades de alto valor, los promotores vuelven a dirigir sus ojos a los panameños...si pudieran vender su alma al diablo lo harian...
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panameno
12/18/2010 11:10:23 AM
No como Villa Lucre que con respeto es una basura de lugar, caliente, es un fogon , cero árboles, angosto, esa gente los promotores son unos aprovechados y el banco general oportunista con los prestamos carisimos que otorgo
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Wikileaks: EU intentó que Sacyr no ganara obras en el Canal

2010-12-18T16:36:00.000-08:00

Internacionales

Wikileaks: EU intentó que Sacyr no ganara obras en el Canal

LA PRENSA/Archivo

Estados Unidos señalaba que la victoria de Sacyr complicaba sus relaciones políticas y económicas con España.

8:57 a.m. - MADRID, España. (DPA). –Estados Unidos presionó para que las obras del Canal de Panamá le fueran concedidas a la firma estadounidense Bechtel en lugar de a las españolas ACS y Sacyr, según despachos de la diplomacia estadounidense filtrados por la web Wikileaks que publica hoy el diario El País.

La embajada estadounidense intentó enterarse de los precios de las ofertas de sus competidoras y se reunió con la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá para conseguir el contrato.

Además, intentó dañar la imagen de Sacyr, que finalmente logró la adjudicación, afirmando que estaba técnicamente quebrada y sembrando las dudas sobre su capacidad para realizar el proyecto, dudas que aseguraba compartía el Gobierno de Panamá.

También acusó a la firma española de ganar el concurso –con su oferta por unos 3 mil 120 millones de dólares–, frente a la de 4 mil 200 millones de la estadounidense- gracias al gobierno.

Washington quería lograr el contrato a toda costa por la situación estratégica del Canal para el país, pero también porque la oferta de Bechtel incluía compras a proveedores estadounidenses por más de mil 200 millones de dólares.

Antes de la adjudicación, la embajada afirmaba que “una victoria de Sacyr sería desconcertante” y el gobierno estadounidense pidió a la representación diplomática en Madrid que investigara el posible apoyo público al proyecto, reconociendo su apoyo a Bechtel para generar empleo indirecto en Estados Unidos.

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Comentarios
Los comentarios expresados son responsabilidad exclusiva de los lectores.
No representan la opinión de prensa.com

IP
12/18/2010 6:52:23 PM
Sacyr tiene mucha experiencia en construcciones. ha echo varios canales y trasvases, ademas de lineas de metro y lineas de alta velocidad. Sacyr sabe hacerlo. pero esta noticia es para los que Creen en gringos! y para que vean que en Panama tambien hay gente capaz y bien preparada, solo que se les ignora por solo ser panameÃ±os! y eso esta mal!
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Kaid
12/18/2010 5:41:18 PM
Por suerte no gano Bechtel, hubieramos quedado con malisima imagen ahora que sale esto. Nos hubiera traido muchos problemas a la hora de hacer este tipo de licitaciones.
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Circo
12/18/2010 4:06:18 PM
Que se puede esperar si este pais cada vez esta peor, cada vez hay mas corrupcion, ignorancia e intolerancia? Panama pronto tendra el nivel de ignorancia y salvajismo de Haiti al paso que vamos.
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panameño
12/18/2010 3:02:04 PM
Hay algo que me decepciona de los gringos y es la manera tan sucia de competir, pareciera que aun vive la raza de los "zones" que creen que Panamá es una especie de isla con esclavos y cocos. Estaban persuadiendo a todos para lograr su objetivo bajo amenazas eso fué lo malo querían lograr un triunfo bajo extorsión pero lo cierto es que muchos de habla Español han demostrado ser mejores cerebros empezando con nosotros mismos nos hemos superado con todo y sus presiones exteriores sigamos adelante.
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Analisis de la evaluacion 2
12/18/2010 2:34:30 PM
de proyectos, no son bilingues y no tienen la capacidad de llevar una reunion de tipo gerencial. Entonces, la pregunta es, como se acepta cambiar los terminos del compromiso adquirido con la propuesta ahora que la estan ejecutando? si la propuesta tecnica era lo que tenia el mayor peso en la evaluacion. Ademas que el personal tecnico clave era parte de esa evaluacion y por la cual obtuvieron el mayor puntaje. Que fue una evaluacion transparente, tengo mis serias dudas.
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Analisis de la evaluacion 1
12/18/2010 2:29:41 PM
Si ven como fue la evaluacion de la puntuacion, se daran cuenta que hubo algo raro. En la evaluacion del personal clave GUPC, presento curriculums de gente que tenia experiencia, que por poco y son astronautas. Elllos obtuvieron el puntaje mas alto, que sumados el 2do lugar y el 3er, juntos no lograron ese puntaje. Sin embargo, en la realidad parte de ese personal tecnico propuesto no es el que esta trabajando aqui en Panama, los que estan son gente que no tiene la experiencia en este tipo
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Analisis de la evaluacion 1
12/18/2010 2:29:08 PM
Si ven como fue la evaluacion de la puntuacion, se daran cuenta que hubo algo raro. En la evaluacion del personal clave GUPC, presento curriculums de gente que tenia experiencia, que por poco y son astronautas. Elllos obtuvieron el puntaje mas alto, que sumados el 2do lugar y el 3er, juntos no lograron ese puntaje. Sin embargo, en la realidad parte de ese personal tecnico propuesto no es el que esta trabajando aqui en Panama, los que estan son gente que no tiene la experiencia en este tipo
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Cambio
12/18/2010 1:39:37 PM
Esto no se trata de jugar limpio o jugar sucio, se trata de que los gringos siempre se las dan de muy limpios y transparentes y quieren andar senalando a todo el mundo cuando ellos son los peores. Que defiendan o no los intereses de su pais no es el problema, sino que lo hacen a escondidas de manchando la reputacion de los demas... sucios!
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darktemplar
12/18/2010 12:53:10 PM
Me pregunto si wikileaks no tendrá los cables diplomáticos españoles para vez que hizo Sacyr para ganarse la contratacion...
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Juan
12/18/2010 12:43:47 PM
Aun no se puede decir nada, que el canal aun no se ha ampliado ... sabremos si fue buena o mala suere en unos 10 aÃ±os

CesarA
12/18/2010 12:15:54 PM
En primer lugar me parece bien que un país luche hasta la muerte por defender sus derechos e intereses, deberiamos copiar otros eso, no es un pecado. Tambien es aplausible que el proceso de licitacion del Canal fuera tan transparente que no se viera afectado por estas campañas. En último lugar Sres PRD no busquen donde no hay...jaja, pobrecitos...
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ramon
12/18/2010 11:35:28 AM
lo interesante de la noticia, son los comentarios de varela y martinelli, sobre el proyecto, cuidado y hay que pelar el ojo
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Manuel
12/18/2010 11:23:02 AM
Pero ese proceso lo llevo la ACP, no el gobierno. Normalmente transparente, pero recuerdo que esa vez fue muy detallado. Por suerte para nosotros. Siempre pienso que sacar al canal de la politica fue nuestra mejor desición, como pueblo moderno.
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Demente
12/18/2010 11:07:56 AM
"Martinelli hizo una mueca, indicó que estaba un poco preocupado y dijo que temía que el administrador del Canal podría haber inclinado el concurso hacia el consorcio que incluía a CUSA, dirigida por su primo"
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Ivan Perez
12/18/2010 10:55:56 AM
En el amor y la guera todo vale. No seamos ingenuos que asi es como se hacen las maracas. Cualquier pais esta en su derecho y hasta obligacion encausar los negocios hacia sus ciudadanos y eso no es jugar sucio.

Hacer lo contrario es jugar tonto.

En esta salimos ganando!!!!.
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pienso
12/18/2010 10:37:30 AM
quien dijo que los gringos juegan limpio???
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xiomara Gonzalez
12/18/2010 10:00:10 AM
Porque no menciona Usted el comentario del Vicepresidente Varela y porque tampoco menciona Usted el comentario del Presidente Martinelli a la Embajadora Barbara???
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js
12/18/2010 9:59:11 AM
pero el pull de los españoles e italianos pudo mas ke el de los gringos...
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Jesus
12/18/2010 9:39:32 AM
Increible, y no lo pueden negar, wikileaks esta cambiando la forma de ver la imagen de EU frente al mundo.

Taxpayers Fund Disasters in Panama

2010-12-14T06:39:00.000-08:00

(AP Photo/Arnulfo Franco)

You may already be concerned about the Panama Canal expansion and other projects in Panama, but the report below clearly outlines how the Panama Canal's future is hostage to financial freewheeling that has caused the collapse of our global economy, and now of infrastructure across Panama.

The rainfall last week in Panama -- a tropical deluge that lasted well over 50 hours non-stop -- collapsed roads, bridges and other infrastructure throughout the country, threatened dams, flooded villages, closed the canal, and sharply highlighted what unchecked and relentless corruption can do. Numerous lives have been lost as a result, along with shared dreams of "modernization". Further destruction of Panama's freshwater resources is threatening survival, not only if the expansion remains unchanged, but from uncontrolled and poisonous mining, hydroelectric and other unrestrained illegal activities.

Banks and other financial institutions must immediately implement their compliance procedures and insist on the necessary engineering changes to the expansion project which will remove the enormous risks being built in to this waterway of such far-reaching impact, to safeguard it, Panama and all who depend on it, both economically and environmentally. More about the results of independent engineering reviews are at www.crucestrail.com in English and Spanish.

Help us take action. Please post, publish, forward, distribute.

Gatun Lake Defense Committee

Taxpayers Fund Disasters in Panama

Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer

All indications are that massive amounts of hard-earned tax dollars, euros, and yen – and who-knows-what other kind of currency – are being funneled into the hands of corruption in the Republic of Panama by way of Development Bank loans to countless questionable projects.

Approved for development in little Panama, in addition to the highly-publicized Panama Canal Expansion, are scores of hydroelectric projects plus a multitude of open-pit mines – to cover 44% of the country's surface area – along with many other projects of equally negative impact and doubtful benefit.

Development loans are supposed to be for funding projects that improve people’s lives, not eliminate livelihoods and chase folks out.

Yet, in virtually all cases in Panama, the destruction of flora and fauna and of quality-of-life for residents are seen by those in power as secondary issues – irrelevant to project bottom lines.

Therefore, projects seeking such loans are carefully promoted on the basis of the “jobs” they will create (the vast majority being short term) and on their “high” rate-of-return (that ignore third party and environmental damages).

Insofar as hydroelectric projects are concerned, Panama has neither an existing nor a projected shortage of electric power generation that would justify developing so much of this resource simultaneously.

With respect to mining, why on earth would a small country of just over three million people aspire to be the world leader in mining – as Panama's leaders claim – and want all possible mines operating at once? Perhaps it is for the same reason that so many hydroelectric projects are being built. Powerful, greedy people are looking to maximize returns from sales abroad at the expense of the defenseless, less fortunate, whose losses are treated as inconsequential.

As for developed nations, do their taxpayers intend for developing nations to be exploited, cultures and ecology decimated and the poor oppressed? Probably not, but the bankers managing their money are doing just that! What those most affected actually need, i.e. what is in this case best for most of Panama’s population, is consistently being disregarded.

With so much easy money to be had, the Panama Canal Expansion's sudden burst onto the scene is of no surprise.

The Panama Canal has been shown to be a very good business. Even with tolls having been increased more than ten-fold – since it was gifted to the Panamanians – no reduction in numbers of ships has occurred, with about 36 ships continuing to transit it daily.

Where do those increased earnings go? To graft and corruption all over Panama, with no end in sight!

The Panama Canal Expansion Project has been touted as the most well-planned and well-executed project of its magnitude in modern times. However, that claim does not stand up to closer scrutiny.

It is becoming apparent that accessing and pocketing the cash value of that asset has been the real plan all along, accomplished by borrowing money for “improvements”,miss-spending it and leaving the people of Panama with the responsibility of paying it back.

This is why no real time was spent studying the many alternatives for expanding the Panama Canal and why the powerful worldwide let that slide right through, unquestioned. It is also why strong arguments to expand the canal in stages were summarily dismissed.

Gaining time for a more thorough evaluation of lock options – such as to first add very much needed lighting along its channels plus to straighten and widen those channels to maximize the present-day canal's transit capacity, both improvements applicable to and needed for future expansion – would have been much more cost-effective.

When the Panama Canal Expansion was announced, the project's key element – its new locks – had already been defined. This is not appropriate when there are several viable options. For a public works project of world importance, having skipped the most important step is particularly inappropriate.

Many people knew that the planned design was not the panacea it was promoted to be, but the crucial detail that remained unknown was that loan applications for building it were already in the mill.

It has become perfectly clear that project promoters were not about to permit anything to delay the process of accessing those loans as soon as possible, no matter how risky, damaging, or illogical the plan. Obtaining value from spending that money was not relevant to the game.

The new locks of the expanded canal are, essentially, an “augmented” version of the US's design from the 1930's. The changes made to that system – deemed to be deficient long ago – do not constitute an improvement.

The lane of locks the US began building decades ago was to have three steps at each end of the canal, like today’s two-lane canal has, but with longer and wider chambers. Before the US suspended their third lane project with the onset of WWII, excavations into rock for the three contiguous lock steps at the canal's Caribbean entrance were nearly completed.

Similarly, the two contiguous steps at the Pacific entrance – parallel to today's two-step Miraflores Locks – were nearly completed. However, excavations for the uppermost one-step lock – parallel to the present day single-step Pedro Miguel Locks – never got started.

As a result of the war, perspectives regarding future canal transit needs changed. New concerns, such as how major projects like this one impact the environment and neighboring activities, caused the project to be put on ice for rethinking.

At issue were: 1) how many lanes should ultimately be targeted, 2) what maximum size ship should the addition handle, 3) how much operating water could ultimately be made available to the canal, and 4) what environmental or ecological issues would need to be overcome. The cost of attending each of these was, obviously, itself an issue requiring calculation and contemplation.

In addition to the Panama Canal Company's routine salinity measurement program, those new concerns gave rise to more detailed environmental studies, such as some of the ones the Smithsonian Institute established.

Also for many years, the US Army Corp of Engineers studied options for, and issues with, digging a Sea Level Canal somewhere across the Isthmus. Participating in those studies were engineers and geologists – including this author’s father. Ultimately – during the years the canal was operated jointly by the US and Panama – a multinational group of experts was brought together and tasked with evaluating system needs and concerns, and recommending the best course for a future canal or upgrade.

With the present Canal Expansion Plan it would appear that its promoters have convinced Panama to opt for ignoring this body of work – concerns and recommendations alike – and proceed as directly as possible to building the third lane much as it was envisioned in the 1930's.

Today’s expansion plan uses much of what the US dug in the 1930's, but with a dangerous deviation – a high-risk shortcut seemingly taken to complete the job more quickly.

Rather than excavate the uppermost Pacific end lock step next to today's Pedro Miguel Locks, as was originally planned, the third step is now added to the lower two steps parallel to Miraflores Locks. That top step is to be connected to Gatun Lake by a raised waterway that parallels the west bank of Miraflores Lake.

That raised waterway is to be kept separate from lower-elevation Miraflores Lake by a dike built across numerous active faults, which were originally rendered harmless by the introduction of that small lake. This dike puts the entire canal in jeopardy!

Closure of the Panama Canal due to an earthquake rupturing the dike would not only catastrophically empty Gatun Lake and severely affect world commerce, it would bankrupt Panama.

It is interesting to note that none of the above was part of the public “debate”. Neither were better ways to expand the Panama Canal. Interesting as well is that the Master Plan – presented to the nation prior to its required approval vote – does not disclose the engineering data needed to develop any system, including the one selected. That explains its embarrassing alternatives to the selected “design”. It is undeniable that serious options were not actually developed, much less compared, since those presented could be, and were, dismissed by a cursory inspection.

Plan promoters are intent on inaugurating this expansion on the Canal's 100-year anniversary in 2014, turning its on-time completion into a matter of national pride. Besides being a highly manipulative tactic, it diverts attention from the issues and is an absurd reason for promoting and advancing a very wasteful, very damaging, and potentially dangerous system without ever having performed comparative assessments of other lock layouts.

Much more effective layouts operated similarly and made using the same parts found in many canals, including today's Panama Canal, exist. Water use could be reduced to half of this expansion's design, which would allow for even more future transits.

The chosen arrangement – which combines circa 1870 water-saving tanks with “known-to-be-too-small” 1930’s lock chambers and adds great danger by changing the top lock location – aggravates matters.

The selected layout uses tanks in arguably the most ineffective and expensive way possible.

Also, quite opposite the claims of the plan's promoters, the way the tanks are being incorporated will greatly increase ecological damage relative to the 1930's design. Anyone with a modicum of technical prowess can independently confirm that many times more concentrated saltwater will intrude into freshwater lakes than would have through the 1930's locks.

The warnings of the suppressed Smithsonian's damage-to-sea-life studies will, undoubtedly, be validated should the new lane be built as designed and be allowed to begin operating.

This could all be avoided by using any of the many lock layouts that are more modern by either one or two generations, while greatly increasing the project's return-on-investment.

From its inception, the Panama Canal Expansion Project has followed a technically and financially illogical path with respect to long-term canal growth and profitability. After being approved by the referendum, the project has proceeded essentially as launched, ignoring all concerns and calls for review.

Interestingly, due to public objections – which threatened to kill the project – a single and very major “change” was made to it prior to the vote. Practically overnight the third water-saving tank was added to each lock step and the range of Gatun Lake's seasonal level fluctuations was increased, which “eliminated” the need to expand the existing watershed.

Project outsiders have always been suspicious of that revision. Not only do the additional tanks slow new lock transits a lot, the cargo capacity of ships using today's locks will be reduced when the lake seasonally drops below today's lowest level.

This change amounts to transit water being borrowed from the older locks to sustain new lock operations, which is like robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Furthermore, costs for executing the innumerable system adjustments this “flimflam” requires were never publicly disclosed, and it is doubtful they were ever estimated since the project's cost never reflected them.

Reports of preparations already afoot to expand the watershed – despite a law against such a move passed shortly before the referendum – appear to confirm that this “change” to the project was simply a trick used to win the approval vote.

It is unclear whether this “plan amendment” was ever brought to the attention of banks extending loans to the project, despite that being a requirement for most such loans. What is clear is that the cost of expanding the watershed is not included in the present plan, even though it is essential for comparing to plans not needing more watershed.

Clearer still is that there are significant short-term financial benefits – for someone other than the Republic of Panama and the canal's users – pushing forward this damaging plan, padded with superfluous work.

It is increasingly obvious that what is in the best interest of the public anywhere, or best for the environment, has never been of real concern. One only needs to look at the way the project's most lucrative contracts were “won” – and take note of who “won” them – to understand what this “expansion” is really all about.

The Republic of Panama will not see profit for a very long time from what is being added, nor will it see any from the presently operated locks. That income will be tied up for generations to pay for this fiasco. Plus, the canal's clients will end up paying too much for too little when using it.

Once the currently planned expansion is completed, there will be no choice but to forever live with the consequences. It will severely and permanently cut short the canal's growth potential. And, the ecology within and surrounding the canal, particularly along both coasts, will become irreparably damaged.

Clearly controls to prevent the misuse of funds from Development Banks do not work. Privy to loopholes in the loan application process and in collusion with corruptible officials, the “planners” of projects in Panama (including the canal expansion) have apparently been milking the Development Bank system for quite some time.

Beyond Panama, the questionable activities of government officials disclosed by way of the “Wiki leaks” suggest that leaders of a lot of nations are aware of many inappropriate activities, such as development funds being misused, but are not really doing much about it.

The Panama Canal Expansion is nowhere near one that could, in all fairness, be considered sustainable. Neither are most of the other projects across Panama. Negative impacts to water resources that the hydroelectric and mining ventures are creating – added to those of the canal – will virtually eliminate the livelihoods of those near them and terminate all river and coastal fishing as a means of subsistence. Damage to agricultural capacity is already being felt and local fishing is likewise on the decline, most directly affecting indigenous and rural residents.

Panama is safeguarding nothing for its future generations. This does not support Panama's selling of itself as a nice place to visit or in which to retire. It does not make Panama a good home for Panamanians, either. And, taxpayers around the world are the unwitting accomplices to that massive environmental devastation by funding it!

None of this has been preordained, however. It could be changed with good leadership, but taxpayers of developed countries will need to demand that.

As it stands, taxpayers are most definitely not going to receive value for their money in terms of better canal services. When the job is done, they will end up paying too much for goods they buy that are transported through the canal after having paid for its inefficient and endangering expansion.

Having been fooled into believing that Panama – with the world's “best-run project” – is the place to invest in or retire, those taxpayers will continue to fund the deceptive propaganda that incessantly promotes Panama to attract more gullible “investors” with pockets to be picked.

Emergencia en el Canal...

2010-12-10T18:05:00.000-08:00

Canal suspendió operaciones La Prensa 10-12-2010

2010-12-10T03:11:00.000-08:00

Canal suspendió operaciones

La administración adoptó la decisión porque el paso de los barcos podía ser afectado por las corrientes del río Chagres que desembocan en la vía.

tránsito de buques
buques. Los buques que estaban en tránsito tuvieron que detenerse hasta que se reanudaran las operaciones. LA PRENSA/Eduardo Grimaldo

Wilfredo Jordán S.
wjordan@prensa.com

El tránsito de buques por el Canal de Panamá quedó suspendido temporalmente ayer desde las 12:00 de mediodía debido al nivel histórico que registraron los lagos Gatún y Alajuela tras las constantes lluvias de las últimas horas.

El Gatún, cuyo nivel máximo es 88.5 pies sobre el nivel del mar, alcanzó los 88.56 pies con lo cual hubo que abrir las compuertas para desalojar agua. El Alajuela, donde el nivel máximo es de 252.0 pies, con las constantes lluvias llegó a 257.6 pies sobre el nivel del mar.

“La medida fue adoptada porque el tránsito por el Canal podría ser afectado por las corrientes del río Chagres que desembocan en el cauce de la vía a la altura de Gamboa, a raíz del vertido en Alajuela”, dijo el vicepresidente ejecutivo de Operaciones de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), Manuel Benítez.

Tras la orden de suspender las operaciones en el Canal, quedaron buques panamax detenidos a lo largo de toda la vía hasta que se reanudarán las operaciones en las esclusas.

En promedio, por el Canal de Panamá transitan entre 35 y 40 embarcaciones por día. En el período comprendido entre las 6:00 a.m. y las 6:00 p.m. se permite el paso de los buques de mayor tamaño, y en horas nocturnas solo transitan las embarcaciones más pequeñas.

Aunque la ACP siempre realiza suspensiones temporales de las operaciones en algunas de las esclusas, ya sea por trabajos de mantenimiento o por algún incidente que ocurra, ayer la administración ordenó la suspensión del funcionamiento en todas las esclusas.

La última vez que el Canal se mantuvo paralizado por más de un día fue el 20 de diciembre de 1989 tras la invasión de Estados Unidos a Panamá.

La situación de alerta generó una reunión entre las principales autoridades de la ACP para evaluar la situación y determinar la normalización de las operaciones en las próximas horas.

Trabajos de ampliación

Las lluvias también han tenido su efecto en los trabajos de ampliación, principalmente en el lado Atlántico donde han sido más persistentes. Donde hay excavaciones y se acumula agua, se colocaron bombas para desalojarla, dijo una fuente vinculada al proyecto de diseño y construcción del tercer juego de esclusas.

Evacuación

Ayer la ACP, en coordinación con las autoridades locales, evacuó a unos 50 residentes de las comunidades de Guayabalito y Santa Rosa, en la parte baja de la represa de Madden que se alimenta del lago Alajuela.

Igualmente advirtió que las comunidades aledañas al río Chagres, así como las de Nuevo Vigía, Salamanca y Boquerón –en la parte superior de la misma represa– debían mantenerse en estado de alerta a las indicaciones de las autoridades.

La entidad canalera informó que los derrames preventivos en los vertederos de Gatún y Alajuela continuarán durante las próximas horas.

En el sector del Atlántico, las operaciones de desalojo de agua a través del vertedero de Gatún también afectaron el tránsito a través del puente vehicular que comunica las poblaciones de la costa abajo con la ciudad de Colón.

La ACP pidió a los pobladores de ese sector que evitaran movilizarse debido a la suspensión de uso del puente vehicular.

Como parte de las acciones coordinadas con otras autoridades se dispuso un sistema de traslado para movilizar a las personas en caso de emergencia.

Al cierre de esta edición (9:30 p.m.) el paso de barcos por el Canal seguía cerrado. Las autoridades de la ACP evaluaban su reapertura.

Panama At Risk Of Large Earthquake New Research Warns

2010-12-02T14:11:00.000-08:00

File image.
by Staff Writers
Panama Canal, Panama (SPX) Nov 22, 2010
New data suggest that the Limon and Pedro Miguel faults in Central Panama have ruptured both independently and in unison over the past 1400 years, indicating a significant seismic risk for Panama City and the Panama Canal, according to research published by the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America (BSSA).
The Panama Canal is undergoing expansion to allow for greater traffic of larger ships, scheduled for completion by 2014. As part of a seismic hazard characterization for the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) expansion project, Rockwell, et al., studied the geologic and geomorphic expression of the Pedro Miguel, Limon, and related faults, followed by an in-depth study into their earthquake and displacement history, critical factors in the design of the Panama Canal new locks and associated structures.

"The Pedro Miguel fault actually runs between the existing Pacific locks - the Pedro Miguel and Miraflores locks - and last ruptured in a large earthquake in 1621," said lead author Thomas K. Rockwell, professor of geology at San Diego State University.

"That earthquake resulted in nearly 10 feet of displacement where the fault crosses the canal, and a similar amount of offset of the historical Camino de Cruces, the old Spanish cobblestone road that was used to haul South American gold across the isthmus. Another such earthquake today could have dramatic effects."

The Republic of Panama sits atop two colliding tectonic plates - Central and South America - and is internally deforming at a significant rate.

The Pedro Miguel, Limon and related faults comprise a zone that extends from the southern flank of the Sierra Maestra in north central Panama southward for at least 40 km (about 25 miles) crossing the Panama Canal between the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks, and extending southward offshore into the Gulf of Panama.

Paleoseismic work by Rockwell, et al., demonstrates that both the Limon and Pedro Miguel faults are seismically active, having a relatively short recurrence rate for large earthquakes, with displacements in the range of 1.5 to 3 meters (4.9 to 9.8 feet).

The oldest event on the Pedro Miguel fault is estimated at 455 AD and is older than any of the events recorded for the Limon fault. However, the penultimate Pedro Miguel event and the third Limon fault event identified in this study have very similar ages at about 700 AD and may represent rupture of the entire onshore zone.

The apparent ability for these two distinct faults to fail in unison has important implications for Panama Canal. While no fault passes through or beneath any critical structures, the area and structures would be subject to significant shaking.

The authors note that the close proximity of Panama City to this active fault zone, and the lack of consideration of earthquake loads in structural design codes, puts this area at high seismic risk, particularly before current buildings can be replaced with stronger, more earthquake-resistant construction.

The paper can be viewed here.

Increased Arctic Shipping Could Accelerate Climate Change

2010-11-21T07:25:00.000-08:00

Ship traffic diverting from current routes to new routes through the Arctic is projected to reach 2 percent of global traffic by 2030 and to 5 percent in 2050. In comparison, shipping volumes through the Suez and Panama canals currently account for about 4 percent and 8 percent of global trade volume, respectively.

by Tracey Bryant

Newark DE (SPX) Nov 03, 2010
As the ice-capped Arctic Ocean warms, ship traffic will increase at the top of the world. And if the sea ice continues to decline, a new route connecting international trading partners may emerge - but not without significant repercussions to climate, according to a U.S. and Canadian research team that includes a University of Delaware scientist.

Growing Arctic ship traffic will bring with it air pollution that has the potential to accelerate climate change in the world's northern reaches. And it's more than a greenhouse gas problem - engine exhaust particles could increase warming by some 17-78 percent, the researchers say.

James J. Corbett, professor of marine science and policy at UD, is a lead author of the first geospatial approach to evaluating the potential impacts of shipping on Arctic climate. The study, "Arctic Shipping Emissions Inventories and Future Scenarios," is published in Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics.

Corbett's coauthors include Daniel A. Lack, from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Earth System Research Laboratory in Boulder, Colo.; James J. Winebrake, of the Rochester Institute of Technology; Susie Harder of Transport Canada in Vancouver, British Columbia; Jordan A. Silberman of GIS Consulting in Unionville, Pa.; and Maya Gold of the Canadian Coast Guard in Ottawa, Ontario.

"One of the most potent 'short-lived climate forcers' in diesel emissions is black carbon, or soot," says Corbett, who is on the faculty of UD's College of Earth, Ocean, and Environment. "Ships operating in or near the Arctic use advanced diesel engines that release black carbon into one of the most sensitive regions for climate change."

Produced by ships from the incomplete burning of marine fuel, these tiny particles of carbon act like 'heaters' because they absorb sunlight - both directly from the sun, and reflected from the surface of snow and ice. Other particles released by ship engines also rank high among important short-lived climate forcers, and this study estimates their combined global warming impact potential.

To better understand the potential impact of black carbon and other ship pollutants on climate, including carbon dioxide, methane and ozone, the research team produced high-resolution (5-kilometer-by-5-kilometer) scenarios that account for growth in shipping in the region through 2050, and also outline potential new Arctic shipping routes.

Among the research team's most significant findings:

+ Global warming potential in 2030 in the high-growth scenario suggests that short-lived forcing of ~4.5 gigatons of black carbon from Arctic shipping may increase the global warming potential due to ships' carbon dioxide emissions (~42,000 gigagrams) by some 17-78 percent.

+ Ship traffic diverting from current routes to new routes through the Arctic is projected to reach 2 percent of global traffic by 2030 and to 5 percent in 2050. In comparison, shipping volumes through the Suez and Panama canals currently account for about 4 percent and 8 percent of global trade volume, respectively.

+ A Northwest Passage and Northeast Passage through the Arctic Ocean would provide a distance savings of about 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively, with coincident time and fuel savings. However, the team says tradeoffs from the short-lived climate forcing impacts must be studied.

+ To calculate possible benefits of policy action, the study provides "maximum feasible reduction scenarios" that take into account the incorporation of emissions control technologies such as seawater scrubbers that absorb sulfur dioxide emitted during the burning of diesel fuel. Their scenario shows that with controls, the amount of Arctic black carbon from shipping can be reduced in the near term and held nearly constant through 2050.

"To understand the value of addressing short-lived climate forcers from shipping, you need to know the impacts of these emissions, the feasibility and availability of technologies that could be put in place to reduce these impacts, and then engage the policy-making community to debate the evidence and agree on a plan," Corbett notes.

"Our hope is that this study will enable better communication of emerging science with policy makers and aid the eight Arctic Council nations with climate policy."

Corbett also has led recent studies to determine the global health effects of shipping, and more recently, a comparison of the daily release of oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and Americans' daily energy use.

Letter to the Panama News 29-10-2010

2010-11-01T22:25:00.000-07:00

Bells and whistles won't fix serious shortcomings

Bert G. Shelton

As construction of the new locks for the Panama Canal proceeds, publicity continues to praise the project's choice of "superior" gates --- and steers clear of noting the pitfalls inherent to the system's overall layout.

No matter how superior a modern-day component is --- as compared to one available 100 years ago --- better parts cannot make a poorer lock layout outperform a better lock layout since all layouts can similarly benefit from those same components.

The problem with the expansion plan's lock layout is that it is based on a 1930's plan that was long ago found to be deficient. Furthermore, modifications to that plan for this project only make things worse.

In the 1930's, the US began construction of a "third set", or lane, of locks. The 1930's lane addition was to have three steps at each end of the canal, like the canal's original two lanes have, but this addition was to have longer and wider chambers for larger ships.

Before the US ceased working on their 1930s project with the onset of WWII, excavations into rock for the planned locks' three contiguous steps at the canal's Caribbean entrance had been practically completed. In contrast, at the Pacific entrance only the two contiguous lower steps --- those effectively parallel to today's Miraflores Locks --- were nearly completed. Excavation of the independent uppermost lock step alongside the present day Pedro Miguel Locks never got started.

As a result of the war, perspectives regarding future canal transit needs changed and new concerns, such as how major projects like this one impact the environment and neighboring activities, caused the project to be put on ice for rethinking. At issue were 1) how many lanes should ultimately be targeted, 2) what maximum size ship should the addition handle, 3) how much operating water could ultimately be made available to it, and 4) what environmental or ecological issues would need to be overcome. The cost of attending each of those issues was, obviously, itself an issue requiring contemplation.

In addition to the Panama Canal Company's routine salinity measurement program, these new interests gave rise to more detailed environmental studies, such as those established by the Smithsonian Institute. Also, the US Army Corp of Engineers studied for many years the options for and issues with building a Sea Level Canal somewhere across the Isthmus. Ultimately, a multinational group of experts was brought together --- during the years the canal was operated jointly by the US and Panama --- and tasked with evaluating all issues and recommending the best course for a future canal or upgrade.

With its present Canal Expansion Plan it would appear that Panama has chosen to ignore concerns and recommendations and proceed with building the third lane much as it was planned in the 1930's.

This plan sticks to the 1930's plan in that its chambers will use the lock sites that the US blasted out. However, rather than blast out the uppermost Pacific end lock step next to today's Pedro Miguel Locks as originally planned, the top step is now to be contiguous to the lower two steps next to today's Miraflores Locks. That top step is to be connected to the Gatun Lake waterway by means of a dike built along the west bank of Miraflores Lake across known faults --- originally rendered harmless by the presence of that very small lake. This plan is very dangerous and puts the entire canal in jeopardy!

Plan promoters are intent on inaugurating this expansion on the Canal's 100-year anniversary in 2014.

However, that's an absurd reason for promoting and advancing a very wasteful, very damaging, and potentially dangerous system without ever having performed comparative assessments of other known lock layouts. Recognized layouts, that use operating procedures present and tested in today's Panama Canal and/or elsewhere, can readily be shown to save more water, transit more ships, be physically and operationally less complicated, require less maintenance, and cause far less damage to the environment.

Not only are the 1930's lock chambers too small for today's shipping needs and is the change in the top lock's location dangerous, the added circa 1870 water-saving tanks don't save enough to justify the cost and operating complexity they add, plus as employed they greatly increase ecological damage potential relative to the 1930's design. While project promoters claim otherwise, anyone with a modicum of technical prowess can independently confirm that salt intrusion into the lake will be many times more as compared to the 1930's plan, an increase that will undoubtedly confirm damage-to-sea-life studies.

From its inception, the Panama Canal Expansion Project has followed a technically and financially illogical path with respect to long term canal growth and profitability. Launched with its planned lock system predefined --- which is not acceptable for any engineering project, especially not a public works project --- this project has proceeded essentially unaltered ignoring all calls for independent review.

One major change that was made --- practically overnight --- was to add a third water-saving tank to each lock step and to expand the range of Gatun Lake's seasonal level fluctuations, seemingly done to quiet public objections to a planned watershed expansion that threatened the project's approval. Project outsiders have ever since been suspicious of that change as, not only does the added tank notably slow lock operations, the cargo capacity of ships using today's locks will seasonally be greatly reduce when the lake goes lower. Reports that preparations are afoot to expand the watershed, despite a law against so doing having been created to gain project approval, suggest this "change" was a ploy and not real.

Clearly there are significant short term financial benefits for someone other than the Republic of Panama and the canal's users, that are driving this unsavory plan forward.

Considering which companies have "won" the most lucrative of the project's contracts along with the questionable processes that were followed in awarding those contracts, it is doubtful that what's in the public's best interest has ever been included. This assessment is not so far-fetched if one considers how the entire country of Panama is now up for grabs for development of all its hydro-power and mineral reserves. Open-pit mining is to cover nearly 44% of this small country's surface area, and hydro-plants are planned for virtually all rivers, big and small, with 28 to be built on just one river! So much for Panama being an attractive tourism and retirement place. And, where are Panamanians to live?

With what's being built and how canal profits for many years to come are being tied up, not only will the Republic of Panama not see profit from what is done for a very long time, all of the canal's clients will pay too much for too little. What's more, the canal's future growth potential will be severely and permanently cut short by what's being built. On top of that, this plan's negative "secondary" impacts to its water resources will greatly reduce or eliminate the livelihoods of many who live near by or fish for a living. Per its present development plans, Panama is safeguarding nothing for its future generations.

Today's Panama Canal Expansion plan is nowhere near one that could, in all fairness, be considered sustainable. The only reason most believe the project is among the world's best-run projects is that the project's propaganda machine has told them so.

Panamá: Trabajadores repudian declaraciones arrogantes del Gerente del Consorcio Unidos por el Canal

2010-08-29T10:23:00.000-07:00

Marcha contra la Leyes Chorizo y Carcelazo, jueves 9 de septiembre, 4:00 p.m. Parque Porras.
Frenadeso | Para Kaos en la Red | 28-8-2010 a las 23:14 | 107 lecturas
www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/panama-trabajadores-repudian-declaraciones-arrogantes-gerente-consorci

COMUNICADO DE CONDENA A LAS DECLARACIONES DEL GERENTE DEL GRUPO UNIDOS POR EL CANAL

El SUNTRACS quiere expresar su más enérgica condena a las temerarias declaraciones dadas a los medios de comunicación por el gerente general del Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC), Antonio Zaffaroni, quien “aseguró que la huelga que paralizó durante cinco días las obras de ampliación del Canal de Panamá a principios de julio fue una prueba con fines políticos contra una polémica ley aprobada por el Gobierno panameño”.

Tales afirmaciones del señor Zaffaroni, arrogante gerente del Consorcio conformado por las empresas Impregilio de Italia, Jean de Nul de Bélgica, Sacyr de España y CUSA de Panamá, intentan esconder las graves violaciones que se presentan en dicho proyecto en abierta violación a los derechos laborales y a nuestra Convención Colectiva, tal como aceptaron en su momento las propias autoridades de Trabajo; lo cual también constató recientemente una Misión de los Sindicatos Mundiales de verificación de la situación sindical en Panamá, conformada por representantes de la Internacional de la Construcción y a Madera (ICM).

Las lamentables expresiones del Señor Zaffaroni ponen en evidencia la falta de ética, sensibilidad humana y de escrúpulos de empresarios que vienen a Panamá a llenarse los bolsillos pisoteando los derechos de los trabajadores e irrespetando al pueblo panameño con la complicidad de los grupos oligárquicos en el poder.

Eso es lo que explica la protección que obtuvieron estos empresarios durante los días de huelga por parte de la Policía Nacional cuyos miembros reprimieron a los obreros, entregaron personalmente cartas de despidos y arrestaron por 8 días a 28 de trabajadores en Colón, detención que luego fue declarada ilegal por los tribunales de Justicia.

Zaffaroni llegó incluso a calificar de “pasayadas” las denuncias sobre las graves fallas en los aspectos de salud y seguridad laboral en el proyecto de ampliación del Canal, lo cual revela su desprecio por la vida de los trabajadores, dado que en ese mismo proyecto ya se produjo la muerte de un trabajador por estas anomalías surgidas de la negligencia empresarial.

El SUNTRACS seguirá velando por los intereses de los obreros, exigiendo el reintegro de los trabajadores ilegalmente despedidos y demandando que se sancione a estos empresarios violadores de los derechos laborales.

Panamá, 28 de agosto de 2010.

¡Sin Luchas no hay Victorias!

¡La Pelea es Peleando!

http://www.frenadesonoticias.org

The World's Greatest Monument to Fraud and Destruction

2010-07-23T09:28:00.000-07:00

This article explains the issues behind the Panama Canal project underway and why there is continued resistance to improving it responsibly and sustainably. Preservation of this crucial piece of world infrastructure should be at the top of international engineering and environmental agendas and not be used for continuing the pattern of global abuse of projects as vehicles for personal enrichment. Its future and that of world commerce are at stake, as well as the life-sustaining capacity of its watershed.
Gatun Lake Defense Committee (Comite ProDefensa del Lago Gatun)
As with any material we distribute, please feel free to post, forward, or publish.

The World's Greatest Monument to Fraud and Destruction

by Bert G. Shelton, Professional Engineer & Research Scientist July 15, 2010

With start of construction of the Panama Canal's new locks, by the winners of a questionable bidding contest, the foundation is being cast for what will become known as the World's Greatest Monument to Fraud and Destruction.

If ever there were a project where ethics was cast to the wolves, this one is destined to top the list.

Throughout the checkered path of this project's “development”, never have so many scientific determinations been summarily dismissed using propaganda to convince project backers that the truth is something other.

While it was claimed by its promoters that every stone was turned to find the best possible locks to overcome the challenges the project faced, the patented response to requests for comment on dissimilar findings by independent assessors with regard to important engineering issues has been that “those opinions are not shared”. Regardless of whether the findings were a physical certainty or determined based on science, that response has remained a constant. From the outset, engineering issues have not been open for discussion or debate to “outsiders”.

The Panama Canal Expansion Project was announced with its new locks —its key element— already selected. In addition to claiming that all known lock systems were investigated prior to that selection, the propaganda following the plan's announcement went on to claim there had even been a contest among school children for lock solutions.

No claims could be verified, not even the supposed contest among school children, which would actually have been a good promotional tactic, although extremely unlikely to have yielded a technically feasible solution.

When the project's “Master Plan” was published, prior to the date of the project's “go-ahead” vote, the other designs it included —presumably those to which the chosen one was compared— were so unrealistic that to analyze them to dismiss them would have been ridiculous. Yet, summarily dismissed as too risky and 4 years too late was a patented ship lift submitted about a year prior to the vote —2 years after the project was announced. These facts suggest better options were never sought as the chosen design was being protected.

Unlike the enthusiasm and creativity that plans to construct the original Panama Canal generated, this expansion's planning was kept behind closed doors, an approach that will prove much to the detriment of the canal's clients.

The reason for all this is simple...to snag Easy Money by packaging a plan sure to gain “development” Bank loans.

This project has qualified for numerous loans from international “development” Banks, for which it had to meet specified Bank requirements. Since obtaining such loans is slow and time-consuming, it is apparent that quick establishment of the system's design and its “qualifications” was imperative to get those loans sooner than later, to which end no tricks or short-cuts were spared in insuring success.

Discussions or debates of technical issues that could mar the image being projected were not entertained. Studies by initially contracted reputable firms that proved unfavorable to the decided outcome were dismissed as inadequate and replaced with favorable reports rapidly prepared by subsequent contractors of dubious reputation. This was clearly done to eliminate the risk of these “technicalities” slowing or impeding loan approvals.

Thus, now being built is an addition to a key piece of world infrastructure that will transit only two-thirds the ships that an equally priced state-of-the-art system would transit per day using the same water. This inefficient lock choice —that is two generations old— will result in about 8 ships having to go around South America, each day, forever, or through the Suez, or not go at all; lost potential that will be recovered in tolls. Numbers don't lie, People do.

What's worse, the follow-on plan is to add another similar lane of equal cost, chosen to make select builders even richer. Yet, with a newer design, two lanes could be added for the cost of today's one, and two more for what the planned future one will cost.

Furthermore, the system being built will cost more to maintain than would a state-of-the-art design, and when operated will cause the extinction of creatures in both oceans, avoidable using more modern lock arrangements.

Through the power of money, that better locks exist has been kept out of all mainstream news. But, soon the canal will be dubbed the World's Greatest Monument to Fraud and Destruction as the truth is discovered by all.

Fraud with impunity by Bert G. Shelton

2010-07-23T06:47:00.001-07:00

The following publication clearly outlines the issues surrounding the current disaster evolving in the Gulf of Mexico and draws parallels to the Panama Canal expansion project currently underway. Written by noted Research Scientist and Professional Engineer, Bert G. Shelton, it can be found online at http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v_16/issue_08/opinion_07.html and at www.crucestrail.com.
Comite ProDefensa del Lago Gatun (Gatun Lake Defense Committee)

Fraud with impunity
by Bert G. Shelton

Real planning and serious engineering seem no longer relevant to the business of "making money." From devastated Haiti, where the construction business flagrantly cut corners which ultimately cost lives (i.e. the poorly constructed UN building), to the Gulf of Mexico now turning black due to more of the same, businessmen routinely direct their projects to eliminate "pesky" engineering details in order to reduce project costs.

The typical response given to those who voice concern is "that's the way it’s always been, so let it go." Thus, it should come as no surprise that big wigs of big companies don't really see it as their fault when things go wrong. Through its inaction, society has accepted that attitude and mode of operation.

Today, doing things wrong has taken on dimensions that most cannot fathom. The heads of projects world-wide are straying more and more from established norms and regulations. Cheating --- and getting away with it --- now seems to be more than just about making easy money. It appears that the game has degenerated into a competition among corrupt egomaniacs for the title of "World's Greatest Cheater."

How badly rules-of-engagement end up being corrupted doesn't matter, so long as the bastardized economics of the project result in inflated profits for its promoters while others are left to deal with resulting damages, often deliberate and avoidable. Minimizing damages to third parties or to the environment is, in fact, contrary to the goal of those running the game. In this competition, getting away with having caused damage is as important of a goal as is making money; more of both is better.

These people want to be remembered, and history has shown that notoriously evil people ultimately get more press than people doing good deeds. Unlike the evildoers that have tried to reach the top through force and become famous dead men, these new devils wish to reach the top without losing their lives in the process.

In developed nations, finesse is required for them to promote questionable designs and advance those to construction. Payoffs to officials and inspectors must be kept under the radar. Getting workers to comply with bad directives is somewhat easier, as most will look the other way rather than lose their job.

In developing nations, on the other hand, officials are there to be bought off and workforce ethics are irrelevant.

More distressing than the open corruption in those nations is how they are being misused. Through them truly devious players of the underworld are bilking the developed nations of untold wealth.

Traditionally, despot leaders of developing nations have rushed ill-conceived projects to fruition so that, before they were out-of-office, they could pocket some of the funds provided by international "development" banks.

While this still goes on, it is apparent that devious players now either greatly influence, or have become part of, the leadership of developing nations to take advantage of the cash offered by the banks. It also seems that hidden relationships have been forged with unscrupulous bank officials who supply funds for unnecessary projects in those nations without independently determining whether or not the project is actually beneficial to that nation.

In fact, more and more in practice, the bankers aren't being required to advise anyone of projects they are funding with the moneys supplied by developed nations. Concerned citizens of the world find out about most projects when those are a done deal and already afoot. What's going on is a classic case of the fox guarding the hen house.

It should, therefore come as no surprise that laundering ill-gotten booty is the objective of a large number --- perhaps even the majority --- of these projects. The lack of proper guidelines for verifying that projects qualify for bank loans, together with the lack of independent oversight, ensure the game's success. As independent confirmation of project effectiveness and environmental compatibility --- i.e. sustainability --- is not a requirement, bogus projects are popping up in developing countries like weeds in the field. In this manner, developed nations end up funding money-laundering schemes.

These corrupt money games happening in poorer nations are not without consequences to the developed nations. In addition to giving underworld players financial backing, morally bankrupt characters are being entrusted with the planet's well-being, which is idiocy considering that they could care less about the well-being of the planet.

US shores are presently being impacted by a disastrous oil-well blowout that was no accident. It was caused by a series of "money-saving directives" made by unscrupulous company officials who, like the underworld players, tried to land a winning goal in the piece of "the game" they controlled. They lost and the planet pays. Now it appears this disaster has been converted into a new "business opportunity" that is being milked for all its worth.

Far from the shores of developed nations, equally serious problems are accumulating from the crooked games being played in the developing ones. While each nation being raped will suffer first, negative effects will mount and eventually reach everyone's shores, devastating the oceans in between in the process.

An example of a project now afoot with serious long-term negative consequences is the Panama Canal expansion that --- in a worldwide promotional campaign that would have brought tears of joy to the eyes of Nazi Germany's Goebbels --- was touted as the best-planned project ever, yet it is based on an obsolete lock design. For the service it will provide, this expansion will cost more than one based on newer state-of-the-art designs. Plus, it will forever use nearly twice the water otherwise required, permanently wasting the canal's most critical resource and stunting its growth potential. It will also cause unnecessary environmental damage and avoidable human displacement.

The new system's inefficiency, permanent shorting of capacity, and higher maintenance needs will result in much higher tolls than necessary. This will raise prices of goods that transit it, the lion's share of which are destined for US markets. Consumers everywhere will forever pay too much so that a few crooks can get rich now.

Furthermore, operation of the lane being added will rapidly salt up the canal, something avoided by the original US design. Besides ruining a world-important freshwater reserve, this will permit sea creatures of both oceans to co-mingle, with results as unpredictable as those of the current holocaust unfolding in the Gulf. It is known that this deadly consequence can be fully avoided with cheaper, more efficient and higher-capacity familiar designs.

Surmising that the primary goal of that project's promoters was to obtain loans from several development banks ---- achieved with a carefully orchestrated campaign to promote the one-and-only lock design considered --- it would seem that building the planned new lane is all that remains to be done. That no independent assessments were ever done to insure the design selected for this world-important project was indeed the best, which it is not, is ludicrous. And, that there is no mechanism to assure that the project will meet whatever stipulations were attached to the loans obtained is totally unacceptable.

Note that in the same way US officials failed to adequately watchdog offshore drilling, they also failed to exercise existing rights to protect US interests with respect to the canal. That's of no surprise, considering the financial games that were played during the Bush-Cheney government that caused a world financial crash along with those played in Panama then and even now. Under the Obama administration a different attitude is not very likely either.

Money games, such as providing development funds to money-laundering projects, or allowing investors to write-off investments in things like reforestation --- which has led to primary forests being cut down to make way for reforestation with non-native trees --- must be stopped. If they are not stopped, the making of carbon-credit treaties becomes a waste of time and money. Why pretend to be "penny wise" while being "pound foolish?"

With that kind of nonsense going on world wide, many wonder why anyone should even bother to recycle. Damages to the world being caused by the mismanagement of projects dwarf these positive efforts.

The present system, under which projects world wide are being blessed, is seriously degrading standards of quality and efficiency. Infrastructure is being built by charlatans who have neither the experience nor the knowledge to correctly apply technologies, even less the capability of finding better solutions, and who don't care. With these people's only interest being to make easy money, they will do things as ineffectively as society will let them.

If the world is to escape this downward spiral, the leaders of the United States and of the rest of the developed world must be pressured by their constituents to stop giving huge sums of money to charlatans and thieves.

Detienen trabajadores del grupo Unidos por el Canal

2010-07-10T10:08:00.000-07:00

l
Viernes, 09 de Julio de 2010 07:26 | Author: Delfia Cortez Acción 100% Noticias

Varios trabajadores del grupo Unidos por el Canal, en el sector Atlántico, fueron destituidos por el gerente de recursos humanos Eduardo Ochomo, que entregó al carta de despido la mañana del jueves.

Los obreros que llegaban desde temprano a sus trabajos en los respectivos buses, fueron revisados a través del pele police lo que causó las molestia porque dijeron que era una clara persecución por las protestas que tienen en este momento.

"Cuando llegamos a este trabajo nos pidieron historial policivo" entonces porque piden cédula para buscar casos que no hay dijo un obrero.

Uno de los destituidos, Yamel Vásquez, obrero de este grupo en Colón denunció que la carta señalaba que se negó a trabajar los días 3, 4, 5 y 7 de julio cuando es totalmente falso, ya que se ha mantenido en su sitio de trabajo.

Las protestas continuaron porque los obreros de la ampliación salieron a protestar nuevamente, cuando se les permitió llegar en los buses a sus labores.

Se informó que las reuniones de los obreros continúan en Panamá con la Cámara Panameña de la Cosntrucción y otros gremios.

Los miembros del SUNTRACS por su parte salieron a piquetear frente al MITRADEL ya que exigen la liberación de sus compañeros y apoyan a los obreros de la Construcción.

Actualizado (Viernes, 09 de Julio de 2010 07:42)

Inversiones Responsables Producen Más

2010-05-29T12:21:00.000-07:00

Thursday, May 27, 2010
Alianza ProPanama

Lo ocurrido en el Golfo de México nos muestra lo peligroso que es hacerle caso omiso a los procesos y a las técnicas de ingeniería desarrolladas para mejorar y proteger una obra. Una de las creencias erróneas de nuestros tiempos es que el generar dinero rápidamente justifica el no buscar cómo disminuir costosos daños o riesgos creados por la actividad y otra es asumir que el actuar responsablemente significaría una inevitable disminución de las ganacias.

El documento a continuación detalla cómo mejorar la ampliación del Canal de Panamá --que también se desarrolló con un apuro injustificable-- y cómo se puede lograr un rendimiento muy mayor, sin malgastar ni arriesgar nuestra agua dulce, fuente de vida del país.

El Ing. Bert G. Shelton, investigador científico panameño, especialista en el diseño y la construcción de estructuras masivas, experto en las técnicas para alzar y bajar buques y en el manejo eficiente de recursos, y el Ing. Bert J. Shelton Vásquez (QEPD) -fundador del Instituto de GeoCiencias de Panamá y profesor titular de la Universidad de Panamá –establecieron un equipo independiente de investigación desde que se anunció este importante proyecto y cuya labor ha continuado a pesar del triste fallecimiento del Prof.Shelton. Los resultados de estos estudios han despertado el interés de expertos en varios paises en donde han sido presentados y de quienes he personalmente, como economista e investigadora, recibido asesoramientos que me convencen de la urgencia del tema.

En Panamá estamos sufriendo terribles consecuencias causadas por desenfrenadas “inversiones”, la falta de infraestructura, trastornos de salud debido a la severa contaminación ambiental y el descontrol en actividades como la minería y las hidroeléctricas irresponsables. Usando los conocimientos que tenemos hoy y actuando con inteligencia, no hay que continuar por este camino equivocado. Dado lo que vemos hoy en el golfo y por todo lo antedicho, una ampliación visionaria y verdaderamente rentable con muchos menos riesgos es lo que el Canal de Panamá merece y nosotros también. Urge hacer una revisión independiente e imparcial de este proyecto de infraestructura mundial que no sólo afectará a Panamá, pero a nuestros paises hermanos y al resto del mundo de forma irreversible.

Magister Leila R. Shelton-Louhi
Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún

www.crucestrail.com

Denunciando la Ampliación del Canal de Panamá

Ing. Bert G. Shelton, 15 de mayo de 2010

El Canal de Panamá ciertamente es un buen negocio. Esto ha quedado muy claro al ver cuánto dinero se ha hecho desde que fue transferido a las manos de La Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP).

La ACP fue formada para manejar el negocio del canal para Panamá y para velar por los intereses de este país. Es su responsabilidad mantenerlo, mejorarlo y hacerlo crecer, en adición a proveerle el paso —de un océano al otro— a los buques de sus clientes.

Bajo el manejo de la ACP el canal ha sido razonablemente mantenido, se le han hecho varias mejoras necesarias. Ahora lo están ampliando; o sea, están haciéndolo crecer.

Eso dicho, pareciera que todo va muy bien, pero no es así.

Al investigar los detalles técnicos del sistema de esclusas y su operación, pareciera que el plan de ampliación no vela por los intereses del país, ni de la mayoría del mundo de transporte marítimo.

Este proyecto —el cual sufre del mal uso del poder y cuyo manejo nunca se ha visto como transparente— producirá una mal llamada “mejora” que seriamente malgastará el recurso hídrico más valioso del país en perpetuidad. Impedirá —para siempre— que el canal alcance su máximo potencial en términos de su prestación de servicios y de la generación de ingresos.

Ese malgasto y esas pérdidas tienen todo que ver con el sistema de esclusas escogido, el cual se anunció casado al plan de ampliación sin haberse cumplido el debido proceso de selección.

En cualquiera obra de ingeniería —y en especial una obra pública de esta magnitud— cuando hay múltiples opciones, la selección del sistema clave del proyecto (o los sistemas claves, si es que hay varios) conlleva un proceso en donde se identifican y se comparan los méritos y las desventajas de las opciones.

Al país se le declaró que el sistema de esclusas con tinas era la única posible opción —y por ende, la mejor— para el proyecto, lo cual es rotundamente falso.

Hay múltiples opciones. Hasta hay un ejemplar en el mismo Canal de Panamá que sería mejor. Es más, la opción más práctica tendría capacidad para 60% a 70% más tránsitos diarios con el mismo desgaste total de agua, y no costaría más.

Como el Canal de Panamá es propiedad del pueblo panameño, invoco el derecho del público a conocer los detalles de los estudios y de las evaluaciones que culminaron con la selección del sistema de esclusas con tinas para el proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá que tendrá tan amplias repercusiones y afectará no sólo el futuro económico del país, pero al del comercio mundial.

Esta denuncia se fundamenta en los siguientes puntos:

* Representación engañosa de los méritos del proyecto en su forma actual

* Selección de un sistema de esclusas sin haberse cumplido el debido proceso técnico

* Despilfarro severo de valiosos recursos hídricos nacionales

* Creación de riesgos innecesarios amenazando a la población y la futura operación de la vía

Considerando que hay cuatro técnicas con las cuales se puede reducir la cantidad de agua que se desgasta al alzar o bajar buques que transitan sistemas de esclusas, y dado a que el sistema de esclusas seleccionado sólo utiliza dos de estas técnicas, denuncio como injustificable el representarle al pueblo panameño que el sistema de esclusas seleccionado es el único factible para este proyecto.

Cabe anotar que el sistema de esclusas del canal de hoy contiene tres de las técnicas para ahorrar agua. En su totalidad el sistema actual puede ahorrar el 50% del agua, y parte puede ahorrar el 75%.

Evaluando el consumo real del sistema propuesto, su ahorro es inferior al 60% que se publica (más cerca al 55%), pero —antes de poder escoger el sistema más apropiado— hay otros factores que se deben evaluar y comparar en adición a cuánta agua usa.

Algo muy importante que se establece en base a la disponibilidad del agua es el tamaño de las cámaras. Con el sistema escogido, cámaras más grandes no se pudieron contemplar porque no habría suficiente agua para aprovecharlas bien y justificar la inversión.

Esta selección ha limitado considerablemente el potencial del canal en términos del tamaño máximo de los buques que lo podrán transitar. También limita el tamaño de los buques en tránsitos donde agrupan más de un buque en la cámara. Mucho negocio futuro se perderá.

Denuncio —por ser totalmente inaceptable e irresponsable— la falta de comparaciones entre el sistema escogido y sistemas basados en las esclusas del propio Canal de Panamá que al mínimo debieron haber sido evaluados. Previo a la selección, existían mejores combinaciones de técnicas de ahorro las cuales pareciera que no fueron consideradas.

Exijo que se le muestre al pueblo las comparaciones.

Estudios independientes confirman que hay arreglos de esclusas con aún otras combinaciones de las técnicas para reducir la cantidad de agua desgastada por tránsito —el más práctico de los cuales permitiendo por lo menos dos tercios más tránsitos diarios como se anotó previamente. (Hay que destacar que ninguno usa componentes desconocidos o inusuales.)

Pregunto, ¿cuál es el beneficio al negocio del transporte naviero y al negocio canalero que se gaste tanto dinero en esclusas que sólo rendirán alrededor de la mitad del servicio que rendiría una ampliación que utiliza el mejor de los sistemas de esclusas disponibles hoy?

Es más, ¿cuál es el beneficio de tener un sistema que —por su exceso de tinas— promete requerir más mantenimiento en relación al número de buques que servirá comparado al menor mantenimiento requerido por sistemas más prácticos y más confiables?

Con mejores esclusas nuevas —y con ajustes prudentes al manejo de las de hoy— no existe la necesidad de ampliar la cuenca actual, ni de forzar el desalojo innecesario de cientos de familias panameñas. Ya se escucha que a los moradores de la zona designada a ser la cuenca oriental —cuyas aguas están reservadas para el futuro uso del canal— se les ha informado que pronto tendrán que mudarse.

Eso es vilmente engañoso.

La cuenca de hoy recibe más que suficiente agua de las lluvias para abastecer a esta ampliación y tiene la capacidad de almacenamiento necesaria para manejar la demanda del canal ampliado al curso del año si se hacen los ajustes pertinentes. Esto fue comprobado cuando se les hicieron ajustes a las esclusas seleccionadas para reducir lo que usarían y se hicieron planes para ampliar la fluctuación del nivel del Lago Gatún lo cual aumenta su volumen de agua útil.

Hechos los ajustes —y antes del plebiscito— se le informó al pueblo panameño que ya no habría que incorporarle la cuenca oriental al proyecto actual. Hasta fue aprobada una ley en contra de los embalses.

De esa forma fueron abordadas las preocupaciones de los moradores y de allí se procedió al voto que aprobó el proyecto.

Ahora pareciera que se pretende ir en contra de lo acordado.

Denuncio como falso que la mejor opción para esta ampliación es la de incorporarle la cuenca oriental al sistema.

Un sistema apropiado no sólo no necesitaría esa agua, pero sería más barato y rendiría más servicio.

Hay que preguntar, ¿porqué se insiste en incorporar la cuenca oriental en esta vuelta y quién será el más beneficiado?

Como se mostró con los ajustes que se hicieron para apaciguar a los campesinos y para influir en la opinión publica, definitivamente hay cómo resolver el presunto dilema del agua.

Se hace armando arreglos de esclusas más eficientes y optimizando el manejo de ambos sistemas de esclusas —el nuevo y el original— para optimizar el uso del agua, como lo han determinado los estudios independientes.

Así se evitaría el permanente y descarado despilfarro del más valioso recurso hídrico del país y la cuenca oriental se conservaría para un futuro crecimiento.

Al referéndum del 2006, lo denuncio por no haber sido democrático.

Cuando todo el peso de un gobierno se usa para obtener el resultado que desean los gobernantes, ese proceso deja de serlo.

A los foros que se hicieron previos al referéndum, los denuncio como no-imparciales.

Esos foros se veían manipulados para evadir discusiones serias sobre puntos técnicos de la obra, las cuales pudiesen haber cambiado el resultado del voto. Hay que cuestionar ¿de quiénes eran los intereses por cuales velaban los panelistas?

Al parecer, la meta era la de avanzar el proyecto a la etapa de construcción lo antes posible y no era conveniente para los interesados que se cuestionara el sistema de esclusas, ni que saliera a la luz que habían más y mejores opciones a considerar, como lo demuestran los estudios independientes.

Denuncio la selección actual de esclusas por las consecuencias graves que se enfrentarán si se llega a concluir la obra tal y como está planificada. Estas incluyen hasta la posible pérdida total del Canal de Panamá en el futuro debido a los riesgos permanentes que se le imponen. Todavía es posible evitarlos porque aún la construcción de las esclusas no ha comenzado; o sea, aún no se ha concretado la obra.

En base a lo antedicho, rechazo rotundamente que sea “muy tarde” reemplazar la selección de esclusas, como nos quieren hacer creer los que están lucrando de este gran negociado.

Es totalmente falso decir que ya “no es posible”—o que “no vale la pena”— hacer mejoras.

En su totalidad, el proyecto acabará costando menos si se recapacita, se investigan las opciones, y se escoge un mejor sistema. Es así, porque será insignificante el costo del cambio comparado a lo que se ahorrará en costos reducidos de construcción y de mantenimiento, más lo que se ganará de los tránsitos adicionales que la primera etapa del proyecto ofrecerá.

Encima de las ganancias que se obtendrían en la primera etapa, hay que sumarle la reducción al costo de la segunda etapa de la ampliación, ya que en estos momentos esa promete ser una copia de la primera. También hay que tomar en cuenta que —al hacerse una segunda etapa mejorada— la capacidad de tránsitos del canal aumentará aún más.

Por último, también hay que tomar en cuenta que, si se escoge un arreglo más beneficioso, la segunda etapa no tiene que hacerse tan pronto como se calcula ahora.

Estas denuncias se concentran específicamente en el sistema de esclusas escogido para el proyecto, cuya construcción no ha empezado.

Los trabajos que ya están en marcha —para ampliar los cauces de navegación existentes y para excavar nuevos— no se verán afectados, ni se perderán al cambiar el diseño del sistema de esclusas.

Lo que sí hay que cambiar, y se denuncia aquí, es el plan de ampliar la cuenca hidrográfica del canal hacia el noroeste en base a la selección fraudulenta del sistema de esclusas con tinas. El uso de este sistema de esclusas altamente ineficiente no atiende los intereses del pueblo panameño, quienes son los dueños legítimos del canal y del área canalera.

También, denuncio el costo de lo planificado por ser demasiado alto en relación al servicio que brindará y porque malgastará el agua del canal.

Además, denuncio lo planificado por imponerle riesgos inaceptables al canal y a sus clientes —riesgos que pueden ser evitados— y por los daños innecesarios e irreversibles al ambiente que ocurrirán cuando el sistema nuevo entre en operación.

Proceder con la ampliación de la cuenca sin la debida evaluación de las alternativas que existen para el sistema de esclusas es cometer un fraude en contra de todos los panameños y, en particular, en contra de los campesinos que residen en las áreas que se pretenden anexar a la cuenca del canal.

De la misma forma, proceder con la construcción de las esclusas seleccionadas —sin haber hecho las comparaciones— sería llevar a cabo un engaño diseñado para defraudar al mundo, al igual que a la nación.

El plan actual de la ampliación del Canal de Panamá aparenta tener como objetivos: 1) maximizar la construcción en materia de excavaciones y de estructuras, y 2) asegurar que sean integradas las reservas hídricas adicionales lo antes posible.

No pareciera ser parte del plan el maximizar el potencial de ingresos del sistema canalero, pero sí pareciera ser parte del mismo el maximizar los ingresos de los involucrados en los trabajos formando parte del proyecto.

Además, pese a las actividades que se usan para transmitirle al pueblo que la protección del ambiente y el bien que representa sí importa, los hechos sugieren que minimizar los daños al ambiente no figura realmente en lo planificado.

En adición a todo lo antedicho, y lo cual da sustento a esta denuncia, se le puede sumar el apuro que se ha visto en Panamá de sacarle provecho a todos los recursos naturales del país de un tiro —algo que jamás se haría en países de primer mundo por lo desastroso que es hacer eso. A ningún pueblo le conviene convertir a todos sus recursos en dinero, sin reservar algo para el futuro, al igual que tampoco es lógico comprometer casi el doble de la cantidad del agua dulce que realmente se necesita utilizar.

El dinero puede perder su valor de la noche a la mañana, los recursos no. Por el bien del pueblo es imprescindible que la explotación de todo recurso se haga de forma racional y que se planifique con luces largas.

En el caso del agua, ciertamente su poder se pierde si llega al mar sin aprovecharse. Pero, no es lógico crear un sistema que acaba no usándolo eficientemente. Esto equivale a echarlo a perder para siempre.

Lo más prudente y del mayor beneficio al negocio del canal sería armar el mejor sistema de esclusas en base a los conocimientos de este siglo. En adición a aumentar dramáticamente el rendimiento de la inversión, tal cambio permitirá que se estudie debidamente el potencial de los recursos hídricos del canal para sacarles el mayor beneficio posible en el futuro. Si se incorpora la cuenca oriental a la brava como ahora se pretende, Panamá perderá en grande.

Con todas las canalladas que Panamá está sufriendo en estos momentos, no debiera sorprenderle a nadie que en la ampliación del canal también puedan haber jugadas indebidas. No podemos permitir, a brazos cruzados, la degradación de este activo nacional incorporándole un sistema de esclusas ineficiente y peligroso —que severamente malgastará el agua al transitar relativamente pocos buques y que creará riesgos graves e innecesarios— simplemente para que ciertos puedan maximizar lo que les cae al bolsillo durante la obra sin importarles en qué estado quedará para las futuras generaciones.

Como ultimo, exijo por parte del pueblo —y en particular de parte de los mas afectados— una revisión independiente e imparcial del proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá —con la plena y libre participación de ingenieros y expertos panameños y extranjeros incluyendo a los miembros de la Sociedad Panameña de Ingenieros y Arquitectos y a otros grupos técnicos y académicos— para que la ampliación produzca un sistema canalero que beneficie a todos los panameños, sin los riesgos permanentes e innecesarios que creará el proyecto actual y sin producir sufrimiento innecesario a la población, ni daños inaceptables al ambiente.

Con ajustes al rumbo que se sigue hoy, la joya que fue Panamá el siglo pasado podrá volver a brillar.

Falla obliga a tomar medidas antisísmicas en ampliación

2010-04-25T09:42:00.000-07:00

EXISTEN 5 FALLAS EN EL CANAL DE PANAMA, PERO 1 ES LA MAS VULNERABLE

Falla obliga a tomar medidas antisísmicas en ampliación
Las nuevas esclusas se están construyendo con un criterio más exigente que el actual y están diseñadas para resistir un movimiento telúrico de hasta 7 grados en la escala de Richter.

Ereida Prieto
ereida.prieto@epasa.com
PA-DIGITAL

Trabajos. El peligro de sismo se tomó en cuenta para los estudios de diseño del proyecto de expansión del Canal. La última ruptura de la falla de Pedro Miguel causó el devastador terremoto de Panamá Viejo, el 2 de mayo de 1621.

Una falla tectónica, ubicada al oeste del Canal de Panamá, hizo que se tomaran "criterios más estrictos" para la construcción del Tercer Juego de Esclusas, reveló el vicepresidente de Ingeniería y Administración de Programas de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), Jorge Luis Quijano.

Quijano dijo que esta falla, con "potencial sísmico", tiene una profundidad de 15 kms. y su longitud de 50 kilómetros "podría extenderse más hacia el sur, bajo el mar".

La falla, que está ubicada en Pedro Miguel, sigue por Howard, pasa por las esclusas de Miraflores, luego por donde se están construyendo las represas y el canal de acceso a la nueva esclusa, hasta llegar a Gamboa.

De acuerdo con consultores de Inglaterra, Noruega, Canadá y Suiza, contratados por la ACP, de producirse un sismo sería entre 6 a 7 grados en la escala de Ritcher, por lo que se "está construyendo para esa magnitud".

"Todo se está considerando en la construcción, como la colocación de unos sellos de arcillas que se autorreparan y pueden soportar movimientos de hasta tres metros laterales y un salto de un metro, en los casos extremos", indicó Quijano.

Aclaró que "no hay ninguna señal ni evidencia de un sismo inminente".

Ampliación.
El gerente de Ingeniería de la ACP, Luis Domingo Alfaro, aseguró que "no ha habido un impacto real en el valor final de la ampliación", pero han hecho "ajustes a las alineaciones y estructuras para ahorrar en la excavación por razones geográficas, recomendado por los consultores".

Explicó que debido a la falla, las especificaciones antisísmicas "son superiores a las estructuras existentes", ya que se diseñó para "un sismo extremo".

"Reconocemos la falla que tenemos en el Canal que no es nueva, ya que hay un mapa geológico que se conoce desde 1938".

"Si tenemos una falla en un lugar sensible del Canal, por eso tenemos que tomar las previsiones", advirtió.

Alfaro dijo que hay que recordar que otra falla conocida como el Cinturón del Formado del Norte "está en casi todo el país desde Colombia hasta Costa Rica y ha producido terremotos superior a los 7 grados en la escala de Ritcher".

Estudios.
El administrador del Canal, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, giró instrucciones a la División de Ingeniería para que se revisen de "manera integral todas las estructuras viejas" de la vía interoceánica, incluyendo la represa del lago Gatún, para determinar si "requieren medidas correctivas".

Recomendaron que para la construcción del Metro, se incorporen todas las medidas antisísmicas, tomando en consideración que las construcciones elevadas son más inestables.

Entre el 2005 y 2007 se realizaron estudios a esta falla, que revelaron que el movimiento más reciente fue en 1621 y afectó a la ciudad capital.

"Hemos compartido esta información con el Instituto de Geociencias de la Universidad de Panamá y el Comité Consultivo del Reglamento Estructural de Panamá".

Alfaro reveló que el funcionamiento del Canal "dependerá de qué tan severo sea el sismo", ya que están construyendo para "salvar vidas".

"Hemos tomado los pasos prudentes para asegurarnos, por eso hemos diseñado las nuevas esclusas con un criterio más exigente que el actual", resaltó.

El sismo de mayor magnitud fue de 7.9° en la escala de Ritcher. Provocó un maremoto en San Blas el 7 de septiembre de 1882.

14 comentarios
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Me remito al ny times el cual indica que a la medianoche el 1 de octubre de 1913 un año antes de inaugurar el canal se experimentó un fuerte movimiento sísmico el cual originaba presumiblemente en la falla de portobelo el cual se estimaba sobre los 7 grados escala richter. Sin embargo no se registraron grietas en las esclusas de gatun donde se sintió con más fuerza. También se debe mencionar el gran sismo de panamá 7. 9 grados del 7 septiembre de 1882 el cual destruyo la fachada de la catedral y que el ing. De leseps ordenó que la repararan rápidamente para que los accionistas de la compañía del canal no se llegaran a enterar de tal noticia.
Oscar sogandares correo privado 25-04-10 [12:37]

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Espero que a pesar de salas los edificios esten bien construidos, sino ya podemos pensar lo que sucedera.
Ines ines@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [12:14]

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Cual sera el nivel de resistencia del corredor sur ante un sismo de categoria 7, podra resistir o se vera seriamente afectado, la falla existe, por lo tanto la posibilidad de un sismo es real no es un invento, antes de usar el dinero de los viejitos asegurados, consideren este hecho.
Angel angel@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [11:20]

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Magnificos comentarios, ya el panamamerica en el confabulario habia advertido sobre el riesgo que tendria esta inversion de la compra del corredor sur, este informe de la acp constituye plena prueba de lo riesgosa que es ejecutar esta inversion, de ocurrir algo y comprar los corredores con el dinero de los asegurados, se establece el conocimiento de los funcionarios que participen en esta transaccion del alto riesgo de la inversion, por ello se hacen mas responsable de lo que ocurra los funcionarios que en el participen, mejor es que se vayan asesorando bien desde ahora.
Fulvio fulvio@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [9:25]

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Acertada opinion de efrain, pues con este informe pagado por la acp y que se debe publicar completo, se debe suspender la idea de compra de corredores por parte de css, pues es inversion de muy alto riesgo para los proximos años y sus puentes y calzadas sobre el mar no soportarian un terremoto del poder indicado, perdiendose todo el dinero de los asegurados. Al menos que reconozcan un error humano en interpretacion de esta falla considerada capaz de generar terremoto de magnitud 7 similar al de haiti y a quema ropa.
No importa correo privado 25-04-10 [9:12]

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Lo que sucedio en prado del este, la naturaleza cobro lo suyo y boli pariente tuvo que responder ante la justicia, si sucede lo mismo con el corredor sur y lo compran con dinero de los asegurados, los que participen de esta decision tendran que asumir sus responsabilidades, conato, apede, camara de comercio, suntracs, educadores, y pueblo en general tendran que estar atentos y las advertencias deben ser publicas para que no evadan responsabilidades juridicas, sociales y morales, esto podria general un escandalo mayor que el envenamiento de los asegurados.
Simon simon@hotmail.com 25-04-10 [9:09]

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Estoy de acuerdo en que se tomen medidas antisísmicas para proteger nuestra principal megaconstrucción y que esto se haga usando tecnología moderna. Pero cuestiono los datos de sismos que ocurrieron hace cientos de años, ya que el primer sismógrafo moderno fue inventado en 1855. Alguien puede aclarar esto?.
Observador correo privado 25-04-10 [9:03]

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Definitivamente que el panamono se identifica con gentuza pesimista y patetica q cree q todo lo sabe y se lo merece. Solo hay q leer a "mundo alreves" esos viven con un mojon pegado en el ano q le mantiene la amargura fresca. Para ellos cada ladron juzga con su corrupta mente. Todo es destilar pesimismo y agrura, como detestan a su propia gente! gracias a dios "mainor" felicita. Yo tambien felicito!.
Para "mundo al reves correo privado 25-04-10 [9:02]

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"mundo al reves" y "no importa" con individuos como ustedes, dios nos salve.
Libre correo privado 25-04-10 [8:56]

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Si al corredor sur en la parte marina sufre un desastre y lo compran con dinero de los viejitos asegurados quien responde por los danos, esto debe quedar claro antes de hacer esta inversion, y se deben responsabilizar de esta compra funcionarios con nombres propios , apellidos y numeros de cedula, para posteriomenten no esquiven sus obligaciones civiles y penales

Nota extraída de: http://www.pa-digital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/nacion-interna.php?story_id=913146&ch=1#ixzz0m8BK0JRo
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El costo ambiental de ampliar el Canal de Panamá, LP. Abr. 19

2010-04-19T20:55:00.000-07:00

DEFORESTACIÓN contra COMPENSACIÓN

El costo ambiental de ampliar el Canal de Panamá

En 2006 los panameños decidieron ampliar el Canal de Panamá. Implícitamente también aprobaron la tala de 470 hectáreas de bosque.

HUELLA. En la medida que avanza el proyecto de ampliación del Canal una zona boscosa desaparece. LA PRENSA/ Gabriel Rodríguez1364149

JOSE ARCIA
jarcia@prensa.com

Con la detonación de explosivos en cerro Paraíso el 3 de septiembre de 2007 se iniciaron los trabajos de ampliación del Canal de Panamá. El hecho también marcó el inicio de la destrucción de 470 hectáreas de bosque secundario, de las cuales 332 ya sucumbieron por el paso de los tractores.

Hasta ahora, la ampliación de la vía interoceánica también ha representado la destrucción de 22 hectáreas de mangles.

El proyecto de ampliación del Canal de Panamá tiene un “costo ecológico desde el punto de vista de vegetación”, señala el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EIA).

“La duración del impacto será larga dado que las áreas verdes en la zona donde será removida la vegetación no se recuperarán por mucho tiempo”, señala el EIA.

Los efectos de la obra no se limitan a la devastación de bosques. El ensanche de la ruta, la construcción de las tinas de reciclaje de agua y del nuevo juego de esclusas también traen consigo la erosión de suelos y el desvío de los ríos Grande y Cocolí.

Son las consecuencias ambientales de un proyecto que fue aprobado en un referendo, de forma mayoritaria: un 76% de los panameños se manifestó a favor y 21.94% lo rechazó. En esa ocasión –22 de octubre de 2006–, 905 mil 445 panameños acudieron a las urnas, de los 2 millones 132 mil 842 habilitados para votar.

Cuatro años después y el proyecto en pleno desarrollo los ambientalista no están fiscalizando la obra. Félix Wing, director de asesoría legal del Centro de Incidencia Ambiental (Ciam), admite que no está pendiente del tema. Mir Rodríguez, director de Almanaque Azul, indicó lo mismo.

Resarcimiento

Por la tala de las 332 hectáreas de bosque secundario, la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) ha pagado $3 millones a la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (Anam) como compensación ecológica.

La ACP también ha desembolsado la suma de $455 mil 800 a la Autoridad de Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá (ARAP), en concepto de compensación ecológica por las 22 hectáreas de manglar afectadas en el Pacífico.

De igual forma desarrolla un programa de reforestación en parques nacionales, tanto en la ciudad capital como en el interior del país (Ver mapa).

Arizmendis Montoya y Abdiel Delgado, especialista ambiental y jefe de proyecto de reforestación de la ACP, respectivamente, son los responsables de que se cumpla con el plan de mitigación, que incluye el plan de reforestación. Además, son los encargados de garantizar que se realicen los inventarios de especies de las áreas que son devastadas.

Sobre el proceso, los especialistas explicaron que antes de iniciar el desmonte del bosque el lugar tiene que ser saneado, es decir, se realiza un inventario de los animales para su reubicación. Hasta la semana pasada se habían rescatado y reubicado 2 mil 353 animales, entre los cuales había osos perezosos, monos, culebras, armadillos, iguanas, caimanes y puercoespines.

Hasta la fecha se han reforestado 450 hectáreas, mientras que otras 65 serán reforestadas en lo que resta del año, para completar 515, aseguró Montoya.

Delgado, por su parte, dijo que esta semana se debe abrir la licitación para la reforestación por la afectación de la zona de manglar. Precisó que en coordinación con la ARAP se escogió la desembocadura del río Chiriquí Viejo, en Chiriquí.

Dificultades

En cuanto a las áreas donde se realizarán las reforestaciones por las zonas de bosque afectadas, los funcionarios explicaron que la Anam es la que decide en qué lugar se harán.

En este proceso han tenido algunas dificultades.

Delgado explicó que este año suspendieron un proyecto de reforestación en La Yeguada, provincia de Veraguas, por problemas de tenencia de tierra.

Es importante, comentó, que la reforestación se realice en zonas que no presenten conflictos territoriales, para garantizar el proyecto. Ahora, comentó, la Anam debe ubicar otro lugar para completar la cantidad de terreno que se debe reforestar por las 332 hectáreas que hasta la fecha han sido devastadas. El compromiso es reforestar el doble de lo que se destruye y con una especie nativa, enfatizó.

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ENFOQUE

No hay fiscalización ciudadana

MIR RODRÍGUEZ*
panorama@prensa.com

OPINIÓN. El resultado del referendo demuestra que a pesar de toda la plata que gastó el Estado en propaganda patriotera, la mayoría de los panameños no sentimos vinculación ni compromiso con el Canal. Pero al ganar el sí los sectores anti expansión quedamos desarticulados: el referendo le calló la boca a los ambientalistas. Pareciera que tras esa consulta los ecologistas ya dimos por perdido ese caso y nos estamos concentrando en atender el asalto sin los precedentes que están sufriendo los ecosistemas de Panamá en los últimos años.

Pero, las razones por las que hicimos campaña por el no a la ampliación siguen vigentes. Al final, las minas a cielo abierto y las hidroeléctricas gigantes forman parte de la misma lógica desarrollista, irracional y elitista de la expansión del Canal, una fórmula que ha contribuido en buena medida a producir las enormes desigualdades de este país.

*Almanaque Azul

La ampliación del Canal de Panamá (Panama News)

2010-04-18T17:25:00.000-07:00

La ampliación del Canal de Panamá
por Bruno Peron Loureiro --- Barómetro Internacional

La opulencia de las partes en pugna crece mientras padecemos en América Latina de los peores males. La ampliación del Canal de Panamá, que une el Océano Pacífico al Mar Caribe se inició en 2007 y está prevista para finalizarse en 2014 con un costo de 5,25 millardos de dólares.

Navío de varios países atraviesan el canal, mientras Chile disputa con Bolivia por la intención de este país de tener un acceso al Pacífico. Todas las barreras se levantan cuando el asunto nos incumbe solamente a nosotros, los latinoamericanos.

Los primeros navíos cruzaron el Canal de Panamá en 1914, desde entonces la mayor parte de ellos han sido buques comerciales o de guerra. La construcción del canal se inició con los franceses en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, pero luego fue retomada por los pangericanos (estadounidenses).

El proyecto sufrió reveses. Enfermedades tropicales, sobre todo la fiebre amarilla y la malaria, afectaron a los trabajadores y provocaron la muerte de millares de ellos. Parte considerable de la mano de obra vino de las islas caribeñas. Inversores de traje y corbata de Nueva York colocaron el dinero pero no se arremangaron siquiera.

El gobierno de Panamá asumió el control del canal recién en 1999 a través de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP), que es una empresa pública y autónoma. Inmediatamente, en 2001 surgió la propuesta de expansión.

Aunque las bananas y el café sean los principales productos agrícolas de Panamá, la renta generada por el canal es muy importante para los números de la economía del país. Desde 1998, el precio por el uso del canal aumentó en un 70%.

Panamá tiene una de las tasas de crecimiento económico más altas de América Latina. Sin embargo, el valor recogido por los impuestos es del 11% de la renta de los contribuyentes, lo que significa una tasa baja, comparada con la media de América Latina. A guisa de comparación, en el Brasil la tributación alcanza a más del 40% de la renta, lo cual arranca las vísceras de los trabajadores, que todavía deben pagar los servicios básicos que el Estado no retorna.

Existe sin embargo un desfase entre el potencial laboral de los panameños y la renta de 1/5 del producto interno bruto generada por el canal, que acaba siendo una herramienta de país pujante para la reducción de los costos de flete. Esta bonanza se mezcla con la enorme desigualdad en la distribución de la renta, que se hace notoria en la bajísima remuneración de la mano de obra de baja calificación y en la concentración laboral de los panameños en el sector agrícola.

Los productos pangericanos y japoneses de alto valor agregado, como computadores y otras piezas electrónicas pasan por el mismo canal por el que se desea que cruce el carbón de Colombia y la soya y minería de hierro de Brasil. En esta pista de doble sentido se mueven por un lado productos pomposos que no tienen ningún sentido útil y por otro las joyas agrícolas latinoamericanas que así pueden tener mejor acceso al mercado asiático y a la costa oeste pangericana.

La economía es un factor sobresaliente en la lucha por un espacio mundial, en detrimento del desarrollo humano. El intercambio cultural y la globalización desafortunadamente han sido pensados sólo en función del lucro que generan.

Se habla cada vez más de desarrollo sustentable. El presidente panameño, Ricardo Martinelli presiona por la aprobación de un tratado de libre comercio con la Pangérica (EEUU). Su mejor argumento es que Panamá suma esfuerzos en la lucha internacional contra el narcotráfico.

Panamá tiene poco que perder con la expansión del canal, por el que pasarán más y mayores navíos y la renta podrá aumentar en los cofres públicos. El quid de la cuestión mientras tanto, es como beneficiará a los panameños y que lección obtiene Nuestramérica de ello.

Desconfío de que los inversores del Norte tengan más para ganar con la ampliación del Canal de Panamá que nosotros, los latinoamericanos que nos hemos especializado en vender lo que no sabemos aprovechar, como el gas, el petróleo y el sudor de nuestros pueblos.

A Con to Beat all Cons: The Panama Canal Expansion

2010-04-03T13:01:00.000-07:00

A Con to Beat all Cons: The Panama Canal Expansion

by: Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer March 15th , 2010

　

A new lane is to be added to The Panama Canal -- one to handle ships that are larger than what can fit into the two lanes the US built a hundred years ago. That is what was told to the people of Panama when they were asked to give the go-ahead vote for its expansion.

Concurrently, shipping companies and ports abroad apparently continue with the impression that, not one bigger lane, but two, are to be added to the canal in fairly short succession.

The first problem the project's "planners" had to overcome was how to obtain enough water to supply just one bigger lane, never mind two.

When the Panamanian people were informed that adjacent watersheds were to be incorporated -- which meant land would be expropriated and people displaced -- the public outcry was hastily appeased by increasing the number of water-saving tanks beside each lock chamber (of the planned third lane that the public was aware of) from two to three. With that modification, and without making mention of plans for yet a fourth lane and its water needs, the project's promoters got the go-ahead vote.

Thus, it would seem that there is no intention of honoring the Panamanian people's desire that the canal expansion not include the incorporation of more watersheds.

Money is obviously the driver of this whole affair. With some 36 transits a day that on average pay about $0.25 million each, which is about 10 times what the US charged for doing the same, there are upwards of 3 billion yearly reasons behind ensuring the success of this game.

　

What the Popular Vote was About

Conditions set in the canal treaties and during the negotiations for the US turn-over of the Canal to the people of Panama, were intended to safeguard the interests of both parties and to protect the watershed. Defining the watershed protection plan was an inter-disciplinary international effort that involved prestigious specialists in water-resources management.

After the vote, the apparent lack of concern demonstrated by all those governments involved in the canal turn-over preparations -- as development plans within the former Canal Zone have unfolded -- has shocked most of the knowledgeable observing public. Precisely what was not supposed to happen -- the takeover of the canal by special interests -- is what has happened. And, in effect, its watershed has been invaded for uses other than those contemplated prior to turnover.

What appears to have happened is that, when this canal expansion was announced, the players in charge around the globe were the same ones in charge leading up to the financial collapse from which the world is now trying to recover. And, considering how the present players are rewarding those responsible for that debacle, any change to the "status quo" in Panama is most improbable.

　

Tactics Employed in Setting-Up the Popular Vote

Prior to the vote, a series of public forums, or town meetings, were held across the country. More like a promotional campaign than a format for discussing plan particulars, these forums were carefully orchestrated to praise the job-producing and money-making virtues of the project while steering clear of any technical discussions that might derail the gravy-train.

The forums included pre-selected panelist representing the "for" and "against" expansion camps, all of whom kept to the script. When pressured by individuals in the audience to answer direct questions of a technical nature, the first action was to brush the question off as a secondary issue. If an individual persisted, that person's competence was put in question, insinuating that the questioner likely lacked the necessary depth in the subject to fully understand the answer...a tactic meant to belittle and shut the person up.

If the person was clearly knowledgeable, the deflection tactic then used was to state that a presenter qualified to answer that question was not available at the forum, but would be at a subsequent forum, which never happened.

Added to that, following the canal expansion plan's announcement to the nation, Panama's Society of Engineers and Architects (known in Panama by the acronym: SPIA) declared that it would perform a technical assessment of the plan. What the SPIA's leadership didn't realize was that political maneuvers were already afoot to derail their assessment plan and it never happened.

In addition to technical discussions at forums being effectively shut down -- an act that alone should invalidate the vote as being undemocratic -- along with the country's only qualified scientific society's plan to assess the project's technical merits being canceled, the Panamanian government officially declared that it favored going ahead with the project. That the government took sides, and openly campaigned for the go-ahead vote, was grossly undemocratic.

Furthermore, the ballot asked only whether or not the people of Panama wanted the canal to be enlarged. Any person with a working knowledge of engineering and business would be crazy to answer no to that question; the canal is a good business with great potential. The problem is that Panamanian politicians have construed the "go-ahead" vote as license for their class to "divi up" the US gift to the Panamanian people among themselves. Similarly, it was taken to give license to the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) to be independent of the nation, accountable to no one, and with the power to reach out and grab anything it wants when it decides it needs it.

What kind of a vote was that?

The story typically told at the start of the public forums was how the proposed water-saving side-tank lock design, now 140 year old, was "re-discovered" by the ACP. They claimed that the method had been overlooked by the US during its years of searching for lock designs that used less water. That feat of uncovering it -- touted as the ACP's crowning achievement -- together with the canal making more money under its management formed the basis for raising the ACP to the status of canal experts.

Historical facts, however, contradict the claim that the US failed to identify side-tank locks. All the locks the US built in the Panama Canal actually include more efficient combinations of water-saving methods than the combination of methods included in the side-tank locks planned for this expansion.

Truth be told, the ACP has never built a canal. This first crack at it, began with a failure to recognize why the canal's original designers did not use side-tanks. As for making more money, when running a monopoly, not much expertise is required to increase income by raising tolls.

What makes the ACP "canal experts"? Could it be expert dissemination of self-promoting propaganda?

It gets even better. The Canal Expansion's Master Plan does not mention -- much less compare -- any concepts applying other combinations of recognized water-reducing methods and lock operating procedures; not even those that exist in the US built Panama Canal locks. What is presented in the Master Plan would embarrass any self-respecting engineer.

Amazingly, prior to and up to voting time the Master Plan did not even include an engineering basis upon which lock designs could be developed and compared. That suggests that the "planners" of this monumental engineering project were just "winging-it" to get things rolling.

Before the vote was taken there were promises made that evaluations of details, which the ACP "did not have the money to do prior to the vote", would be faithfully done. That hasn't happened.

All of this suggests that the true purpose of the expansion has been achieved with respect to the construction work and those who will profit from it.

Seeing beyond the hype, the goal of this project does not appear to be to endow this important piece of world infrastructure with a first-class addition, one that maximizes return-on-investment by using resources optimally, while impacting third parties and the environment the least.

　

What They Didn't Tell Us

Based on observations along the way, it would seem that those who put together the expansion plan were oblivious to the water-saving capabilities the US built into the Panama Canal's system.

This became apparent after examining what transpired during the extended dry season that occurred immediately prior to the expansion plan's announcement, at which time cargo was unloaded from ships and railed across the Isthmus -- in order to transit ships at shallower draft -- followed by reloading at the other end.

Although the ACP was made aware of the canal's water-saving capabilities soon after that offloading and reloading fiasco, their existence has never been acknowledged, much less their use. But clearly these are now used as dry season transits have tended to take longer since then, and that unusual lock operations have been seasonally observed.

Recognized at the outset that water-saving operations take extra time and reduce the number of daily transits, the original canal's US designers included a plan to add a reservoir in the near future (today's Madden Dam and Lake) to avoid having to use the notably slower water-saving manipulations. To save some money, US politicians of the day eliminated one of the two culverts that were to be in the center-wall of the locks. Designers had included them, because water could have been manipulated markedly faster with two instead of one.

Although only the simplest procedures were used thereafter by the US canal operators, the water-saving capabilities of each of the locks were tested in the canal's early days, as witnessed by many canal employees at the time. Many passed the knowledge down.

The planned third lane is to have three steps at each end of the canal, like the locks the US built. Steps can be used to reduce water use, to manage structural limitations, and/or to handle elevation changes throughout a waterway. With steps of equal height, as is the case in Panama, the same volume of water can be used step-to-step in raising or lowering ships, resulting in less water being used.

In addition, the US built locks have paired lanes, the parallel chambers of which are laterally connected by pipes with valves. That permits water in this two-lane lock design to be drained from one chamber into its adjacent pair to fill it half-way, effectively cutting water-use in half. With side-tank locks, on the other hand, two tanks are required beside each chamber to do the same thing.

Those tanks are each as wide and as long as a chamber -- and must be piped individually to the chamber. They do nothing more than receive, hold and return water; whereas the chambers of paired-lane locks both handle ships and save water. Furthermore, paired-lane locks have fewer pipes and require fewer water movements to achieve it.

Among the Panama Canal's US built locks, is one single-step paired-lane lock unit -- the Pedro-Miguel locks -- that can raise and lower ships using 25% of the water normally used. In addition to saving water by laterally draining it from one chamber to its pair, a second ship can enter each of the chambers after the first ships traveling in the opposite direction exit, thus using just 25%.

This significantly outperforms the planned side-tank locks, which will use 40% of the water normally used per transit at each step.

　

More About Those Better Lock Options

If the canal expansion were reconfigured to use Pedro-Miguel style locks, a two-step system that uses about 13% less water than the three-step system planned by the ACP would result. This paired-lane system would be comprised of two single-step units at each end of the canal that have a short channel between them, similar to today's Miraflores Lake.

For the same money, instead of just doubling the canal's capacity with the planned three-step third lane, it can be tripled with a two-step paired-lane system that adds a third and a fourth lane. (Lock bids show that two more chambers would cost about the same as the planned 18 tanks.)

With the ACP's plan, tripling the canal's capacity requires the addition of a fourth lane that costs as much as the third, added to which more watershed must be acquired and prepared, adding yet more cost; not to mention that doing so goes solidly against the wishes of the people of Panama.

The beauty of the paired-lane option, besides fulfilling the people's wishes, is that it occupies less space than the planned third lane. With two lanes in the space of one, the space for the planned fourth lane can be reserved for a fifth and a sixth lane of this more efficient option.

And, if the right locks are built now, today's watershed can supply the future operation of all six! To do that would require operating the locks the US built in their maximum water-saving mode to fully supply the new lanes, while reducing their transits to no less than three fifths of normal.

(Note that this "borrowing" of water is apparently already contemplated in what is planned.)

The new lock efficiency needed to accomplish that is attained by adding a pair of tanks to each of the Pedro-Miguel style lock units, which reduces their water-use to 17% from their "normal" 25% minimum volume per transit.

Using locks outfitted in that manner would result in a new system that uses 43% less water per transit than obtainable with the planned side-tank system.

　

Minimizing Cost and Risk

The Pedro-Miguel system with tanks provides, by far, the least expensive way to minimize the risk of running short of water and the best way to get the most out of the present canal expansion effort. With it and the water available in today's watershed, the canal's transit capacity can be more than quadrupled at its maximum potential.

In contrast, for greater cost and with more impacts, as was noted earlier, the planned expansion will only about triple the canal's capacity. What is worse, it will add unnecessary risks.

The first point to remember is that fewer ships will transit the planned system than the equally priced, simpler, and more efficient Pedro-Miguel style system. It will also cost more to use: two ships will end up paying the toll that could transit three.

The second point to remember is that the planned system has a lot more operating parts and will require many more operations to complete a transit than otherwise. Consequently, maintenance costs will be higher and breakdowns will occur more often. That adds expense and risk.

Most importantly, what is now planned introduces a new -- and unnecessary -- risk of losing the entire canal. It requires an elevated channel to bypass Miraflores Lake, a lake that "bridges" known faults. An earthquake could fail a dike that is to be built across those faults.

While the ACP insists the seismic risk in that area is low, the French experienced a substantial quake there. In light of that, the US wisely decided to add Miraflores Lake.

Why take that risk now? Why put worldwide ports and shipping businesses in jeopardy when -- without that risk and for the same cost -- simpler two-lane locks could be built that would handle more transits? Besides tripling capacity, the investment could be paid off much sooner.

In short, a two-step paired-lane system has no unknown or risky gadgets, transits more, costs less, and causes the least impact to others. With it, truly sustainable development is possible.

A system styled after the Pedro-Miguel Locks could easily be used in place of what is planned, considering that its parts and operations are all known and in use. In addition to the benefits already noted, this system would also avoid the excessive intrusion of salt into Gatun Lake through the planned locks. The lake between the lock steps will serve as a barrier to salt intrusion, as Miraflores Lake proves at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal.

　

Unmasking the Con

Considering all that's been noted above, and years of independent study and analysis since the expansion of the Panama Canal was announced, it truly appears as if this construction project is being driven by charlatans looking to transfer canal wealth as quickly as possible into the pockets of family and friends in “ typical banana-republic style”.

In order to effect that transfer of wealth, acceptance of the canal expansion plan itself first had to be gained. Knowing that key concerns had to be satisfied -- regarding water conservation, environmental protection, human rights, animal rights, etc. -- promotional efforts declared them to be of great importance to the project. However, claims that due attention has been given to these concerns are not given credence by deeds.

Actually coming up with reasonably good solutions for the various challenges of the project does not appear to have ever been a project goal. This conclusion is based on project-related actions and statements, or lack thereof, as the case may be. With no one higher up holding the feet of those really in charge to the fire to put things right, they can do -- and have done -- as they please.

In this allegedly democratic republic the media regularly focuses on how the people don't have a say because the judicial system serves the state, not the people. That, in fact, is a stated reason the US declined to sign the most recent attempt at a "free" trade agreement between the two countries.

By what can be seen and surmised, there are many issues with respect to the canal that have been poorly handled, or simply ignored, and choices made that make no sense.

The bidding processes alone speak volumes about the views on ethics and how doing things right is not likely even on the project leadership's list of concerns. A closer look at which companies have “won” the dry digging and the lock construction bids -- while considering their family ties -- says it all.

Anyone who fancies participating in bids for canal-related work -- or any other work down there for that matter -- should understand that the playing field is not level. The common third world practice of requesting bids from competent firms just to obtain ideas and “how-to”, with no intent to award them work, but rather to obtain that input for the "winning" bidder, often family, is not alien to Panama.

To downplay the fact that "planners" and promoters apparently got what they were after without bothering to do real engineering, propaganda to this day relentlessly trumpets the virtues of this "great and well-planned project" ostensibly to keep up the show and all the side businesses that have sprung up in concert.

(Some of those side businesses are, in themselves, no laughing matter; and many like them -- which are most unfriendly to the locals -- are in operation throughout Latin-America.)

The fact that reputable consortia were bidding on the locks was, in effect, being characterized in the news releases as somehow validating the lock choice. The consortia, however, were not charged with investigating and proposing alternative systems; they were charged with proposing solutions to the challenges of the pre-defined system and providing construction cost estimates.

The fact that the bidding process had to be extended several times for bidders to be able to come up with ways around numerous problems with the plan -- problems that should have been resolved during the design selection and pre-engineering phase -- naturally did not receive press.

As an example of just how effective the propaganda continues to be, many people still parrot what they've heard about how transparently the bidding process was managed. Being told that they should feel honored by the fact that such fine and reputable consortia had vied for the opportunity to design and build their canal's great new locks was lapped up by them.

　

Where This Leaves "Joe Public"

To this day the general public remains clueless to what was, and is, really going on.

Einstein once theorized that just two things seemed infinite: the universe and human stupidity; although he wasn't absolutely positive about the universe. This would seem to support his theory.

Panamanians are not the only ones that have been taken in by this sophisticated con. Even before the Panamanian public was aware of what was afoot, project promoters had apparently wined and dined their way into the hearts of canal clients around the world -- spending money that was not yet theirs to spend -- gaining the confidence of their "clients"; all the while refining the game. Once they got the vote, any questionable conduct there may have been became irrelevant.

The con artists have, for all intents, won the game.

It would seem that these new canal owners see no need to bother with maximizing efficency to make more money, as to get more they need only tighten the squeeze on Joe Public, who will not be able to do a thing against their monopoly. Nor do they project a need to responsibly minimize the canal's load on the environment, as impacts to it probably won't become a problem until after they are dead. They will undoubtedly improve details that threaten to delay the flow of money into waiting pockets, but not likely ones negatively effecting efficiency and/or the environment.

That is, unless those using the waterway or those bearing the ultimate costs -- Joe Public -- take action now to change the outcome.

While improving the canal for the benefit of future generations appears irrelevant to their goal (which seemingly is to get very rich, very quick, and die happy), a good time to put a stop to the con would be now -- before it becomes virtually impossible once cast in concrete!

However, as the canal's new owners likely see it, their monopoly will not be challenged in their lifetime, so they are sitting pretty. Disasters left to future generations are of no concern. They are takers, and they are taking us all to the proverbial cleaners.

The con that beats all cons has been run, having successfully used public funds to fleece suckers the world over.

This historical feat will live forever in infamy.

Más Ingresos c/la Misma Inversión

2009-12-24T14:52:00.000-08:00

La ampliación del Canal de Panamá sigue siendo el enfoque de estudios independientes de ingeniería.

Sin duda alguna, con sencillos cambios al proyecto actual, el rendimiento futuro de esta enorme inversión puede ser incrementada importantemente con el uso más eficiente de técnicas conocidas y comprobadas.

El artículo adjunto explica cómo sacarle más provecho al agua dulce de la cuenca para aumentar la capacidad de la vía y sus ingresos – sin crearles riesgos permanentes e innecesarios a los usuarios, a la población, al ambiente, ni a la cuenca y al canal en sí.

Compartimos el entusiasmo con el que estos resultados han sido recibidas no sólo por expertos mundiales en canales y esclusas, pero por otros grupos técnicos, científicos y ambientales.

En vista de las lecciones de Copenhagen, a Panamá le toca tomar las riendas del futuro – actuando con un liderazgo ejemplar, responsable y visionario – y mostrar que la voluntad colectiva sí existe para cambiar la forma en que se hacen inversiones de impacto permanente global.

El Canal de Panamá debe ser el ejemplo. El mundo lo necesita.
Comité ProDefensa del Lago Gatún

The Panama Canal Expansion Plan: Hazardous to Panama, Shipping and the Environment

by Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer 5 December 2009

Delays can be very costly for large ships that use the Panama Canal. It has been suggested that, with the single-lane lock arrangement selected, the service to be offered by the expanded Panama Canal will be the most reliable and prompt.

So, how much does that system reduce transit time relative to other systems, how does it improve reliability, and what are its down-sides?

The planned single-lane locks -- with three steps at each end of the canal, and with three water-saving tanks per step -- are to transit 12 ships a day, a limit seemingly set by water availability. (Two more could perhaps transit, if more water became available.)

The logical way to operate that system is to have ships enter each end of the canal, in succession, the first part of the day; and, likewise, exit the other end of the canal during the latter part of the day. The transit direction of the single-lane locks would be reversed after the last entering ship sailed clear of them. Then the exiting process would begin for the ships waiting at lake-level, which by that time would have crossed the Isthmus of Panama. The last exiting ship sailing clear of the locks would mark the end of one day and the beginning of the next.

This is similar to what is done in the present-day canal, although not for the same reason.

Today's canal has a narrow section called "the cut", through which the largest ships that currently transit the canal -- Panamax ships -- can sail in one direction at a time and only during daylight hours. To optimize ship-flow through it, both lanes of the locks at each end of the canal begin the day by raising ships. As the Pacific locks are nearest the cut, northbound ships are the day's first to negotiate it. When southbound ships begin arriving at the cut, cut traffic management procedures are initiated, and that is followed by the reversal of one lane of the locks.

As dusk approaches, the last of the large southbound ships hurry to get through the cut before dark. At about the same time the second lane at the locks is reversed to maximize the rate at which the ships exit the canal. During the remainder of the night, two-way lock operations are resumed to handle the smaller ship traffic that can ply the cut at night.

Since the width of the cut will not be increased sufficiently in this canal expansion effort to permit Panamax ships -- or the larger post-Panamax ships that are to transit the new locks -- to meet each other in the cut, these larger ships will still have to take turns sailing through it.

Because ships will need to wait for the transit direction of the cut, as well as that of the planned single-lane lock, to match theirs, a transit (from entry of the locks at one end of the canal to exit at the other) will most likely take about 15 hours, assuming all else goes smoothly. In theory, it could take a ship about two-thirds of that time, but operational reality is different.

A simpler, proven two-lane alternative lock arrangement could be built for about the same cost. With only two-steps, it would handle up to 22 ships a day, compared to the single-lane system's maximum of about 14. A transit by way of these locks would take about 17.5 hours.

When comparing these lock options, there is more to consider than just the differences in transit time and capacity of each system.

As a starter, the two-lane lock arrangement requires about 13.5% less water per transit than the one planned. It also uses about 13.5% less water than what the canal's original locks use.

Because of this, it would be logical to reduce the use of the original locks and use that water more effectively in the new locks to operate them at full capacity.

The two-lane alternative locks need about 19 transit-volumes of original lock water to transit 22 ships. As there are presumably 12 transit volumes already available (per the single-lane lock plan), only 7 more need to be "borrowed" from the original locks.

Because idle time is gained when transits through the original locks are reduced, that time can be applied towards reducing the amount of water used by those transits that do occur. As a result, total transits through these locks only need to be reduced by about 4 to gain the needed water.

With this alternative of comparable cost, the canal capacity gained would be about 1.6 times that gained by using the planned system.

This means that for every three ships that transit the two-lane alternative locks only two ships could transit the single-lane system. This suggest that, to recover the income from the ship that does not transit, the ships that do transit would be charged about 50% more in tolls.

For the third ship that does not get to transit, is its "loss of time" not relevant?

Then there is the matter of system reliability and safety.

Because the planned system only has one lane, all large ship traffic would halt were it to close unexpectedly. How are costs to shipping impacted when that happens?

With the two-lane alternative, on the other hand, ships could continue to transit through the unimpaired lane.

The single-lane system requires a dam to be built across known fault lines.

What is the cost of losing Gatun Lake should one of those faults slip and cause the dam to fail? And, how can reducing 12 daily transit times by 2.5 hours be reconciled against lost lives and a multi-year canal shut-down should that dam fail?

The two-lane lock arrangement avoids the need for such a dam.

Environmental and ecological issues must also not be overlooked.

The planned single-lane arrangement promises to increase lake salinity at a rate that is markedly higher than that of today's canal. Many reputable studies have shown this.

Not only will what is planned pollute a world-important freshwater lake with salt, that pollution will put many sea creatures along the coast of both oceans in harms way.

How can reducing the canal transit time of a few select ships by 2.5 hours justify placing seafood delicacies enjoyed by millions on the endangered list?

That is unacceptable and need not happen.

To make matters worse, a follow-up expansion plan exists that adds more unnecessary problems.

That plan will cost far more than the current one. It will terminate the way of life of a great many people and devastate the ecology of vast areas in order to obtain the water it needs to increase the post-Panamax ship transit capacity to about 30.

By contrast, at lower cost and within the confines of today's watershed, the canal's post-Panamax transit capacity could be increased to 40 by adding a second two-lane lock arrangement like the first and by enhancing both to save even more water. The enhancement would consist of adding two water-saving tanks at each step of each two-lane arrangement, costing only about 15% more.

Water to operate both enhanced two-lane lock arrangements would be borrowed from the original locks by further optimizing their use of water and time as was described earlier. The option to expand the canal's watershed by expropriating lands and flooding vast areas would be reserved for when climate changes force it at some future date.

Using the alternative locks in both expansions would result in about 27% more added capacity at a far lower cost, with far less impact to the ecology and to third parties, and a greatly reduced risk of total loss, compared to what is planned.

Today, the Panama Canal serves around 36 ships a day. Despite certain canal features being seen as causing "unnecessary" delays -- per a lack of understanding of the purpose of those features -- ships continue to show up and wait their turn to transit.

Most of its users find transiting the Panama Canal a much better deal than any other option; and, more would use it if they could.

Given that preference, and because once the planned single-lane system is built there is no way to later convert it into one that is more efficient and less polluting -- nor can the risk of losing the lake be removed, nor can any loss of ocean species be undone -- replacing that design is imperative.

A two-lane lock arrangement offers a truly sustainable expansion: providing more service for the same cost, allowing for greater future growth, and avoiding catastrophic problems. That is what needs to be added to the Panama Canal.

Carta Abierta al Presidente de la República de Panamá

12 de julio de 2009

Excelentísimo Señor Ricardo Martinelli Berrocal

Presidente de la República de Panamá

Primeramente deseo felicitarlo por su victoria rotunda al ser elegido al puesto máximo del país.

No hay quien envidie los retos que Usted enfrenta, pero reconocemos que todos debemos estar dispuestos a darle nuestro apoyo para poderlos superar.

Siendo el Proyecto de Ampliación del Canal de Panamá sin igual en términos del uso de los recursos del país, considero que – como ingeniero e investigador científico, especialista en el diseño y la construcción de estructuras masivas y con una trayectoria que incluye la creación de varios sistemas avanzados para alzar naves, y, como ciudadano comprometido con el futuro del país – es mi deber informarle que existen arreglos de esclusas que atienden de manera efectiva a los retos del proyecto que aún no han sido superados. Los riesgos y daños graves que resultarán al ser incorporado y operado el arreglo actual, el cual se fundamenta en el concepto presentado al anunciarse el proyecto, pueden ser evitados usando un arreglo más apropiado.

Como resultado de un estudio independiente de los retos de la ampliación y de los métodos más efectivos para superarlos – efectuado junto con un asesoramiento de los múltiples métodos para reducir la cantidad de agua desgastada por tránsito, del cual adicionalmente nacieron arreglos de esclusas aún más eficientes – se han identificado varios arreglos de esclusas que serían más apropiados para nuestro canal porque ofrecen beneficios mucho mayores.

Al combinar más efectivamente los mismos componentes ya aceptados por la ACP, y al aplicar las mismas operaciones en secuencias optimizadas, se logran importantes incrementos en capacidad sin un aumento proporcional en los costos de construcción y en los gastos de operación y mantenimiento.

Entre varias posibles, el arreglo de esclusas más recomendable para la ampliación es uno compuesto de 4 unidades parecidas a la unidad de esclusas de Pedro-Miguel, pero más grandes. Sin tina alguna, y al ser operado debidamente, este arreglo de dos carriles – el cual incluiría dos escalones en cada extremo del canal – usaría 13% menos agua por tránsito que el arreglo asignado y ofrecería la posibilidad de incrementar el número de tránsitos diarios por hasta dos tercios.

Importantemente, este arreglo evitaría el riesgo de que se cierre el paso a naves posPanamax, algo que puede ocurrir si sólo hay un carril. Además, haría innecesaria la construcción de un dique sumamente riesgoso a lo largo de la ribera oriental del Lago Miraflores, el cual si colapsa – al desplazarse alguna de las varias fallas geológicas sobre las cuales será construido – causará la pérdida del Lago Gatún y de los poblados y las industrias ubicadas a los costados de la entrada del Pacífico.

También, el pueblo y el medioambiente beneficiarían con este arreglo porque no permitiría el ingreso de la cantidad de sal al Lago Gatún que ingresará por el arreglo actual; y, su método práctico de mitigación permitiría eliminar la sal contaminante antes de llegar al lago. No hay un método práctico que haga esto con el arreglo actual.

Es más, con el arreglo recomendado existe la opción de agregarle dos tinas por escalón ahora o en el futuro para reducir su uso de agua aún más, a casi la mitad de lo que el arreglo actual desgastará. Esto representa un uso de tinas altamente superior comparado a cómo las usa el arreglo actual, que no tiene una opción similar para ahorrar agua.

En el internet, en www.crucestrail.com hay más información relevante a este tema.

El aporte de Panamá al mejoramiento del canal debe ser un avance real – que nuestras generaciones futuras puedan contemplar con orgullo – y no un paso hacia atrás, tomado al adicionarle esclusas de un diseño antiguo que fue superado por el diseño de las esclusas de nuestro propio canal.

No sería aceptable incorporarle al canal un arreglo de esclusas que introduce los riesgos notados y que – en perpetuidad – usará casi el doble del agua por tránsito comparado a lo que usaría un arreglo de primera línea, en vista de que – con esfuerzos y gastos comparables – se pueden evitar esos riesgos usando un arreglo más eficiente y de más capacidad.

Señor Presidente, en vista de los resultados de estos estudios, no permita que este proyecto de tan gran importancia al mundo proceda sin hacerse un asesoramiento abierto y transparente, por expertos incontrovertibles e imparciales, de las alternativas para sus esclusas – lo clave del sistema.

Como el diseño detallado de las esclusas apenas ha empezado, y aún no están en construcción, la selección todavía puede ser reemplazada.

Lo que me motiva es obtener para el país y el mundo la mejor ampliación por lo que nos costará y asegurar el uso más efectivo de los recursos hídricos del Canal de Panamá.

Me mantengo a su disposición,

Respetuosamente,

Ing. Bert G. Shelton L.

Panama Canal expansion: Buyer beware

2009-11-02T20:12:00.001-08:00

Panama Canal expansion: Buyer beware

Posted on Nov 01, 2009 by Jeff Tecklenburg.

By Bert Shelton

Announced at the beginning of 2003 and receiving the go-ahead from the people of Panama, the Panama Canal expansion project has reached the stage where design and construction of its new locks has begun.

Expanding the Panama Canal is generally seen as good, as more and bigger ships will be able to benefit from that shipping shortcut.

Although the project kicked off before the global market crash, and shipping is not growing at the pace that precipitated its launching, there is merit in continuing the project. The canal is a key piece of world infrastructure, overdue for enhancement, regardless of momentary market conditions.

Proven by experience, investing in infrastructure during down markets is a wise move. Building then typically reduces project costs — supplies usually costing less — plus it generates jobs in an otherwise depressed environment. Such investments often pay off sooner, as markets revive, which strengthens recovery.

This, of course, assumes that the investment is well planned.

Problem is, the present Panama Canal expansion is not.

The project’s most critical step — identifying the lock system that best fits the conditions and characteristics of the canal — was skipped.

As a consequence, requests for clarifications flooded the project and lock-design bid deadlines were repeatedly extended. Required to warranty designs for complex and high-risk elements, some bidders withdrew from what had been promoted as a “simple concrete construction project.”

Per the current plan, the canal gains one new lane having a three-step lock unit at each end, with three water-saving tanks per step (18 in total).

Of greatest concern is the building of a risky dam — across known geologic faults — to link the new Pacific locks directly to higher elevation Gatun Lake, skirting Miraflores Lake. Its failure would empty Gatun Lake, wiping out homes and businesses lining the canal’s Pacific approach.

That would close the canal for years, deeply affecting U.S. interests.

Another concern is with excessive volumes of salt intruding through the new locks, altering Gatun Lake’s freshwater ecosystems and gravely threatening coastal sea life of both oceans, turning it into a migratory pathway across the Isthmus of Panama.

Yet, our independent research identified existing lock arrangements that avoid these risks and increase efficiency by combining the same components and operations differently.

For instance, a two-lane lock arrangement of comparable cost — requiring only two steps at each end of the canal — uses about 13 percent less water per transit and assures effectively uninterrupted large-ship transits.

Like the Pacific lock arrangement of today’s canal, each end’s two steps would be separated by a short stretch of channel, canceling the risky dam and virtually eliminating the threat of salt reaching Gatun Lake.

This two-lane arrangement preserves conditions of Gatun Lake, and of both oceans, and the livelihoods of those dependent on those waters.

With the current plan’s water availability already “iffy”, the unpublicized plan — to build yet another lane like it — will require annexing and flooding neighboring areas, displacing a lot more people and wildlife.

That’s totally unnecessary.

The two-lane arrangement can reduce its per transit water use significantly (to 57 percent of the current plan) by adding two water-saving tanks to its lock units. That permits maximizing its transit capacity with water available today.

The need for development to be sustainable gets a lot of lip service these days. Yet, this major canal’s expansion proceeds unquestioned.

Improving return on investment by maximizing efficiency, service and reliability, while minimizing impacts to others and to the environment, appears irrelevant to a business model reminiscent of those that collapsed world markets.

With attainable short-term profits already guaranteed, no incentive for improvement exists.

That incentive must be created with political pressure — soon — else suffer unnecessary permanent environmental damage, reducing the Panama Canal’s potential forever.

Bert G. Shelton is Texas-based research scientist and engineer with a lifelong interest and study in the Panama Canal’s function and structure.

"Grupo Unidos por el Canal"

2009-09-07T19:47:00.001-07:00

"Grupo Unidos por el Canal"

Los nefastos antecedentes sobre los que se funda la ampliación del Canal de Panamá no dejan de representar un enorme peligro para la Nación panameña. Las señales, pruebas y evidencias de la tropelía con la que se impuso el proyecto de ampliación son abundantes. El sólo análisis de lo que se trató de imponer con la nefasta Ley 44, echada abajo fundamentalmente por la lucha del campesinado organizado, revelaría nefastas ambiciones de poderosos clanes económicos que venden ilusiones con el proyecto de ampliación del Canal, mientras ellos, se enriquecen a la velocidad de cohete.

Alberto Alemán Zubieta, renunció a la presidencia de Constructora Urbana S.A. (CUSA), un negocio familiar que ha pasado a ser, muy probablemente, la compañía constructora más importante en el país, una vez que fue nombrado como administrador del Canal de Panamá.

CUSA ganó la primera licitación (para la remoción de tierras) en el proyecto de ampliación del Canal. Anteriormente la misma compañía había ganado otras licitaciones para obras de mantenimiento del mismo Canal.

En los medios se ha reportado que, el “Grupo Unidos por el Canal construirá el nuevo juego de esclusas por 3,118,880,001.00 millones de dólares”. ¡Que casualidad!, ¡que sorpresa!, CUSA, Constructora Urbana S.A. forma parte del recién nacido “grupo unidos por el Canal”. Según se informa la ACP le ha otorgado, en un “TRASNPARENTE” proceso de licitación, el más prístino, limpio, pulcro, glorioso, inmaculado que se haya dado en toda la historia de la humanidad y antes de ella, la licitación para la construcción de el nuevo juego de esclusas. ¡Que vaina!

Ahora el mismo y más interesado afirma que nada tiene que ver que el actual Administrador de la Autoridad del Canal (ACP), Alberto Alemán Zubieta, con Constructora Urbana S.A. (CUSA). Debemos entender -dejando cualquier sospecha de intereses cruzados o de conflicto de intereses a un lado- que no tiene nada de malo, ni representa falta a la ley o a la ética, pasar, de ser Presidente de una compañía familiar de construcción (CUSA), a ser el Administrador del Canal (ACP).

Para que quede claro –eso sí, según la opinión de la persona más interesada y directamente involucrada en el tema-, que la compañía en cuestión, (CUSA), gane muchas y la más importante licitación en el multimillonario proyecto de ampliación del Canal, “no debería causar ninguna suspicacia”.

El mismo administrador lo ha explicado a La Estrella de Panamá, en una noticia publicada el 9 de julio de 2009: “Para el administrador de la ACP, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, no debería causar ninguna suspicacia el hecho de haber sido accionista de CUSA y que su primo, Rogelio Alemán, sea el actual presidente de esa empresa.

Al concluir el acto de apertura de sobres, Alemán Zubieta señaló que se retiró de CUSA hace 14 años cuando asumió su cargo en la ACP y que en 2005 vendió las acciones que le quedaban.

Sólo entonces CUSA empezó a participar en licitaciones del Canal.”

¿Se imaginan ustedes al administrador de la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, al mismo tiempo, como presidente de una compañía constructora, que además empieza a descollar en el mercado nacional ganando licitaciones en las que se destacan trabajos para el Canal de Panamá? Nosotros no lo imaginamos, de allí que renunciar a la PRESIDENCIA DE CUSA al asumir la administración de la ACP era una jugada lógica seguida por la venta de “las acciones que le quedaban”.

Una investigación a fondo es lo menos que debería hacer un gobierno responsable para develar los intereses y las ambiciones solapadas que están en el proyecto de ampliación del Canal. Los argumentos y las denuncias planteadas, desde antes de la imposición fraudulenta del proyecto, vienen a complementar los nuevos argumentos y justificadas SOSPECHAS que asoman la cara a pesar de la publicidad y la cuantiosa inversión en imagen que realiza la ACP.

Héctor Endara Hill
hector@panamaprofundo.org

02.09.2009

Advertencias sobre lo que sucede en el canal

2009-09-07T18:49:00.000-07:00

Advertencias sobre lo que sucede en el canal

Eduardo A. Esquivel R. ing.
consultor agroforestal

La Prensa, 1 de septiembre de 2009

Ya se han vertido muchos comentarios sobre la reciente “licitación” de la ampliación del Canal, llamada “el premio gordo de la ampliación”, por algunos medios. Leo con interés el artículo del Lic. Mora Rangel en la “Página del Lector”( La Prensa , 28/8/2009), donde expresa que “le asaltan nuevas preocupaciones” sobre esta adjudicación. Le diré que, desde el año pasado, cuando se supo que CUSA, la empresa de la familia Alemán, participaba en la licitación, a través de una empresa formada ad hoc para este negocio, llamada “Grupo Unidos por el Canal”, aposté a mis colegas que esta empresa sería la ganadora sin ninguna duda.

Por supuesto: ¡Nadie me aceptó la apuesta! Era la crónica anticipada de una licitación ganada. Hemos visto que la ACP se ha preocupado mucho, antes y después de la licitación, en “explicar” la transparencia de la licitación, en espacios pagados en los medios. La propia insistencia en esta “explicación” pública es sospechosa, ya que si todos e hizo con honestidad y transparencia no hay nada que explicar. Pero, humildemente creo que la transparencia de esta licitación no es más que un hábil truco de ilusionista de salón. Hay indicios alarmantes en este sentido. Uno de ellos, quizás el más importante del proceso, es la participación de las otras empresas rivales de Unidos por el Canal. Una vez, un empresario conocido mío, supo de una licitación pública importante.

Lo primero que hizo fue ponerse de acuerdo con el funcionario clave que manejaba el asunto para que se seleccionaran otras dos empresas específicas para la licitación final. Segundo, se puso de acuerdo con estas empresas rivales, para que participaran de “relleno” en la licitación, pero ofreciendo un precio ligeramente mayor. A cambio les dio una compensación monetaria importante. Veo con asombro que la ACP va a pagar, graciosamente, a las empresas que participaron de la licitación y perdieron, cerca de 15 millones de dólares. Si la ACP consideró que el proyecto presentado por estas empresas no le servía ¿Por qué les va a pagar por algo que no sirve? Otra cosa importante es, como dice el Lic. Mora Rangel.

“Licitar lo más bajo posible, para poder emparejar las cargas durante la ejecución del proyecto, sería ni más ni menos una vulgar estafa”. De hecho: ¿Para qué se hace la licitación si después vienen las famosas adendas? Es importante que el Estado panameño, y la ACP , exija que no se dará ninguna clase de adendas ni compensaciones aparte de la suma original pactada. Sobre las empresas miembros de “Unidos por el Canal”, bueno, tienen un currículo espeluznante: una debe 16 mil millones de dólares en España; otra, en Estados Unidos, licitó un proyecto por 5 mil millones y terminó costando 15 mil millones con las adendas. La otra nunca ha construido nada parecido. Recordemos que el Canal de Panamá no pertenece a la ACP , sino al Estado panameño. Y es el Estado panameño el aval de todos los financiamientos que se hagan, y todos nosotros seremos los que pagaremos si este proyecto se maneja mal.

Otra vez sobre el Canal...

2009-09-07T17:53:00.000-07:00

Otra vez sobre el Canal...

Marcos A. Mora Rangel
economista

La Prensa, 28 de agosto de 2009

En dos ocasiones anteriores, por este mismo diario, me he referido al tema del Canal. De ambos escritos “Sigámosle la pista al Canal” y “Procuremos el consenso”, el último me mereció la llamada y felicitación de un distinguido miembro de la familia Fidanque. A raíz del artículo “ La ACP debe ser más precavida”, del Ing. Carlos Rangel ( La Prensa , 22/8/2009), me asaltan nuevas preocupaciones.

Si bien no me asustan las voces que hablan de conflictos de intereses, sí me pone a temblar las posibilidades de que este magno y necesario proyecto se convierta en el dolor de cabeza para las presentes y futuras generaciones de panameños. La situación financiera de las empresas líderes del consorcio ganador, aunado a las debilidades técnicas que han señalado algunos de los concursantes luego de concluidos los actos, debe poner al más osado de todos los mortales con la carne de gallina. Las aseveraciones del Ing.

Alemán, de que al primer semestre de este año Sacyr y Vallehermoso han reportado 600 millones de utilidad y han comenzado a saldar su deuda de 16 mil millones de dólares con la venta de activos, por el nivel de sus compromisos y el tipo de empresa, no me tranquilizan para nada. Recomiendo al Gobierno en general, y a la ACP , en particular, que este tema sea analizado y coordinado por un equipo interdisciplinario del más alto nivel que incluya entre otros a la SPIA , a los colegios de abogados y economistas, técnicos y especialistas jubilados del Canal, etc.

La ampliación del Canal es la obra de la cual dependerá el país para los próximos años y la responsabilidad por la situación que hoy se afronta no puede recaer en el sentimiento y en el olfato de un determinado funcionario. Los que sin ser ingenieros, por cierto tiempo hemos estado ligado a proyectos de esta disciplina, sabemos que operan como anteproyectos de ley, llevados al Legislativo. Sabemos cómo entran, pero no podemos asegurar cómo terminan, aparte de los consabidos “camarones”.

Es necesario que se sepa de antemano cuál sería el límite máximo al que se puede extender el contrato suscrito y por qué tipo de consideraciones. Hay un riesgo que debe ser asumido por la ACP y otro por el consorcio ganador. Licitar lo más bajo posible, para esperar emparejar las cargas durante la ejecución del proyecto, sería ni más ni menos una vulgar estafa. En Panamá tenemos ejemplos de este tipo. En el Proyecto de Laguna Alta se licitó la compra de un volumen dado de agua y en el proceso de suscripción del contrato se aumentó dicho volumen, con lo cual, por economía de escala, le disminuyó el costo de producción al ganador, afectando al resto de los participantes. Todos, absolutamente todos, debemos apoyar a que la ACP conduzca a buen puerto el proyecto de ampliación del Canal.

Peligro: El ¿negocio? de Sacyr en el canal de Panamá

2009-07-14T20:41:00.000-07:00

En Europa, una oferta tan agresiva hubiera sido descalificada por baja temeraria.

Peligro: El ¿negocio? de Sacyr en el canal de Panamá
Urgente24 ya ha informado acerca de preocupantes pormenores de la oferta de la constructora española Sacyr y la italiana Impregilo en el Canal de Panamá. Pero las novedades van de mal en peor. Lean el comentario publicado en la web madrileña El Confidencial, por su director:

POR JESÚS CACHO | 12/07/2009 | 12:07

MADRID (El Confidencial ). El presidente de Sacyr Vallehemoso, Luis del Rivero (LdR), no cabía en sí de gozo. Después de muchos meses de angustia, tiempo de infarto con la constructora al borde de la quiebra, el empresario recibía el miércoles una de esas alegrías que no se olvidan, un balón de oxígeno en el momento más oportuno: la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) decidía adjudicar a un consorcio (Grupo Unidos por el Canal) de empresas capitaneado por Sacyr (40%) la construcción del 3er. juego de esclusas del famoso canal, seguramente una de las obras de ingeniería más importantes de nuestro tiempo.
Tan exultante estaba Del Rivero que se atrevió con un popular ripio: “Podemos volver a hacer la rima asonante que se utilizó cuando al Real Madrid le cascaban fuera y llegó a jugar muy bien dentro y la afición decía 'así, así, así gana el Madrid'. Pues ahora se puede utilizar la misma rima y decir que 'así, así, así gana Sacyr”.
Es sabido que el punto fuerte del señor de Murcia no es la sintaxis del castellano, ni falta que le hace. Lo de este perspicaz ingeniero de caminos ha sido siempre la obra pública y, en los últimos años, la capacidad para hacer negocios a la sombra del Gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero, materia en la que se ha revelado como un auténtico maestro.
Al servicio del Poder, sin ningún tipo de freno o atadura. Su alegría tenía un componente añadido: acababa de mojarle la oreja a su más querido enemigo, Florentino Pérez, presidente de ACS, la constructora que lideraba otro gran consorcio (con las también españolas FCC y Acciona y la alemana Hochtief) que aspiraba a adjudicarse la obra. Hace apenas un mes, Pérez le hizo el feo de dejarle fuera de la nueva directiva del Real Madrid.
En realidad, y para que a nadie cupiera duda, Floro repitió junta dejando fuera al trío de Sacyr que le había acompañado en su primera etapa como capo del Real: LdR, Juan Abelló y Marta Silva. Don Juan se disculpó con la misma elegante compostura con que luce el smoking: “Mira, Fernando, a mi me gusta pasar los sábados en el campo y lo que menos me apetece es ir al Bernabéu; cuando quiera ver un partido te lo digo, me invitas al palco y listo”.
Pero a Luis la ofensa le pareció un gesto de menosprecio difícil de olvidar. De ahí el regocijo del miércoles. En el grupo liderado por Sacyr figuran también la italiana Impregilo, la belga Juan de Nul y la panameña Constructora Urbana S.A. (CUSA). Todo un ejemplo de astucia.
“Lo de hacerse acompañar por unos panameños es un revelador detalle de viejo contratista que se las sabe todas”, asegura un importante constructor madrileño.
“Mientras Florentino tenía que consensuar con los socios de ACS casi todo, desde luego la cifra incluida en la plica, LdR se ha movido sin interferencias de ningún tipo. Con los US$ 3.118 millones ofertados por Sacyr -US$363 millones por debajo de la partida asignada por la propia ACP, US$1..067 millones menos que Bechtel y US$2.863 millones menos que ACS-, es casi imposible hacer esa obra.
En Europa, una oferta tan agresiva hubiera sido descalificada por baja temeraria.
Pero Sacyr necesitaba hacerse con ella a toda costa: se trata de coger carga de trabajo y exportar imagen de gran empresa en el momento más delicado.
Y por eso Rivero toma una decisión de alto riesgo, y la toma él solo, jugándose el todo por el todo. El caso era meter la cabeza. Luego vendrán los “modificados”, los “complementarios”, las “liquidaciones” y demás familia, que la encarecerán en un 40% al menos”.
Florentino se ha distraído en demasía con Kakás y Ronaldos y puede que eso haya tenido que ver con lo ocurrido, o eso piensan sus socios en ACS, los hermanos Juan y Carlos March, siempre preocupados por la inabarcable vanidad de su gerente, y los Albertos, Cortina y Alcocer.
Todos han tenido, además, que tragar bilis escuchando el contento del Gobierno con el éxito de LdR. Sacyr es un caso sui géneris de empresa privada que funciona cada día más con las pautas y estímulos de la gran empresa pública.
Con el paraguas del Estado. Elegida en su día como ariete con el que asaltar la fortaleza del BBVA y echar de la presidencia a Francisco González, El Gobierno le condujo después de la mano a Repsol, y más tarde frenó en seco los nervios de tito Botín, que sigue aguantando, el hombre.
En los últimos meses no son pocos los que, dentro de Exteriores, aseguran que Sacyr le da cada día más trabajo a la diplomacia española. El caso es que José Blanco le felicitaba el jueves por la adjudicación a Sacyr. “Nos enorgullece muchísimo”.. El propio ZP tuvo tiempo para llamarle con su enhorabuena alborozada, antes de partir de viaje para L’Aquila (Italia).
Martinelli y el lobby español
No menos contento se mostró David Taguas, antiguo responsable de la Oficina Económica del Presidente (OEP) en Moncloa y actual gerente de Seopán, la patronal de las grandes constructoras. “¿Quién fue el que colocó a Taguas en Seopán? Del Rivero, como todo el mundo sabe. ¿Y qué intereses ha defendido Taguas en esta puja por encima de todo? Pues lógicamente los de Sacyr”.
Quien así se manifiesta en privado es un alto responsable de una de las empresas perdedoras. Taguas, en efecto, viene desde hace tiempo desplegando una activa labor de lobby como cabeza de esa patronal ante las autoridades panameñas.
En la primera semana de junio se reunió a solas con el nuevo presidente panameño, Ricardo Martinelli –que fue recibido por Zapatero en Moncloa y por el Rey en Zarzuela-, en un hotel madrileño.
¿Motivo del encuentro? El concurso para la ampliación del Canal y el problema de la doble imposición existente entre ambos países, asunto que podía perjudicar a las firmas hispanas.
El 1 de julio, Taguas asistió en Ciudad de Panamá, al lado del príncipe Felipe de Borbón, a la toma de posesión de Martinelli como presidente electo.
El aludido se defiende con ardor, rechazando las insinuaciones que circulan por el sector. “Eso no lo puede decir nadie serio. ¿En qué cabeza cabe que yo haya podido hacer lobby en favor de una empresa concreta? Es cierto que ha habido discrepancias, que me han dolido, sobre cómo mover desde Seopán este asunto, pero el objetivo era claro: Los panameños querían desyanquizar el Canal, porque todo allí es inglés, dando la obra a una empresa europea, y las españolas son las mejores. Su carta para presionarnos era que España seguía teniendo a Panamá en la black list de los paraísos fiscales. Para remover ese obstáculo me he empleado a fondo. Al final, se ha conocido la adjudicación sin que el tema se haya resuelto, aunque con Panamá en una dark list desde la cumbre de Londres del G-20. Y todo esto con incontables viajes, llamadas y contactos, que me han permitido conocer a todo el mundo en Panamá. También Martinelli quería conocerme y por eso me llamó para desayunar cuando vino a Madrid. Hablamos de todo menos del canal. Y me invitó a su toma de posesión, a la que asistí en representación de todo el sector. Allí flotaba la sensación de que la obra se la iban a llevar los de Bechtel. Ni siquiera hablé del asunto con el administrador de la ACP”.
CUSA, un negocio de la familia Alemán
Lo más divertido del entero episodio, sin embargo, está residenciado en Panamá. Porque resulta que el responsable de la ACP, Alberto Alemán Zubieta, es primo carnal del presidente de CUSA, Rogelio Alemán.
Más llamativo aún: el propio Alemán Zubieta fue muchos años presidente de CUSA, y en Panamá es lugar común que la constructora es “un negocio de la familia Alemán”.
No hay noticia de que el gestor de la ACP se haya abstenido en todo acto administrativo que haya tenido que ver con esta adjudicación. No obstante lo cual, el tipo argumentaba el miércoles muy serio ante la prensa local que “Nos sentimos complacidos del proceso que se ha llevado y de cómo se ha llevado. Es verdad que Rogelio y yo somos familia, pero aquí no hubo ningún tipo de soplo, de información o de beneficio”.
El propio presidente Martinelli hizo gala de sentido del humor cuando, al ser preguntado por la presencia de CUSA en la oferta ganadora, aseguró sin dudarlo: “¡No lo sabía, me estoy enterando hoy…!”
Leído en un foro del diario panameño La Prensa: “Está claro que podían participar mil empresas que CUSA siempre iba a ganar… Es una lástima que el país tenga dueños”.
Pelillos a la mar
Los conquistadores han desembarcado de nuevo en Centroamérica. Sacyr ha despertado en Bolsa, y aquí paz y después gloria. Las incertidumbres económicas de la operación para la constructora quedaron el viernes muy claras en el artículo de McCoy al respecto.
Hablamos de unos 1.200 millones de euros de obra durante 8 años, con un margen de Ebitda del 6%, equivalentes a 70 millones de beneficio operativo ajustado.
Lo importante ahora es subrayar que de nuevo estamos ante un aleccionador episodio de esa confusión entre lo público y lo privado en que navega la mal llamada democracia española.
Sacyr funciona cada día más como una empresa pública, cuyo largo brazo llega a Libia, Italia, Panamá o donde se tercie. Zapatero tiene motivos para estar satisfecho: en momentos tan duros como las actuales, puede presumir de exportar caridad (1.500 millones comprometidos en L’Aquila) y tecnología de construcción por el ancho mundo. Aunque lo que realmente exportamos es corrupción a palo seco. Nada nuevo bajo el sol de España.

http://www.urgente24.com/index.php?id=ver&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=125552&cHash=786d612a72

http://www.cotizalia.com/cache/2009/07/10/opinion_84_sacyr_ratonera_canal_panama.html
Desconfianza por el contrato de Sacyr para la ampliación del Canal de Panamá
Afirman ahora que los 2 contratos que ganó la constructora española Sacyr, accionista Nº1 de Repsol, no resultan 'la gran cosa' para asegurar la recuperación financiera de una empresa en problemas de pasivos. Leamos un contenido demoledor, titulado 'Sacyr y la ratonera del Canal de Panamá':
POR S. MCCOY | 10/07/2009 | 11:27

MADRID ( Cotizalia ). "No lo hará, dejará la obra colgada". Así de rotundo se mostraba un alto directivo de una constructora española cuando servidor recabó ayer su opinión acerca de la adjudicación al Consorcio liderado por Sacyr Vallehermoso del diseño y construcción del tercer juego de esclusas del Canal de Panamá. "Cuando empiecen a hacer los números tras la decisión definitiva tendrán sudores fríos; verán la ratonera en que se han metido", agregaba otro.
Escepticismo generalizado ante una oferta que reúne lo imposible: la mayor capacitación técnica, que la compañía se encarga de describir someramente en el Hecho Relevante enviado el miércoles a la CNMV , a un precio no sólo sustancialmente por debajo del de las ofertas competidoras (3.118 millones de dólares contra 4.185 y 5.981 respectivamente) sino inferior incluso al importe base de licitación: 3.481 millones. La cuadratura del círculo. Suerte que el concepto baja temeraria parezca que no existe en el país centroamericano que si no…
Alguno argumentará que la envidia no deja de ser deporte nacional en España y que, por tanto, gran parte de las dudas sobre la capacidad de ejecución del Proyecto se deriva del deseo de ser tan elegido como la firma presidida por Luis del Rivero, que acumula cartera alrededor del globo. Podría ser. Pero contra los sentimientos, la fuerza de los argumentos.
Uno, la calidad y experiencia de los otros pujantes, en especial de la americana Bechtel -que conoce de sobra el mercado e iba a por la obra a toda costa-, hacen dudar de la viabilidad de la propuesta. US$ 1.000 millones de diferencia entre los dos primeros clasificados es una cuantía difícil de justificar. Cuando menos, extraño.
Dos, no se trata en puridad de una obra civil ya que una parte sustancial de la misma consiste en la estructuración y el montaje de las compuertas, trabajo especializado que se ha de subcontratar a alguna de las pocas firmas especializadas que hay en el mundo. El poder, por tanto, del líder del Consorcio es más limitado al depender fundamentalmente de la buena ejecución de otros partícipes en el mismo. Prepárense para la brega.
Tres, el contratista y financiador, ACP, es duro de pelar, como prueba el hecho de que sólo haya habido tres sobres para una obra de tal envergadura : la capacidad de jugar al alza con los modificados posteriores parece, de partida, limitado. Cuidado, que no en todas partes cuecen habas.
La sensación en el sector, por tanto, es que Sacyr ha ido a reventar la subasta, acción de la que a corto plazo se derivan para ella beneficios elocuentes.
> Por una parte, reforzar su imagen en un momento en el que la viabilidad de la empresa había sido puesta en tela de juicio por algunos analistas, entre los que me incluyo;
> en segundo término, conseguir una diversificación internacional que compense su excesiva dependencia del ciclo español;
> tercero, aumentar su carga de trabajo con objeto de garantizar su actividad..
No hay que olvidar que a cierre de marzo, la cartera de construcción de Sacyr era de € 6.200 millones aproximadamente, incluyendo el paralizado Puente sobre el Estrecho de Messina y de € 5.500 millones sin él.
Por tanto, y asumiendo un dólar de € 1,40 y una participación en el Consorcio del 45%, son US$ 1.000 millones más a añadir a los anteriores, entre un 16% y un 18% del total, a los que habría que sumar los US$ 700 millones de la adjudicación italiana de esta misma semana, un 11%-12% adicional. Seis meses más de backlog a la hucha.
Un motivo, sin duda, de satisfacción interna y hasta externa, orgullo patrio, que choca con el primer principio básico que enseñan al llegar a la Facultad de Empresariales: la clave del éxito de un negocio está en la rotación por el margen.
Si tu margen es estrecho, vende mucho; si vas a vender poco, por lo menos que el margen sea amplio, especialmente si tu venta es especializada y su desarrollo complejo.
Hacer este viaje para lograr una rentabilidad a nivel EBITDA -o beneficio antes de intereses, impuestos, amortizaciones y depreciaciones- similar a ese 6% del negocio constructor en España, como ha señalado la sociedad, parece arriesgado. Pena los mencionados US$ 1.000 millones hasta la siguiente oferta que la ambición o la locura han desperdiciado como potencial retorno adicional, si nos creemos que los números de Sacyr incluyen rendimiento alguno, interrogante extendido entre los expertos.
La capacidad de maniobra es limitada no sólo a nivel operativo, donde se han establecido una serie de bonificaciones y penalizaciones para el caso que la obra se concluya antes o después del plazo prefijado de 1.883 días, sino incluso a nivel financiero, con un componente divisa que no hay que desdeñar. De momento hay que retratarse con un 10% de down payment contra aval bancario. Empieza la fiesta.
La subida de bolsa de ayer prueba que Sacyr ha conseguido su objetivo.
Pero, ¿está justificada tan explosiva alza? Hagamos unos números: US$ 1.000 millones de obra al 6% de margen de EBITDA equivalen a € 60 millones de beneficio operativo ajustado, menos del 2% de la capitalización de la firma, cuantía a generar durante los próximos 5 años como poco.
Supone, además, sólo una tercera parte de los € 174 millones de EBITDA conseguidos en el primer trimestre de este ejercicio.
El incremento de la acción del 12% de ayer parece, a todas luces, excesivo al calor de estas cifras, especialmente cuando obras de mucha más envergadura y rentabilidad, como la adjudicación de las autopistas tejanas a Ferrovial , US$ 4.700 millones al 10%, han pasado desapercibidas.
¿Short squeeze o cierre de cortos? No, si nos atenemos a la comparativa diaria de las posiciones en préstamo que recoge el Boletín de la Bolsa de Madrid, que muestra cómo en la jornada se incrementó en alrededor de 40.000 el número de valores vendidos frente a la tendencia decreciente de los últimos meses. Buy the rumour, sell the fact.
¿Entonces? El juego de los resortes mediáticos, querido amigo. Hip, hip, hurra. Así, así, así gana Sacyr comenzaba El Mundo su crónica del acontecimiento poniendo tal soniquete en labios del propio Del Rivero.
No estaría mal que alguien le recordara al Presidente de la constructora cuáles son las circunstancias en que tal cántico resulta de aplicación. Cuando hay sospechas de... díganlo ustedes. No todo el monte es orégano ni en todas partes ven las mismas bondades en la operación.
Basta mirar lo que hizo ayer el otro socio principal del Consorcio, Impregilo, en la bolsa italiana : saludó la noticia con una caída superior al 2% en un mercado de jueves al alza. ¿Son los inversores de aquel país más listos que los españoles? No creo. Pero ustedes mismos. Sólo el tiempo da y quita razones...
De momento, siento aguar el minuto de gloria de la constructora, sigan vigilando el balance y la capacidad de repago de la deuda con el negocio ordinario, monitoricen los resultados de Vallehermoso, división más problemática, y no pierdan de vista la evolución de Repsol , cuyo movimiento un euro arriba o abajo supone € 0,6 en la suma de las partes de Sacyr. Lo demás no dejan de ser maniobras de distracción. Huyan de los cantos de sirena.

Carta Abierta al Presidente de la República de Panamá

2009-07-13T17:43:00.000-07:00

Esclusas de Gatun tomado de[www.flyawaycafe.com]

Carta Abierta al Presidente de la República de Panamá

12 de julio de 2009

Excelentísimo Señor Ricardo Martinelli Berrocal

Presidente de la República de Panamá

Primeramente deseo felicitarlo por su victoria rotunda al ser elegido al puesto máximo del país.

No hay quien envidie los retos que Usted enfrenta, pero reconocemos que todos debemos estar dispuestos a darle nuestro apoyo para poderlos superar.

Siendo el Proyecto de Ampliación del Canal de Panamá sin igual en términos del uso de los recursos del país, considero que – como ingeniero e investigador científico, especialista en el diseño y la construcción de estructuras masivas y con una trayectoria que incluye la creación de varios sistemas avanzados para alzar naves, y, como ciudadano comprometido con el futuro del país – es mi deber informarle que existen arreglos de esclusas que atienden de manera efectiva a los retos del proyecto que aún no han sido superados. Los riesgos y daños graves que resultarán al ser incorporado y operado el arreglo actual, el cual se fundamenta en el concepto presentado al anunciarse el proyecto, pueden ser evitados usando un arreglo más apropiado.

Como resultado de un estudio independiente de los retos de la ampliación y de los métodos más efectivos para superarlos – efectuado junto con un asesoramiento de los múltiples métodos para reducir la cantidad de agua desgastada por tránsito, del cual adicionalmente nacieron arreglos de esclusas aún más eficientes – se han identificado varios arreglos de esclusas que serían más apropiados para nuestro canal porque ofrecen beneficios mucho mayores.

Al combinar más efectivamente los mismos componentes ya aceptados por la ACP, y al aplicar las mismas operaciones en secuencias optimizadas, se logran importantes incrementos en capacidad sin un aumento proporcional en los costos de construcción y en los gastos de operación y mantenimiento.

Entre varias posibles, el arreglo de esclusas más recomendable para la ampliación es uno compuesto de 4 unidades parecidas a la unidad de esclusas de Pedro-Miguel, pero más grandes. Sin tina alguna, y al ser operado debidamente, este arreglo de dos carriles – el cual incluiría dos escalones en cada extremo del canal – usaría 13% menos agua por tránsito que el arreglo asignado y ofrecería la posibilidad de incrementar el número de tránsitos diarios por hasta dos tercios.

Importantemente, este arreglo evitaría el riesgo de que se cierre el paso a naves posPanamax, algo que puede ocurrir si sólo hay un carril. Además, haría innecesaria la construcción de un dique sumamente riesgoso a lo largo de la ribera oriental del Lago Miraflores, el cual si colapsa – al desplazarse alguna de las varias fallas geológicas sobre las cuales será construido – causará la pérdida del Lago Gatún y de los poblados y las industrias ubicadas a los costados de la entrada del Pacífico.

También, el pueblo y el medioambiente beneficiarían con este arreglo porque no permitiría el ingreso de la cantidad de sal al Lago Gatún que ingresará por el arreglo actual; y, su método práctico de mitigación permitiría eliminar la sal contaminante antes de llegar al lago. No hay un método práctico que haga esto con el arreglo actual.

Es más, con el arreglo recomendado existe la opción de agregarle dos tinas por escalón ahora o en el futuro para reducir su uso de agua aún más, a casi la mitad de lo que el arreglo actual desgastará. Esto representa un uso de tinas altamente superior comparado a cómo las usa el arreglo actual, que no tiene una opción similar para ahorrar agua.

En el internet, en www.crucestrail.com hay más información relevante a este tema.

El aporte de Panamá al mejoramiento del canal debe ser un avance real – que nuestras generaciones futuras puedan contemplar con orgullo – y no un paso hacia atrás, tomado al adicionarle esclusas de un diseño antiguo que fue superado por el diseño de las esclusas de nuestro propio canal.

No sería aceptable incorporarle al canal un arreglo de esclusas que introduce los riesgos notados y que – en perpetuidad – usará casi el doble del agua por tránsito comparado a lo que usaría un arreglo de primera línea, en vista de que – con esfuerzos y gastos comparables – se pueden evitar esos riesgos usando un arreglo más eficiente y de más capacidad.

Señor Presidente, en vista de los resultados de estos estudios, no permita que este proyecto de tan gran importancia al mundo proceda sin hacerse un asesoramiento abierto y transparente, por expertos incontrovertibles e imparciales, de las alternativas para sus esclusas – lo clave del sistema.

Como el diseño detallado de las esclusas apenas ha empezado, y aún no están en construcción, la selección todavía puede ser reemplazada.

Lo que me motiva es obtener para el país y el mundo la mejor ampliación por lo que nos costará y asegurar el uso más efectivo de los recursos hídricos del Canal de Panamá.

Me mantengo a su disposición,

Respetuosamente,

Ing. Bert G. Shelton L.

The Panama Canal Expansion: Making It Non-Detrimental to Society

2009-06-09T11:51:00.000-07:00

Bounty in Miraflores (coutesy of czbrats.com)

The Panama Canal Expansion:
Making It Non-Detrimental to Society
Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer – June 8, 2009

It is said that expanding the canal will benefit everyone. The Panama Canal’s cargo capacity is to be nearly doubled by the planned expansion, which is to add a single new lane for transiting Post-Panamax ships.
Increasing the canal’s capacity has been long desired and seen as good, so it is difficult to argue against its expansion. However, is the chosen single-lane system really the best option and in the best interest of shippers and of society, who will ultimately fund the project?
An independent review of water-saving and operational techniques has identified better lock systems that have been around for more than 100 years, as well as more recent ones that would be far more beneficial and cost-effective.
As an example, an alternative single-lane system arrangement that has locks like those currently planned – but with 4 chambers (instead of 6) and 2 tanks per chamber (instead of 3¬) – would use 45 (instead of 52) million gallons per transit. Not only would this system have fewer parts and use less water per transit, a dike over geologic faults would be unnecessary and Gatún Lake would be spared from becoming brackish.
However, with any single-lane system, an unexpected problem at any chamber can shut it down.
To avoid shutdowns, a two-lane alternative with 8 chambers – and no tanks – that also uses 45 million gallons per transit could replace the currently planned system. The Panama Canal’s Pedro-Miguel Lock unit is an example of that system’s type of locks. Water use could be further reduced to 30 million gallons per transit by using a recent improvement that adds 2 tanks to each unit of that system.
As with the single-lane alternative, both two-lane systems would avoid the problematic dike presently planned, and Gatún Lake would be protected from salt intrusion.
Either of these two-lane arrangements would make it possible to markedly increase canal cargo capacity, which means more growth in future business.
The planned single-lane lock system presents no similarly obvious advantages. It offers relatively fewer transits for the water used, despite having many more components.
Benefits from the alternatives found during the review, on the other hand, are clear.
The single-lane alternative initially studied – which could transit at least 9, possibly 10, ships a day – has 2/3rds the chambers, fewer than half the tanks, and uses 13% less water per transit than the planned system.
At first glance, the simpler single-lane locks would appear to be more cost-effective than those planned, when considering the transits obtained for the money spent on locks. However, even though more efficient, the lower total capacity of these simpler locks would likely not generate sufficient profit margin to pay for the expansion’s total investment.
Thus, in addition to targeting higher efficiency, the new locks also need to be able to handle more transits.
The two-step two-lane system noted above – which also uses about 13% less water per transit – could easily transit more than the 12 ships a day now planned. Assessment of it confirmed that it would be more cost-effective to build than the planned three-step single-lane system with 6 chamber and 18 tanks.
Because of its two lanes, its chambers can perform the dual function of transiting ships and saving water. Increasing the number of chambers from 6 to 8 implies that this lock system will cost at least 1/3rd more than the planned system. However, that implied increase in cost is significantly reduced by the elimination of 18 tanks.
Additional money is saved by not having to build a very risky dam across geologic faults, as is now required. That not only reduces the cost differential, it also removes risk.
Because each transit uses less water, 14 ships can transit it instead of 12 a day with the same water. That increase in capacity pays for any remaining cost differential.
Furthermore, even more transit capacity can be extracted from it. When heavy rains are more frequent, transits can be increased to about 18 a day. That increase could be made permanent later by adding water storage to the canal.
Alternatively, transits could be increased by at least 50% simply by adding 2 tanks to each of the system’s two-lane lock units. With those tanks added, and when used most effectively, this two-lane system would reduce water-use to 57% of what the planned system will use per transit.
In contrast, there is no way to modify the planned system to reduce its water-use in the future, short of demolishing them and building anew.
Although a two-lane lock system could be designed and built so that tanks could be added in the future, if they were added at the outset they would immediately pay for themselves.
Adding tanks would virtually eliminate the plan to seasonally fluctuate the level of Gatún Lake over a greater range than it is fluctuated today, a change that is needed to increase the supply of water for operating the planned locks.
Eliminating that need would significantly reduce costly dredging.
The 40ft draft depth of the canal’s 35 miles of channel between the Atlantic and Pacific locks must be increased to accommodate 50ft draft ships. However, by not having to drop the lake to the low level the planned system requires, those 35 miles would not have to be deepened an additional 4ft.
Money spent on dredging those 4 extra feet to attain 12 transits a day would be better spent on tanks to attain 18 transits per day – which should also lower the tolls.
Unless eliminated, the plan to increase lake fluctuations will also seasonally force ships that transit the original locks to reduce the cargo they carry by a much larger amount than is the case today, because the bottoms of the original lock chambers cannot be lowered as the lake level drops.
The research shows that the two-lane system would permit canal service and reliability to be significantly improved at a cost about equal to what is currently planned.
By spending the money more effectively, a lower risk and less problematic expansion can be accomplished, offering lower tolls, many more transits, and effectively eliminating the risk of a protracted wait for Post-Panamax ships due to an unexpected lane closure.
None of the alternative systems call for a risky new dike across known faults as the planned new lane requires for traffic to bypass Miraflores Lake. The integrity of that planned dike cannot be guaranteed. Its failure would empty Gatún Lake. That puts the Panama Canal and Panama City at risk. It is a risk that can be totally avoided.
Society, shippers, and operators of Pacific port facilities would be foolish to accept risking an unnecessary dam failure.
Finally, there are additional impacts not accounted for in the present plan that do not arise with the alternative systems.
The planned locks are to operate transiting ships in groups, one direction at a time. Brackish water will be injected into Gatún Lake when ocean-bound ships exit by way of these. This happens today, but only at Gatún Locks. (At the Pacific end of the canal, Miraflores Lake interrupts that salt-injection process.) The excess water in today's canal system falls just short of flushing all the salt reaching Gatún Lake. Consequently, its salt content has been rising very slowly over the last 100 years.
Relative to today’s Gatún Locks, about triple the volume of brackish water will be injected into Gatún Lake when ships exit each end of the canal through the planned locks. Because the planned locks will use less fresh water per transit – 40% of what a regular lock operation uses – the mix of water in them will contain much more salt than what is injected today via Gatún Locks.
As more lake water is used to move ships and less is spilled along with the salt it carries, Gatún Lake’s salt concentration will – without question – rise at a much faster rate than it is rising today.
Obviously, adding salt to the lake does not negatively affect transits. But the Gatún Lake freshwater resource, which belongs to the nation, will be ruined when its salt concentration rises. That loss – avoidable if higher-yield locks are used – has not been taken into account in the costing of the planned single-lane design.
Neither have losses from the predicted eradication of, or irreparable damage to, sea life along both coasts. Too much salt in the lake will permit coastal creatures to migrate across the Isthmus of Panama, which could lead to disastrous consequences, such as stronger species wiping out weaker ones.
If the cost of these damages to nature were to be properly assessed for the expansion as it is now planned, its price tag would rise far above the most costly of any of the alternative lock options noted here, all of which use existing, tried-and-tested equipment and operations, and which more effectively control salt intrusion.
Yet, the current plan continues. The perception is forming among many that the intent may be to deliberately damage Gatún Lake.
Whether that is the case or not, a brackish Gatún Lake will create a huge market for those who have recently acquired rights to the water of many of Panama’s rivers. Those special interests will profit handsomely from selling their water to the population.
Also – with Panama’s greatest freshwater reserve ruined – other special interests that have long wanted to install industries within the canal will be able to do so, without being blamed for polluting that invaluable global resource.
It is clear that building the planned lock system brings no added benefits to society. The damage it will cause in order to benefit third parties is irreparable and unconscionable. Once poorly performing locks are built they cannot be modified later to improve their performance and reduce their negative effects.
Several more effective lock alternatives to those misleadingly promoted as the best and only for the project exist.
An unbiased revision of the plan – before lock construction begins – is imperative to guarantee a truly sustainable development project that optimizes canal services and maximizes capacity and profits, while preserving a critical freshwater reserve for this and future generations.

Alternative System for the Expansion of the Panama Canal

2009-06-09T09:08:00.000-07:00

Alternative System for the Expansion of the Panama Canal

2009-06-09T06:35:00.000-07:00

The following link under title will download a Powerpoint Presentation by Bert G. Shelton Research Scientist & Engineer
Enlace: http://sites.google.com/site/crucestrail/Home/W20%5B2%5D.VersionforACP.ppt?attredirects=0

Polluting Our Life-Essential Resources in Panama

2009-06-08T11:09:00.000-07:00

Gamboa
Lighthouse
(courtesy of
czbrats.com)

Notes from
the Front Lines:

Polluting Our Life-Essential Resources in Panama

Leila Shelton-Louhi, 06 June 2009

Panama has been the focus of a far-reaching, global campaign to solidify it as a great place for investing, a great place for living and a great place to retire. The campaign has been so successful that it is difficult to navigate around the country without running in to newcomers at practically any and every stop.

Usually debating what and where in the country to buy, it is always clear that it has never crossed their minds that the infrastructure propping up what they are placing their hard-earned cash into is anything other than what they’ve been sold.

It has, therefore, come as an immense shock to many that their paradise is plagued with many problems, particularly those caused by certain of its custodians who have irrationally ignored every possible control and planning mechanism to the detriment of all of Panama’s inhabitants.

For newcomers, besides problems with finalizing deals or even the details of an apartment, there is life-threatening pollution from all manner of uncontrolled contaminants presenting them an immediate, hidden and exponentially growing danger.

Odd health ailments have arisen in areas receiving concentrated doses of fumes, often odorless, blown through their neighborhoods from nearby factories that do not use any form of filtering during their production cycles. To acid rain and intensifying smog, dioxins and other plastic-manufacturing chemicals are increasingly added daily.

In general, the plastic portion of already unmanageable garbage presents the most worrying aspect. Whether in the cities and towns or in the countryside, or while driving along practically roadway, most people are breathing unhealthy levels of plastic fumes drifting from the ubiquitous – albeit illegal – garbage disposal fires that appear where least expected.

Less visible are the hidden toxic waste disposal areas which have sprung up, given loopholes in the present laws, and which burn electronic waste – after scavenging through it – subsequently allowing rains to wash the residues, filtering heavy metals into nearby streams and into the water supply, as an example. With water quality controls not updated to include testing for much more than bacteria, these pollutants remain undetected.

Besides air and water quality, the most urgent concern centers around water availability. Many neighborhoods in Panama City and around the country suffer from sporadically available supplies at best. Some have been receiving water via cistern trucks for years.

In the meantime, illegal mining operations aided and abetted by some government officials are springing up across the country. Similarly, under the guise of hydroelectric projects, most freshwater sources have been concessioned off to third parties with irresponsibly lopsided contracts in their favor.

It doesn’t take a giant step to see the water problems newcomers will face in paradise along with everyone else once supplies dry up or are destroyed by uncontrolled chemical use in the mining operations or other toxic dumping.

Last week an entire system of rivers and streams, in which fish were dead, were found to be laced with cyanide. Coincidentally, a mining operation under ongoing heavy criticism by citizens is in the area. Many more companies are initiating illegal operations despite heavy protesting going on at this writing. (More info at www.chiriquinatural.com)

In light of these activities, growing fears are now centering around the unnecessary risks the Panama Canal expansion presents to the country’s largest freshwater reserve, Gatún Lake. If its destruction is allowed, the only alternative for fresh water will be buying it from the concessionaires. That is, if it has not been polluted, too.

Given that the Panama Canal could be expanded without ruining Gatún Lake begs the question why a plan without that risk – and which increases transit capacity and reliability even more – has not been made. (More info at www.crucestrail.com)

Whether there is a deliberate plan to destroy life-sustaining resources in order to create markets for private sale or whether it is due to continued gross incompetence by its custodians, neither the Panama Canal expansion, nor the mining projects and other poisoning activities can be allowed to continue unchecked.

Those worrying about their investments in paradise need to join forces and take active steps to protect not only their investment, but their health as well.

The Panama Canal Expansion: A Plan Detrimental to Society

2009-05-17T14:18:00.000-07:00

The Panama Canal Expansion: A Plan Detrimental to Society

Bert G. Shelton, Research Scientist and Professional Engineer – May 15, 2009